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America is a country of strong families and strong values. My life’s been blessed by both. 
I was raised by a single mom and my grandparents. We didn’t have much money, but they 
taught me values straight from the Kansas heartland where they grew up. Accountability 
and self-reliance. Love of country. Working hard without making excuses. Treating your 
neighbor as you’d like to be treated….I approved this message because I’ll never forget 
those values, and if I have the honor of taking the oath of office as president, it will be 






Once again, everybody seems to be talking about values this election cycle. Candidates 
have been working hard to convince voters that they “share their values.” Citizens have 
been repeatedly polled regarding whether they think candidates indeed share their values. 
Pundits have attributed electoral wins and losses to the results of such polls. And news 
channels have kept the salience of values high by broadcasting events such as this year’s 
Democratic forum on religion and values, “the Compassion Forum.” 
 All the attention paid by politicians and pundits to values is not ill considered. 
Values play a tremendously important role in shaping Americans’ political decisions. 
Their power has been documented at the individual level with respect to social welfare 
and civil rights and liberties (Feldman 1988; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Hochschild 
1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; Stoker 2001), race-related public policy 
(Feldman 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; 
                                                 
1 From Barack Obama’s “Country I Love” television ad, released in June 2008. 
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Sniderman and Carmines 1997; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), and evaluations of political 
leaders and electoral choice (Abramowitz 1997; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, 
and Barbaranelli 2006; Feldman 1988; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; Mulligan 
2008). Numerous scholars, many working from a historical perspective, have examined 
Americans’ values at the national level as well, remarking on their role in shaping the 
nation’s political institutions (Hartz 1955; Huntington 1981; Lipset 1963; Myrdal [1944] 
1964; Smith 1997; Tocqueville 2004). 
 Despite all this attention to values, however, political scientists know surprisingly 
little about what shapes citizens’ values or why citizens lean on their values so heavily 
when making political decisions. The import of values to political behavior is particularly 
puzzling given that values often appear to contradict individual citizens’ self-interest. I 
argue here that, to better understand the mystery surrounding values, we need to better 
understand the process of value development at the individual level. And, to do that, I 
turn to work in political science, psychology, and sociology. 
C. Wright Mills once argued that ordinary men and women lacked a sociological 
imagination, to their detriment (1959). My aim is to contribute needed knowledge to the 
discipline of political science with respect to values by exercising my own sociological 
imagination vigorously. The result is a theory of group influence over values, Social-
Emotional Influence Theory, that posits that social identity and emotion together imbue 
citizens with a sense of commitment to the values that dominate within their respective 
social groups. Thus, SEI Theory helps us to understand both why citizens rely on values 
when making political choices as well as how citizens come to embrace the specific 
values that matter to them. 
 3 
Definitions 
We begin with what we already know about values.2 What exactly are values, those 
constructs that appear to be so consequential to politics? Values are normative entities. 
They describe the world as it should, or ought to, be. They embody what we believe to be 
good and right, what we believe to be moral. Because they describe our vision of an ideal 
world, values are sometimes referred to as “ideals.”3 Values are often distinguished from 
facts. Values differ from facts in that they are ideal states toward which we should strive, 
whereas facts are observable truths about the world. 
Values are abstract, or general; therefore, we can distinguish values from 
narrower normative judgments. For example, the belief that all citizens have an equal 
right to health and happiness is a value. On the other hand, the belief that the nation ought 
to adopt a single-payer health care system that covers all citizens is better thought of as 
an attitude; it is too specific to be considered a value. Because values are general, any one 
value will be associated with many specific attitudes or judgments. 
Values are multifaceted. They clearly have a cognitive component (i.e., the belief 
itself); they can be thought of as idealized standards used to evaluate the goodness of 
people, objects, and situations (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). Values also have an 
emotional component (Rokeach 1973). Because people feel emotionally committed to 
their values, having to choose between two values is upsetting (Tetlock, Peterson, and 
Lerner 1996) and value violations by others often make us angry (Elster 2007, 153, 356; 
Herzog 1998, 221). Finally, values also have a behavioral component. Values are 
                                                 
2 In offering the definitional aspects of values in this paragraph and the one that follows, I draw on Feldman 
(2003b), Kinder and Sanders (1996), Rokeach (1973), and Stoker (2001). 
3 Of course, following this logic, one could also define values as reflecting “what we value.” While there is 
truth in this, I am somewhat hesitant to emphasize such a definition because the word “value” has become 
so closely associated with monetary worth. 
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idealized goals toward which we strive in our daily lives (Rokeach 1973; Schwartz 1992). 
Once they are formed, values are relatively stable; however, values can and do change 
throughout our lives. 
Technically, values are always good. I use the term “disvalues” (Rescher [1969] 
1982) to refer to rejected values, to our visions of what is immoral, bad, wrong. Disvalues 
may then be thought of as abstract standards used to judge the terribleness of people, 
objects, or situations, or as potential outcomes to avoid. Whether a standard is a value or 
a disvalue is subjective; one person or group’s value may be another’s disvalue.4 
Some automatically assume that because values are moral, they are religious. This 
interpretation of values may be particularly common today given the salience of the 
“culture war” debate. But the term “value” is broad, encompassing both religious and 
nonreligious values. For example, while many researchers have sought to assess whether 
differences in income or moral values matter more to Americans’ voting decisions (e.g., 
Bartels 2006; Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Fiorina 2006), values actually have something 
to say about both economic and social issues. Citizens’ stances on traditional family 
values inform where they stand on abortion or gay rights, just as relative commitments to 
the value economic equality inform views on tax policy or government aid to the poor. 
Values are closely linked to the concept of social norms. I will occasionally refer 
to “norms and values” where the discussion warrants. Perhaps the best way to distinguish 
                                                 
4 Not all values researchers agree with this idea. In particular, Rokeach (1973) proposed that all values were 
held by all people. For this reason, he argued that values are best thought of as value priorities and best 
measured via a ranking system. Political scientists seem to have implicitly rejected this idea given that they 
typically measure values with Likert-type scales that measure the degree to which a person accepts or 
rejects the value in question. While many values are widely shared (making value ranking a legitimate type 
of value measurement), the fallaciousness of the statement that all values are embraced by all people 
becomes clear with just a few examples: Most Americans no longer accept racial segregation, once an 
important value among a large subset of Americans; most Americans reject the legitimacy of governing 
aristocracies, a type of government accepted in many part of the world; a majority of Americans reject 
polygamy, a custom practiced by a minority of Americans as well as by citizens elsewhere. 
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these two terms is to remember that values are normative beliefs, beliefs about what 
should or ought to be; in contrast, norms are widespread behaviors that are supported by 
beliefs about what should or ought to be. In this sense, values can be said to be causally 
prior to norms: In the U.S., most of us avoid explicit racial prejudice because we value 
social equality; the French follow the norm of wealth redistribution because they believe 
in economic equality. Norms also tend to be more specific than values. For example, the 
value “economic individualism” might translate into two norms: hard work and financial 
independence. This said, some norms cannot be easily paired with a more abstract value 
belief, such as wearing black at a funeral (in the West) or the appropriate use of eating 
utensils. Such norms are certainly supported by beliefs about right and wrong, but not by 
beliefs that we would necessarily refer to as values.5 
A final difference between social norms and values bears discussion. Social 
norms are necessarily widely shared within a social group or society. Although values are 
typically shared in this way, the definition does not require widespread adherence; an 
individual may hold values that are considered to be disvalues by his or her peers. The 
term “shared values” is used to refer specifically to values that are widely held. While I 
emphasize in this dissertation the social forces that contribute to values, this definitional 
difference between social norms and values reflects the fact that any given individual’s 
values may derive from both social and individual origins. 
 
 
                                                 
5 It is important to point out that the use of the word “norm” does not always imply a morally sanctioned 
behavior. For example, some might call driving on the left side of the road a “norm” in England. I prefer 
the word “convention” to refer to typical behavior without normative implications. Note, however, that it is 
difficult to think of many conventions that are not in some way endorsed as the “correct” way to behave. 
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Politically Relevant Values 
As a political scientist, I am most interested in studying that set of values that is 
politically relevant. That is, I am interested in those values that are used by citizens to 
evaluate political candidates, political institutions, and public policies. In some cases, 
these values may be a part of the heralded American Creed, e.g., democracy, equality, 
and individualism. And in other cases—for example, in the case of religiously 
conservative values—they may rest outside that Creed. 
 Politically relevant values have become increasingly useful in descriptions of 
U.S. public opinion in the wake of Converse’s findings that most Americans do not rely 
on sophisticated liberal-conservative political ideologies when making political decisions 
(1964; Feldman 1988). At the same time, Americans’ use of values implies that they are 
not as unsophisticated as Converse believes them to be; discrete, abstract ideals organize 
citizens’ more numerous and specific political attitudes, serving as important sources of 
what Converse refers to as “constraint.” For the small percentage of citizens who use 
more sophisticated ideologies, values not only constrain attitudes but also serve as the 
backstops of more complicated belief systems (Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996). 
Students of political behavior have successfully described a panoply of politically 
relevant values held by citizens (e.g., Bowers 1995; Feldman 1988; Feldman and 
Steenbergen 2001; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Markus 2001; McClosky 
and Zaller 1984; Prothro and Grigg 1960) and, as discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter, examined the consistently strong impact of values on political decision-making. 
In addition, political researchers have focused more recently on the nature of value 
competition—when a person is faced with a political decision to which more than one 
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value is relevant—and its consequences (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Brewer 2001; Grant 
and Rudolph 2003; Jacoby 2006; Kuklinski, Riggle, Ottati, Schwarz, and Wyer, Jr. 1991; 
Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001). 
 Yet, few researchers have explored why citizens come to embrace the values they 
do in the first place. Kinder and Sanders (1996) are among the few that wonder aloud 
where political values come from. They write, “We know remarkably little about this. In 
the empirical study of political principles, the question of origins seldom comes up, and 
when it does, it is not taken very seriously” (277).6 Feldman criticizes scholars’ omission 
more forcefully in his canvass of the empirical values literature: 
 
To be fully successful, this enterprise requires a clear 
conceptualization of societal values and the ways they are 
shaped and maintained. Unfortunately, this is currently a 
major gap in the literature. Societal values are either taken 
as a given in order to examine their consequences or are 
measured by mean levels of value priorities in (typically) 
small samples. And while researchers have used a variety 
of means to explore crosscultural differences in values, 
they have not really systematically explored how those 
differences emerge (2003b, 498-499). 
 
In other words, in nearly every study to date that focuses on values at the individual level, 
values are either simply described or, if part of a causal analysis, are the independent, not 
the dependent, variable. As a result, political scientists have a very limited understanding 
of how politically relevant values are shaped and maintained. 
 Why this oversight? Certainly one reason may be the assumption, stemming from 
studies of “core” or “traditional” American values, such as liberty and democracy, that all 
                                                 
6 Kinder and Sanders (1996) do go on to conduct a limited analysis of the origins of political ideals, finding 
that conventional variables (such as education and income) matter not at all, but that political engagement, 
changing economic welfare, and sympathies for various interest groups in American society do matter. 
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Americans hold roughly the same values. If this were true, then studies of value 
competition, such as those focusing on value framing (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
1997), would be of the greatest interest. The determinants of (supposed) value consensus 
hold less appeal than the causes of variation in actual value use. However, as just about 
any study of values at the individual level will reveal (see especially Hochschild 1981; 
Jacoby 2006; Prothro and Grigg 1960), and as we will see in Chapter 3, it is certainly not 
the case that Americans all share the same values. 
A second problem stems from moving values from one side of the regression 
equation to the other. To the extent that politically relevant values are rooted in 
nonpolitical processes, any study of the determinants of values will be equivalently 
“nonpolitical.” But this should not stop us. A great deal of political behavior is rooted in 
social, not political, processes (Walsh 2004; Zuckerman 2005). To ignore the social roots 
of political decision-making is to fail to fully understand political decision-making. 
 A third problem with respect to investigations into the development of values is 
that the value-formation process is not one we can learn much about via introspection. 
Introspection is important to research in political behavior in two respects: It may be used 
by the investigator to help form appropriate research hypotheses, and, of course, in many 
studies, hypothesis testing depends on the ability of subjects themselves to introspect. 
Introspection is often not available with respect to value formation because much 
significant value development occurs when we are children (see Sears and Levy 2003)—
a long time ago for both adult subjects of studies and their investigators—and outside of 
conscious awareness (Bargh and Chartrand 1999; Sumner, [1907] 2002, 76-77). 
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 That these barriers have prevented a better understanding of value formation at 
the individual level is unfortunate. As I touched on earlier, not only are values key 
elements of political decision-making, but their existence and import represents a vexing 
epistemological problem: Values appear not to fit into anything resembling the rational 
choice framework that has dominated political science in recent decades. If values appear 
not to fit into our discipline’s dominant paradigm, then either we are wrong about values 
or we are wrong about the paradigm. 
In recent years, many political scientists have assumed that we were wrong about 
values, ignoring them in models of political decision-making because they were assumed 
to play a limited role in politics or even to be complete fictions, Machiavellian cloaks for 
self-interest (see Stoker 1992 for a discussion of this phenomenon). Some who have paid 
close attention to values (and/or to the related construct, norms) have proclaimed that 
they are real and important, but that they are ultimately rooted in self-interest (e.g., 
Chong 2000; Hardin 1995). On the other hand, if my description of values thus far is 
roughly correct, and they indeed rest outside the rational choice paradigm, then we have 
two questions to answer: Not only “why, and how, do citizens come to embrace the 
values they do?” but also, “why, and how, do citizens come to embrace values at all?” 
 
Previous Studies of Value Development 
A handful of scholars of politics have given a great deal of attention to the issue of value 
development at the individual level. Perhaps the most extensive recent study of this kind 
in political science is Chong’s Rational Lives (2000). Chong treats norms and values akin 
to rational choices. He argues that citizens accept the norms and values of their social 
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groups because they expect rewards to flow from their conformity. I echo Elster’s 
argument that, while interests can certainly inform norms and values, norms and values 
are not reducible to individual interests (1989b). Economic liberals can be found in the 
Bronx as well as in Beverly Hills. Often self-interest is nowhere evident, as in the case of 
pro-life activists or those living a vegan lifestyle. 
In response to such points, Chong leans heavily on the benefits of a good 
reputation and group coordination around norms and values; however, people often act in 
accord with their values in the absence of interaction with, or surveillance by, the group 
(e.g., at home alone; while traveling abroad). In addition, rational choice explanations for 
norms and values that emphasize the benefits of a good reputation rely on a problematic 
assumption: that self-interested group members will invest energy in enforcing 
conformity to norms and values, overcoming the temptation to free-ride (Elster 1989a). A 
better explanation for norm and value enforcement, one that does not accord well with a 
rational choice perspective, stems from the emotional aspect of values. People are 
motivated to sanction value violators because violations, even those that do not affect 
them personally, make them angry (Elster 2007). Chong also argues that shared norms 
and values arise because individuals use peers as role models, imitating behavior that 
they assume to be helpful. That this behavior occurs is likely, but it does not really help 
us to understand values. As Tetlock and colleagues argue, people understand values not 
just as helpful, but as right, and not just as right for themselves or their group, but as right 
for everyone (Tetlock 2000; Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner 1996). 
 More recently, some researchers have taken a new tack on value development, 
arguing that political ideologies are embedded in the human genome. In so doing, these 
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researchers have moved beyond individual-level, self-interest explanations for values to 
self-interest explanations at the genetic level (see Dawkins 1976). In the most prominent 
of these studies to date, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) argue that genes influence 
people’s personality traits, traits which underlie commitment to political conservatism or 
liberalism. Employing quantitative behavioral genetic techniques—more specifically, a 
classic “twin study” design—the authors find that approximately 50% of the variance in 
conservatism in their sample is due to genetic variation. 
The most important problem with this approach at the present time is 
methodological. Because of a problematic assumption underlying the method, the vast 
majority of twin studies cannot be counted on to accurately assess the extent to which 
genetic variability contributes to trait variability (Suhay, Kalmoe, and McDermott 2007). 
Furthermore, empirical examples offer suggestive evidence that Alford, Funk, and 
Hibbing overstate the contribution of genetics to value differences. First, it is common for 
values to diverge in the face of likely genetic similarity. In the U.S., compare the 
economic views of working class, white union members to working class, white non-
union members. Or compare the conservative social values of the Dutch in western 
Michigan to the liberal ones of the Dutch living in the Netherlands. Over-time 
comparisons can yield even more striking comparisons. Compare the level of racism in 
Germany during World War II to that found in Germany today. Or compare the 
environmental views of Americans today to those of just ten or twenty years ago. Second, 
it is common for values to converge in the face of genetic diversity. Adoption studies 
which examine trans-racial and trans-national adoptions offer perhaps the best evidence 
of this. The consistency with which such children fully adopt the norms and values of 
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their new culture strongly argues against any significant genetic determinism of cultural 
values (Richerson and Boyd 2005). 
This said, humans are, of course, biological beings; therefore, genes must play 
some role—direct or indirect—in shaping values. Given the overwhelming genetic 
similarity of humans, it stands to reason that genes play a greater role in creating value 
similarities than differences. Where value differences exist, it is my belief that 
environmental causes (physical and social) overwhelm genetic ones. However, studies 
like Alford, Funk, and Hibbing’s cannot test these presumptions. In addition to the 
methodological problems involved, such studies pay attention only to causes of trait 
difference, not similarity. They also cannot comment on the mechanisms by which genes 
affect traits like values. For the moment at least, I leave such arguments to the side. 
 
Values: More Social, More Emotional 
As I will argue in more detail in the next chapter, more promising studies of value 
formation focus on socialization by group members. Why focus immediately on group 
socialization? One reason for beginning with the social group is that politically relevant 
values and group membership co-vary. A second reason is the plethora of evidence that 
suggests that groups do in fact influence their members’ political views. 
The main problem with socialization studies, however, is that they have paid 
relatively little attention to the psychological mechanisms of value transfer from the 
group to the individual, leaving it unclear why individuals are motivated to take on the 
values of their groups, especially when those values conflict with self-interest. 
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In order to explain value socialization, I focus on two psychological attributes of 
the individual: subjective identification and emotion. I argue, first, that successful 
socialization depends on the individual’s psychological identification with the group and, 
second, that identification matters in large part because we care about what our peers 
think of us. To clarify this latter point: I argue that social group members are able to 
influence one another’s values in large part because of the power of emotions of self-
assessment (pride, embarrassment, and shame). People feel pride when they are approved 
of by their peers, and embarrassment or shame when they are derogated by peers. 
Together, these emotions motivate value conformity.7 I refer to the summation of these 
hypotheses as Social-Emotional Influence Theory. Thinking about American politics, 
social-emotional influence ought to occur within our national “group” as well as within 
diverse sub-national identity groups (family, neighborhood, class, race, religion, etc.). 
In the first empirical chapter of the dissertation, Chapter Three, I seek to answer 
two questions with data from a recent Pew Research Center survey on Americans’ values. 
First, a necessary empirical assumption underlying the Social-Emotional Influence model 
is that values and social groups overlap. Can we verify that politically relevant values 
vary according to social identity group in the U.S.? I assess whether between-group 
variation in value commitment is greater than within-group variation. The data show that 
                                                 
7 Note that I use pride and shame in a subtly different way than previous scholars of politics. The limited 
extant scholarship that focuses on these emotions in conjunction with identity has considered these 
emotions to be feelings we have toward our peer group, or, as in social identity theory, feelings we have 
about our own individual identity that stem from the status of our social group (Tajfel and Turner [1986] 
2004). For example, we might consider “black pride” or “gay pride,” or the shame that members of both of 
these groups have had to fight over the years because of group-based prejudice. But the older usage (pride 
and shame stemming from the status of one’s group) and my, newer, usage (pride and shame stemming 
from one’s own status within one’s group) are not incompatible. In both cases, pride and shame are intra-
group emotions related to individual status. In the prior formulation, one is focused on whether peers in a 
larger community (e.g., the United States) judge one positively or negatively based on the status of a 
narrower group identity (e.g., race, gender, sexual orientation). In the formulation discussed in this 
dissertation, one is focused on whether one’s peers in a particular community (e.g., the United States or 
one’s racial group) judge one positively or negatively based on whether one shares the group’s values. 
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Americans differ according to age cohort, class, gender, race / ethnicity, and religion with 
respect to a wide variety of politically relevant values. Next, I ask, can we attribute these 
differences to social conformity within groups? Controlling for overlapping social 
identities as well as income and education, I find that more than half of the group value 
differences persist. These persistent differences suggest that social processes within 
identity groups play a role in creating value differences among citizens. 
Chapter Four is the first of three chapters to test key hypotheses that flow from 
Social-Emotional Influence Theory with experimental data. Data are drawn from an 
experimental test of influence over socially conservative values among Catholics living 
in the Midwest. The main goal of the study is to demonstrate that group influence over 
values depends on identification with the group. A secondary goal is to begin to explore 
the emotional mechanisms of SEI Theory. The data suggest that those with strong 
Catholic identities are influenced by their peers when they perceive that peers hold 
progressive views on traditional family values and also that such individuals actively 
seek to distinguish their values from those of out-group members. The data also suggest 
that these relationships are mediated by self-conscious emotions. Finally, in a test of the 
political import of traditional family values, participants’ relative stands on these values 
were found to be closely associated with political opinions linked to electoral behavior. 
 Chapter Five, which examines social-emotional influence among college students 
with regard to the value economic individualism, focuses on the emotional mechanisms 
of SEI Theory. The main goal of the experiment is to test whether self-conscious 
emotions mediate group influence over economic individualism. A second goal is to 
confirm the import of subjective identification in such influence. Overall, the evidence 
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supports the dissertation’s central emotion hypothesis. Participants were influenced by 
their peers’ views on average only if a self-conscious emotion (pride or embarrassment) 
was aroused. Furthermore, this interactive relationship between emotions and group 
influence occurred only among students who closely identified with peers. This said, such 
students also resisted influence when no emotions were made salient, a finding that 
complicates our understanding of the role of identity somewhat. 
In Chapter Six, I test the Social-Emotional Influence model with data from an 
Internet survey-experiment conducted with a representative sample of 300 Americans. 
Social-emotional influence is examined with respect to the value economic equality. 
Building on the results presented in Chapter Five, the study tests the emotional 
mechanisms of the model more carefully and explores whether social-emotional 
influence works differently among different age groups. The data offer mixed support for 
the SEI model. Younger adults’ opinions (35 and under) unexpectedly shifted away from 
peers’ views, as represented in letters to the editor, except for when a sense of shame was 
aroused. On the other hand, older Americans were persuaded by the letters, as expected, 
but persuasion did not increase as hypothesized when pride or shame was aroused. 
Finally, commitment to economic equality was found to be highly politically relevant; 
participants’ views on this value were closely associated with their approval of President 
Bush and vote intentions with respect to the 2008 presidential election. 
 In addition to summarizing the dissertation’s argument and findings, the 
concluding chapter discusses avenues of inquiry beyond the present one that would 
enrich our understanding of the Social-Emotional Influence model and related topics and 










Group Influence and American Ideals: How Social Identity 
and Emotion Shape Our Political Values and Attitudes 
 
 
It never troubles [man] that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds 
is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a churchman in 




For some time, political scientists have faced a fundamental puzzle: Why do values 
matter to citizens when they so often conflict with self-interest? To understand why 
values matter to citizens, I argue that we have to better understand the process of value 
formation and change at the individual level. And, to do that, we need to pay more 
attention to social identity9 and emotion. 
In this chapter, I put forward a unique social-psychological theory that aims to 
explain how values form at the individual level and, ultimately, why they matter to 
citizens. First, I place value formation firmly within the social group; individuals who 
subjectively identify with a social group will tend to take on the values of that group. In 
other words, group socialization depends for its success on individuals’ psychological 
identification with the group. Second, I argue that, within the context of American 
                                                 
8 From J.S. Mill’s On Liberty ([1859] 1980). Page 78. 
9 “Social identity” refers to the social group or groups to which the individual feels a sense of belonging 
and which the individual has incorporated into his or her personal identity. Throughout the dissertation, the 
terms “reference group,” “identity group,” and “in-group”—as well as the more colloquial word “peers”—
are used interchangeably. Fiske (2004) defines a group at its most basic as two or more interacting 
individuals who are perceived, by the individuals themselves, as well as by others, as belonging together. 
Such a group has “entitativity;” it is seen as a coherent whole. Entitativity rests on three factors: similarity 
between individuals, a sense of common fate or interdependence, and, sometimes, proximity (460-461). 
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politics, citizens’ identifications with the nation as well as with a wide range of sub-
national groups (e.g., family, school peers, women, black Americans, Evangelicals) affect 
their values. Third, I argue that the role group identification plays in value formation 
stems, in part, from a specific set of emotions called “self-conscious emotions.” In short, 
the emotions pride and shame, which result from positive and negative judgments of 
peers, push group members in the direction of value conformity. Further, these emotions 
become associated with group values (and disvalues) in the individual’s mind, explaining 
why some values become internalized as good and why others are rejected. 
 
Values and Groups Intertwined 
Researchers have known for some time now that values and social groups overlap. In his 
survey of the empirical values literature, Feldman writes that there appear to be “mean 
differences in value priorities across people living in different societies” (2003b, 480). 
Inglehart, taking value differences among nations and regions as his starting point, builds 
a systematic theory to explain the covariation (1971; Inglehart and Baker 2000). Inter-
group value variation exists not only at the national level. Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes (1960, ch. 12) attribute patterns of voting behavior among social groups in the 
U.S. in part to unique group norms. And Putnam attributes political differences between 
the north and south of Italy to differing regional civic cultures (1994). In fact, the 
covariance of social groups and values is so strong and consistent that the term “culture,” 
part and parcel of group life, includes values as a key component (Kluckhohn 1951). 
 Why does this correlation exist between values and social groups? One 
explanation for the fact that values tend to cluster together is that people who share 
 18 
similar circumstances will be attracted to similar values. In his seminal paper, “The Silent 
Revolution in Europe” (1971), Inglehart borrows from Maslow to argue that only after 
physiological and safety needs are met will individuals value behaviors less essential to 
survival, such as self-expression and political participation. Thus, varying levels of 
economic development across societies will result in value differences as well. In later 
work, Inglehart focuses on the impact of other factors on values, such as the nature of 
service-oriented work in post-industrial economies (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
However, Inglehart’s modernization theory only describes part of the value 
development story. Among societies in similar socio-economic circumstances, World 
Values Survey data reveal both convergence (as modernization theory predicts) and 
divergence (contrary to modernization theory). Inglehart and Baker attribute significant 
divergence, when it occurs, to the path-dependent nature of value traditions; in other 
words, to the persistence of unique national and regional cultures (2000). 
An alternative account to modernization theory—an account which helps to 
explain value divergence among countries in similar socio-economic circumstances—
attributes the value-group link to socialization within groups. Scholars in this tradition 
suggest that political values and attitudes10 are significantly shaped by the family in 
childhood and adolescence (Bandura 1977; Bengtson, Biblarz, and Roberts 2002; 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, Stoker, and 
Bowers 2007; Sears 1993). For example, Berelson et al. (1954, 93) write: 
 
Just as young people learn from their elders, say, the 
religion and table manners appropriate to their situation, so 
                                                 
10 I expand our inquiry to include studies of political attitudes, given that attitudes and values tend to be 
closely linked. 
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do they learn the appropriate political beliefs….As he 
comes to voting age, the young voter’s political 
consciousness is no tabula rasa on which various interests 
can contend; it is pre-shaped in particular political 
directions, as it is in other ways. 
 
In other words, just as with religious beliefs or etiquette, children are taught which 
political values and attitudes they ought to hold, and they embrace them at an early age. 
Reference groups beyond the family, and later in life, have an important role to 
play in socialization as well (Almond and Verba 1965; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 
1991; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 
1960; Newcomb 1963). Theodore Newcomb, analyzing longitudinal data, discovered that 
the female students at liberal Bennington College shifted their political views markedly in 
the liberal direction over the course of their four years there (1963).11 Following up with 
the women many years later, Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb (1991) found that their 
political views continued to be affected by their years at Bennington as well as by new 
social affiliations, including friendship groups and husbands. In The American Voter, 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes provide compelling evidence of the social 
influence of unions and racial and religious groups over political attitudes (1960, ch. 12). 
 Moving beyond the classic reference group studies cited above, more recent 
studies of social influence have determined that husbands and wives influence one 
another’s political views (Stoker and Jennings 2005), as do conversation partners more 
generally (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Mutz 
2006; Parker, Parker, and McCann 2008; Walsh 2004). Studies show that with whom 
                                                 
11 This shift could not be attributed to the general “liberalizing” effects of a college education—the 
Bennington students shifted much more than students at less liberal but otherwise similar colleges nearby— 
or to attrition. 
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citizens talk (Mutz 2006) and cohabitate (Nickerson 2008) affects their levels of political 
participation as well. Finally, influence need not always take place in person; it also takes 
place at a distance, as when we read what “the majority” thinks in an opinion poll (Mutz 
1998) or base our judgment of a candidate’s debate performance on the enthusiasm of the 
audience’s reaction to him or her (Fein, Goethals, and Kugler 2007). While it is a 
common mistake to underestimate the influence social factors have over behavior (Fiske 
2004), scholars are increasingly recognizing the power our peers have to shape our 
political views. 
 
The Role of Identity in Influence Over Values 
There is debate, however, over why people successfully influence one another. Most 
scholars investigating the psychological mechanisms of peer influence have drawn their 
explanations from more traditional ways of thinking about decision-making. That is, 
either persuasive logic or new information relevant to a person’s existing goals must be 
supplied for influence to occur. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) describe a “two-step 
information flow” whereby opinion leaders share valuable information gleaned from the 
media with peers. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and other persuasion researchers (see 
O’Keefe 1990) focus on the effectiveness of strong arguments in persuasion, along with 
factors that can improve the persuasiveness of otherwise weak arguments. In an original 
twist on these more cognitive theories of persuasion, Mutz (1998) argues that individuals 
are persuaded by the majority’s point of view (e.g., represented in a published opinion 
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poll) because, in trying to understand why the majority holds the view it does, they 
conjure up supportive arguments for that view and persuade themselves in the process.12 
 There is a problem applying this paradigm to values, however. The problem is 
that most people do not make very good arguments for, or against, values. Indeed, often 
people cannot offer any good reasons for their values whatsoever (Tetlock 2000; Tetlock, 
Peterson, and Lerner 1996). Writes Tetlock: 
 
When we press people to justify their policy preferences, 
all inquiry ultimately terminates in values that people find 
it ridiculous to justify any further. Antiabortion partisans 
consider “because life is sacred” a self-explanatory 
justification for their position just as pro-choice partisans 
consider “women’s liberty” to be a self-justifying 
justification for their position (2000, 247). 
 
Similarly, Sumner writes: “[F]or the people of a time and place, their own mores13 are 
always good….The reason is because the standards of good and right are in the mores” 
([1907] 2002, 58). In sum, because values are typically understood to be good in and of 
themselves, making reasoned arguments in support of them can be quite difficult. And, if 
arguments are rarely made in defense of values, it stands to reason that arguments are not 
important components of the persuasion process with respect to values. 
 Fortunately, there is experimental evidence from the field of psychology that 
strongly suggests that not all interpersonal influence fits within the traditional reasoning 
                                                 
12 Some scholars emphasize other mechanisms of value or attitude transfer from person to person, such as 
exposure to and comprehension of others’ values (McClosky and Zaller 1984) or the salience and 
consistency of attitudes (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2007). I agree with these scholars that these factors 
matter and, in some cases (i.e., exposure and comprehension), are necessary to influence. That said, these 
explanations for socialization do little to explain why individuals are motivated to take on the values of 
their peer groups. Even if I correctly perceive a salient and consistent group value, we would not expect me 
to mindlessly incorporate it as my own view based on these minimal criteria. What additional factor, or 
factors, might persuade me to internalize it as my own? 
13 The term “mores” is roughly synonymous with the term “social norms.” 
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framework. Influence can occur even when no logic or new information is shared. Sherif 
([1936] 1966) demonstrated with his “auto-kinetic effect” studies (in which a stable point 
of light appears to move, when in fact the movement is an optical illusion) that a group of 
previously unacquainted individuals will converge on an estimate of the light’s supposed 
movement; furthermore, individuals will hold to these group estimates even when 
participating a second time apart from the group. In a more conservative test of the power 
of group influence, Asch (1951) asked groups of students to judge which line in a pair 
was longer; various pairs were presented, and the correct choice was always obvious. 
Unbeknownst to his subjects, Asch placed each real subject with a group of confederates 
who purposefully made errors.14 The real subjects were persuaded by the confederates’ 
errors about one-third of the time. 
Some researchers have argued that the influence observed by Sherif and Asch is 
not real, that “normative influence” or “surface compliance” in order to ingratiate oneself 
with the group was at work (e.g., see Deutsch and Gerard [1955] 1965). But surface 
compliance does not explain why the auto-kinetic effect persisted when subjects 
participated alone or why Asch’s findings replicate when subjects’ judgments remain 
private (Deutsch and Gerard [1955] 1965; Turner 1991). 
 So why the influence? Additional studies suggest that one reason for such 
influence is participants’ psychological identification with the group. Identification 
reflects a sense of closeness or “we feeling” with one’s group (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960). While all social group members typically identify to some 
degree with the group of which they are a part, group members also vary in their degree 
                                                 
14 Asch conducted many variations of this experiment. In one variation, one confederate would “defect” 
from the others and side with the participant in giving correct answers; this variation reduced the 
participant’s tendency to conform. 
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of identification. Thus, the expectation is that, while nearly all group members will be 
subject to influence, high identifiers will be more subject than others. As Campbell et al. 
write, “whenever a group holds distinctive beliefs about some issue, then within the 
group a differentiation appears between members according to the strength of their group 
identification” (1960, 308). 
Experimental studies of influence that experimentally manipulate group 
identification provide the most convincing evidence for the role of identity in social 
influence. Such studies show that greater attraction to, or psychological identification 
with, the group leaves the subject more open to influence, including influence over social 
and political attitudes (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, and Turner 1990; Back 
1951; Clark and Maass 1998; Kelley 1955; Wood, Pool, Leck, and Purvis 1996). This 
line of experimental work has carefully isolated identification as a cause of increased 
conformity. In other words, the effects are not confounded with competing causal 
hypotheses, such as the fact that people feel a stronger sense of identification with groups 
with whom they already share values and attitudes. 
Admittedly, the similarity in values of social group members is a two-way street: 
People identify more with those who are similar, and they become more similar to those 
with whom they identify. It is because of this endogeneity that I focus here, and in the 
empirical chapters, on experimentation, which allows one to isolate causation. In 
addition, in the empirical chapters, I focus on those groups that are not likely to be 
formed around pre-existing political ideologies (such as friendship groups or political 
parties), although certainly they too can exert influence (e.g., see Layman and Carsey 
1998). As Campbell et al. argue, “[I]n most groups formed along occupational, ethnic, or 
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religious lines membership is more likely to determine attitudes than are attitudes to 
determine membership” (1960, 323). We can extend this claim to many primary groups, 
such as family and neighborhood, as well as to one’s nation. Whenever one interacts with 
individuals within a group for reasons other than value similarity—for example, due to 
geographic proximity or a specific cooperative goal—group identification (should it 
occur) will causally precede value similarity at the individual level. 
Before we move on, let us examine the causal link between value similarity and 
group identity from another angle. In some cases, a person with significant value 
differences with his or her group will resist group influence. This is likely to occur when 
a particular value or attitude is very strongly held and is in sharp contrast to a dominant 
group value.15 (The value disjuncture may exist due to identification with a second group 
with competing values or for more personal reasons.) Because identification in part relies 
on value similarity, such an individual is likely to eventually identify less with the peer 
group—or perhaps even completely disassociate him or herself from the group—as a 
result of the perceived value dissimilarity. 
So far we have focused on influence by groups with which one subjectively 
identifies. What about those groups with which one does not identify? Can we make any 
predictions about individuals’ interactions with out-groups? Interestingly, when 
individuals are exposed to the point of view of out-group members, they tend to shift 
their own views away from those of the out-group and in the direction of pre-existing in-
group norms (Turner 1987; 1991). Note that, because identity is in part based on value 
similarity, some out-groups will be ideological out-groups, i.e., groups that are defined as 
                                                 
15 A dominant group value typically is one that is held by the majority of group members; however, 
sometimes a value held by a powerful, highly visible, and/or comparably vocal minority may be perceived 
to be a dominant group value.  
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out-groups because their views are diametrically opposed to one’s own. Polarization due 
to an active lack of identification with a group is, in effect, the opposite of group-based 
influence, although the outcome is the same: greater similarity with the in-group. 
 Identity clearly plays an important role in group influence and also group 
polarization. But why should psychological identification on its own drive these 
phenomena? Identification as an explanation for influence may at first seem appealing 
but, upon second glance, is lacking a causal mechanism. What is it about a “we feeling” 
(or a “them feeling”) exactly that opens a person up to group influence over his or her 
values, those consequential moral standards that so often shape political choices? 
Self-categorization theory (Turner 1987; 1991), a close cousin of social identity 
theory (Tajfel and Turner [1986] 2004), takes up these questions. Synthesizing a vast and 
unruly literature on social influence in psychology, and drawing on Festinger (1950) in 
particular, Turner (1991) argues that peers provide the individual with helpful “social 
reality tests”16 when they indicate whether or not they agree with his or her point of view. 
In other words, people are continually “bouncing ideas off” of one another; the feedback 
individuals receive constitutes evidence as to whether an idea is right or wrong. 
Only those with whom one identifies, however, can provide such tests. Turner 
writes: 
 
In so far as we categorize ourselves as similar to others in 
the same situation (in relevant respects), it is natural and 
logical to think that we should tend to respond in the same 
way. In so far as we do, we should experience subjective 
validity [italics added]. The perceived, expected or believed 
                                                 
16 Social reality tests stand in contrast to “physical reality tests.” With the latter, the individual separates 
fact from fiction through direct engagement with the physical environmental (e.g., hitting a piece of glass 
with a hammer to see whether it is breakable). 
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agreement of similar others in the same situation implies 
that our behaviour is a function of the objective world 
(1991, 161). 
 
Likewise, in so far as we categorize ourselves as dissimilar from others, it is natural and 
logical to think that we should act differently. 
Applying these ideas to social influence over values within the context of U.S. 
politics, we should expect value conformity in identity groups of all shapes and sizes: in 
primary,17 or face-to-face, groups such as families, churches, schools, and workplaces; in 
larger secondary, or national, groups such as religious, racial, gender, and regional 
groups; and, finally, in the nation as a whole. Further, to the extent that citizens identify 
more or less with each of these groups, the conforming or polarizing influence of the 
groups upon citizens’ values should vary accordingly. 
 
Explaining the Role of Identification with Emotion 
Turner’s synthesis of an enormous number of social influence studies into one coherent 
theory offers a major step forward in our understanding of social influence. That said, I 
argue that Turner’s ambitious theory does not quite do what it sets out to do—provide a 
comprehensive explanation for both group conformity and polarization. His very 
cognitive theory leaves out an important player: emotion.18 
                                                 
17 I borrow the language of “primary” and “secondary” groups from Campbell et al. (1960, pp 296-297). 
18 Some might wonder whether Festinger’s famous theory of “cognitive dissonance” (1957) provides an 
alternative “purely” cognitive account of value conformity similar to Turner’s. It does not. Festinger’s 
theory integrates cognition and emotion, hypothesizing that conflicting cognitions create emotional 
discomfort which motivates a dissonance reduction strategy, such as attitude change. Recent work has 
demonstrated that “dissonance” appears to be, as Festinger hypothesized, emotional discomfort (Elliot and 
Devine 1994). Among the situations that create dissonance is encountering disagreeing others (Matz and 
Wood 2005). Described in this way, the theory resembles the cognitive-emotional theory I offer below. 
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How do we know that leaving out emotion constitutes an important oversight? 
First, there is the question of selective motivation. People are different from their peers in 
literally millions of ways. What motivates a person to conform with respect to a 
particular behavior or attitude but not thousands of others? Incorporating emotion into a 
theory of social influence can help to better account for which discrepancies individuals 
see as problematic and therefore seek to remedy (Barrett 1995, 47). Second, we know 
that encounters with agreeing or disagreeing peers are thick with emotion; opinion 
disagreements are particularly uncomfortable for all involved (e.g., Asch 1951; 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, 150; Noelle-Neuman 1993). Third, as 
discussed in the last chapter, values have an important emotional component, as do 
attitudes more generally (Fiske 2004). Bringing emotion into our social influence model 
is one way to account for how an emotion becomes associated with a value or attitude. 
More generally, recent research on emotions suggests that they have an important 
role to play in shaping political attitudes and behaviors. For example, fear and anxiety 
motivate individuals to abandon routine and pay close attention to an approaching threat 
(LeDoux 1996). Along these lines, recent political studies have found that anxious 
partisans rely less on their long-held partisan identifications (Marcus, Neuman, and 
MacKuen 2000) and that citizens are more influenced by anxiety-provoking political ads 
(Brader 2006). Although emotions sometimes get in the way of decision-making, work 
by neuroscientists Damasio (1994) and LeDoux (1996) make clear that emotions are 
crucial to smart choices; we would not survive for long without them. 
Which emotions deserve our attention as we think about social influence over 
citizens’ political values? Empirically oriented political scientists have focused on the 
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role of three primary emotions in political decision-making: anxiety/fear, anger, and 
enthusiasm (e.g., Brader 2006; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Huddy, Feldman, and 
Cassese 2007; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Valentino, Hutchings, 
Gregorowicz, Groenendyk, and Brader 2006; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis 
2008).19 On the other hand, works by political philosophers address a broader range of 
emotions, including the “social emotions” (admiration, contempt, sympathy/empathy, and 
envy) and the “self-conscious emotions” (pride, embarrassment, shame, and guilt) (Burke 
[1790] 1953; Elias [1989] 1996; Elster 1999; Gibbard 1990; Herzog 1998; Hobbes [1651] 
1994; Hume [1739/1740] 2000; Miller 1993, 1997; Rousseau [1762] 1988; Saxonhouse 
2005; Smith [1759] 1982; Nussbaum 2001, 2004).20 
The failure of political scientists to investigate the role of social and self-
conscious emotions, especially given the obvious social and moral nature of politics, is 
unfortunate. But that is not why we cast our gaze in this direction. Rather, scholars 
interested in social influence have singled out these emotions—particularly the self-
conscious emotions embarrassment and shame—as key players in social conformity (e.g., 
Asch 1951; Elster 1989a, 1989b, 1999, 2007; Goffman 1959; Milgram 1992; Noelle-
Neuman 1993). Turning to the psychological literature on emotions, we find that scholars 
here also focus on the self-conscious emotions—especially embarrassment, shame, and 
pride—as motivators of conforming behavior and achievement (Lazarus 1991; Lewis 
                                                 
19 Psychologists Lerner and Small and colleagues have cast a wider net, examining the economic and 
political effects of the emotions sadness, disgust, and sympathy, as well as anger and fear (e.g., Fischhoff, 
Gonzalez, Lerner, and Small 2005; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischhoff 2003; Lerner, Small, and 
Loewenstein 2004; Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff 2006; Small, Loewenstein, and Slovic 2007). 
20 Some of these emotions are also referred to as “moral emotions,” e.g., shame, guilt, and empathy 
(Tangney and Fischer 1995). 
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2000). Self-conscious emotions involve “elaborate cognitive processes that have, at their 
heart, the notion of self” (Lewis 2000, 623). 
Embarrassment and shame are similar negative emotions that differ mainly in 
terms of their intensity level (Lazarus 1991).21 According to Lazarus: 
 
Shame is generated by a failure to live up to an ego-ideal 
[i.e., the ideal self]. We feel disgraced or humiliated, 
especially in the eyes of a parent or parent-
substitute….[A]nother person whose approbation is 
important to us views and presumably is critical of our 
failure (241). 
 
In other words, we feel embarrassment or shame when we perceive that important others 
have judged us harshly because we have not lived up to some ideal standard (see also 
Lewis 2000; Mascolo and Fischer 1995). 
On the other hand, pride “is enhancement of one’s ego-identity [i.e., the self] by 
taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either our own or that of someone or 
group with whom we identify” (Lazarus 1991, 271).22 The opposite of embarrassment 
and shame, pride involves feeling good about ourselves because, in the eyes of important 
others, we have achieved something valuable or measured up to an ideal standard (see 
also Lewis 2000; Mascolo and Fischer 1995). 
While these emotions stem from the perceived evaluations of oneself by 
important others, the important person or people need not be actually observing us—or 
                                                 
21 Some would disagree with this characterization, arguing that differences other than intensity level may 
separate these two emotions; however, one can interpret other apparent differences between the two 
emotions within the “intensity” framework. For example, embarrassment is often felt in response to 
missteps vis-à-vis relatively trivial social norms (e.g., wearing the wrong thing to a party), whereas shame 
is often felt in response to missteps with respect to deeply ingrained norms (e.g., incest). 
22 Italics in original have been removed. 
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even be alive—to cause pride or shame. “It is only necessary that we imagine how [they] 
would react to what we have done or not done” (Lazarus 1991, 241). 
That an important relationship exists between these self-conscious emotions and 
societal values may already be apparent. It is impossible to define self-conscious 
emotions without mentioning their relationship to the attitudes, behaviors, and other 
characteristics which we ourselves and our peers believe make people worthy of respect. 
Lewis (2000) defines embarrassment, shame, pride, and hubris with reference to societal 
“standards, rules, and goals” (i.e., values, norms, etc.). Embarrassment or shame results 
when we fail to meet a standard, rule, or goal, and pride or hubris when we do meet one. 
Scheff (1988), drawing on work by Cooley ([1922] 2006), argues even more 
forcefully that these emotions motivate conformity to societal expectations: “Pride and 
shame make up a subtle and pervasive system of social sanctions. This system leads to 
experiencing social influence as compelling” (396). While the judgments of our peers are 
key, again, they need only be imagined to provoke pride or shame. “The deference-
emotion system functions virtually continuously, even when we are alone, since we can 
imagine and anticipate its motion in vivid detail” (396).23 
While the literature on self-conscious emotions advances us considerably in our 
understanding of group influence over values, it cannot do it alone. I argue that it can 
only do so in concert with Turner’s self-categorization theory. First, emotions scholars 
focus on the role of “important others,” or society in general, in generating pride, 
embarrassment, and shame. In so doing, these scholars stop short of addressing the 
importance of social groupings in generating these emotions. If we substitute the term 
                                                 
23 For this reason, I find it inappropriate to draw lines between influence that occurs “in person” and 
influence that occurs at a remove (e.g., a person reading an opinion column in the newspaper), as Mutz 
(1998) suggests we do. That said, certainly in-person influence will tend to be more intense. 
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“in-group” for “important others,” then this line of research becomes much more relevant 
to group influence. Second, emotions scholars argue that pride, embarrassment, and 
shame motivate behavioral conformity to peers’ expectations; however, ideological 
conformity is overlooked. I propose that the experiences of pride and shame provide a 
sense of “subjective validity” and “subjective invalidity” along the lines Turner describes, 
making these emotions relevant to conformity of value belief. Third, and finally, 
emotions scholars have little to say about the role of self-conscious emotions in attitude 
polarization with respect to out-groups. I take up this topic at the end of the chapter. 
 
Social-Emotional Influence Theory 
Putting the pieces together, I introduce a model of influence over political values called 
“social-emotional influence.” The SEI model helps to explain why groups are so 
instrumental in shaping our values as well as why we often feel so passionately about 
values that seem to have little to do with our self-interest. 
I argue that value socialization is highly dependent on psychological identification 
with the group. One key reason for the importance of identification in socialization is 
self-conscious emotion. Individuals feel pride when they receive positive feedback from 
peers, and embarrassment or shame when they are derogated by peers. When the 
individual perceives that such feedback (and the accompanying emotion) stems from 
value conformity or deviation, the relevant value is colored by that emotional experience, 
and value commitment strengthens or weakens accordingly. 
In other words, when pride becomes associated with a value, it makes that value 
feel “good” or “right,” i.e., subjectively valid. And when shame becomes associated with 
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a value, the value becomes a disvalue, feeling “bad” or “wrong,” i.e., subjectively invalid. 
In this way, values come to be both internalized and emotion laden. Note that both pride 
and shame tend to push the individual in the direction of conformity with the group, with 
pride strengthening or reinforcing group values, and shame stigmatizing group disvalues. 
Below, in Figure 2.1, I clarify the theoretical framework being introduced with a 
simplified depiction of the model’s two causal paths. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Two Paths of Social-Emotional Influence 
 
 
 Finally, while Social-Emotional Influence Theory focuses on in-group 
socialization, it can be logically extended to explain group polarization as well. Recall 
that individuals tend to shift their attitudes away from those of out-group members. I 
  Pride 
Subjective validity:  
value is right 
Subjective invalidity:  
disvalue is wrong 
Embarrassment or shame 
Person B perceives negative 
judgments because his/her 
values are out of line with group                
Exposure to group value or opinion 
Person A and B move in direction of value conformity 
 
Person A perceives positive 
judgments because his/her 
values are in line with group              
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argue that this occurs because association with a derogated out-group, whether through 
personal interaction or the adoption of its values, is a source of shame within in-groups; 
the lack of association a source of pride. Thus, we would expect that when a person 
learns of a derogated out-group’s values, pride (in his or her differentiated values) and 
embarrassment or shame (if his or her values resemble those of the out-group) should 
generate conformity to the in-group’s values in a manner similar to that discussed above. 
There are many indications that social-emotional influence is at work in the social 
and political world. Consider Michael Moore’s 2007 film Sicko. Moore shares images 
and stories of sick infants, homeless people, and 9/11 heroes who have been abandoned 
by the U.S. healthcare system. Moore’s film seems intended to make the viewer feel 
shame over the nation’s care for its sick with the hope that such emotion will motivate 
opinion change. Or consider that the National Organization for Women, with the hope of 
decreasing sexism in the media, recently began a “Media Hall of Shame” to embarrass 
media who covered Hillary Clinton’s Presidential bid in a sexist manner. Finally, 
consider that, for decades, pro-life activists have attempted to shame and humiliate 
women entering abortion clinics with the intent of discouraging women from seeking 
abortions. Certainly such pressure reduces the number of abortions sought; many of the 
women who do use such clinics will do their best to slip in unseen, heads bowed. 
Not all social-emotional influence is so emotionally uncomfortable, of course. 
Consider the fact that polling places distribute “I voted” stickers on election day to 
encourage voting. Presumably, wearing the sticker reinforces the act of voting by making 
the voter feel even prouder for having fulfilled his or her civic duty; for nonvoters, not 
having a sticker to wear can lead to embarrassment, particularly if one is surrounded by 
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more civic minded colleagues or neighbors. Or consider why medals awarded to soldiers 
encourage service and bravery. The medals bring an emotional reward for sacrifice; 
soldiers who wear them are admired, and feel proud as a result. Or consider that, as 
environmental attitudes have become increasingly progressive, a “green” lifestyle is 
suddenly idealized; driving a tiny hybrid is cool (after years of SUVs being status 
symbols) and using plastic shopping bags is a sin in some cities. 
Finally, a long list of social norms is enforced largely by the mechanisms 
described: We do our best to avoid walking out of restrooms with our fly undone or toilet 
paper trailing from one of our shoes. Most of the men among us avoid wearing skirts to 
the office. We generally eat with utensils and chew with our mouths closed. 
Of course, the SEI model depends on the assumption that peers do regularly judge 
others favorably when they act in line with dominant group values and unfavorably when 
they do not.24 In other words, we expect that group members are—consciously or not— 
active socialization agents. Both the academic literature (e.g., Elster 1989a, 1989b, 2007; 
Fredrickson 1998; Walsh 2004) and daily experience argue that this is the case. 
Consider the uproar that ensues in the U.S. when a prominent person, such as 
former Senatorial candidate George Allen or actor Mel Gibson, is caught using 
prejudiced language. (Or even when a prominent person, such as former President Bill 
Clinton on the campaign trail for Hillary Clinton in 2008, is suspected of making veiled 
prejudiced statements.) Or consider the frank, and sometimes even obsessive, admiration 
we heap on those who embody our highest ideals, including respected politicians, such as 
Barack Obama, successful business leaders, such as Bill Gates, or popular entertainers, 
                                                 
24 Note that these judgments can also be conceived of in emotional terms: Strong approval can take the 
form of admiration, and disapproval contempt or disgust. 
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such as Oprah Winfrey and Clint Eastwood. Consider the popularity of Halls of Fame, 
Honor Rolls, and Walls (and Halls) of Shame. Parents and teachers scold students who 
are caught plagiarizing, and praise those who win scholarships. These kinds of positive 
and negative judgments of others are a ubiquitous part of our social life. 
 
Variations and Limitations 
It is important to note that Social Emotional Influence Theory is not one-size-fits-all. 
Individuals may differ in the degree to which they experience social-emotional influence. 
In particular, several factors may increase or decrease a person’s susceptibility: Some feel 
self-conscious emotions more easily or intensely than others; others are much more 
oriented toward social groups than average, some less so; still others have personalities 
that are open to social influence while others pride themselves on going against the grain. 
 In addition, groups will differ in the extent to which social-emotional influence is 
a factor with respect to a value or set of values. Several factors are likely to increase or 
decrease such influence among groups: a relatively high or low rate of inter-personal 
communication, a relatively high or low level of identification on the part of group 
members, and a tendency to value conformity or diversity (in other words, holding a 
meta-group value that emphasizes either sameness or difference). 
 Finally, we should not expect social-emotional influence to always and 
everywhere be effective among group members. As noted earlier, group influence with 
respect to a politically relevant value may not occur if a pre-existing and contradictory 
value is strongly held by an individual. That said, if the individual continues to identify 
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with the group over time, the expectation is that the group will slowly make inroads with 
respect to the value in question. 
 
A New Perspective 
The theoretical framework of social-emotional influence allows us to look at much of the 
political science literature with a new, clarifying perspective. As discussed, it helps us to 
understand why individuals take on social group values, an especially perplexing 
phenomenon when those values conflict with self-interest. Moving from the individual to 
the group level, social-emotional influence helps us to understand why social groups, as 
large as a nation or as small as a neighborhood or even family, often maintain a 
consistent political culture over a long period of time. 
In addition, social-emotional influence has relevance to the development of 
political attitudes and behaviors in general. Whenever a political attitude or behavior 
functions as a group expectation, such that conformity garners peers’ respect and 
deviation their opprobrium, we are likely to find social-emotional influence at work 
generating (and reinforcing) conformity within the group. For example, Campbell, 
Converse, Miller, and Stokes write that there are “expectations concerning the 
appropriate behavior for the ‘loyal’ Catholic or union member” (1960, 296), expectations 
that strongly influence group members’ voting behavior. More recently, Mendelberg 
(2001) discusses the power of racial norms in shaping political campaigns. Social-
emotional influence helps to explain why these social expectations affect behavior. 
As a general model of peer influence, social-emotional influence represents an 
important addition to existing models of influence. It enriches Noelle-Neuman’s account 
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of the “spiral of silence,” which documents social pressure but stops short of clarifying 
the psychological mechanisms at work (1993). Social-emotional influence also 
complements Diana Mutz’s more cognitive explanation for “impersonal influence” 
(1998). Especially with respect to values—where compelling arguments are few and far 
between—social-emotional influence is a better candidate for explaining group influence 
at work. 
Social-Emotional Influence Theory also provides a missing mechanism for a wide 
range of social influence studies, from Huckfeldt and colleagues’ studies of social 
networks (Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995) to 
experimental field studies of social influence over voting behavior (Gerber, Green, and 
Larimer 2008; Nickerson 2008).25 
 Finally, the social-emotional influence framework allows us to better understand 
why it is that groups coalesce around distinct sets of values. For this reason, SEI Theory 
links up with studies of ethnocentrism. Drawing on the work of William Graham Sumner, 
LeVine and Campbell argue that not only do social groups tend to adopt distinct sets of 
values (or “folkways”), but they also tend to view those values as superior to those held 
by other groups (1972). These phenomena are arguably the most important elements of 
ethnocentrism. Social-emotional influence theory helps to illuminate some of the causal 
mechanisms underlying these phenomena. We conform to the in-group in response to the 
judgments of our peers; these judgments not only produce opinion change, but they also 
embed values with a strong sense of pride and subjective validity, and they embed 
disvalues with a sense of shame and subjective invalidity. To the extent that other groups 
                                                 
25 The model need not be restricted to political variables. For example, it could also provide an explanation 
for the well-publicized recent finding that obesity is “contagious,” i.e., that the average weight of family 
members and friends appears to affect one’s own weight (Christakis and Fowler 2007). 
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do not share one’s values, and especially to the extent that they embody one’s disvalues, 
those groups will appear to be quite naturally both wrongheaded and contemptible. 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, I offer a social-psychological framework that seeks to explain value formation 
and change called Social-Emotional Influence Theory. I locate the source of citizens’ 
politically relevant values within the social group and argue that subjective identification 
with one’s peers is key to successful group socialization. I explain why identification 
matters by drawing on recent research on the self-conscious emotions: The emotions 
pride, embarrassment, and shame together motivate value conformity. Finally, focusing 
on the U.S., I expect that social-emotional influence occurs within groups of all sizes, 
ranging from the family to religious or ethnic groups to the nation as a whole. 
 In the pages ahead, I focus on building an empirical case for social-emotional 
influence over politically relevant values. I turn to survey evidence in Chapter Three to 
verify that politically relevant value differences do emerge among identity groups in the 
U.S. and to experimental evidence in Chapters Four, Five, and Six to test the various 
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The Social-Emotional Influence model explains why citizens often embrace dominant 
group values. Psychologically identifying with a group, whether a nation, religion, social 
class, etc., causes the individual to conform to the group’s values, all else equal. As I 
argued in Chapter 2, identification works through our self-conscious emotions: pride, 
shame, and embarrassment. When we identify with a group of individuals, we care what 
they think. When our peers approve of certain values (and the people who hold them) and 
disapprove of other disvalues (and those who hold them), they evoke our self-conscious 
emotions in relation to group values, motivating us to conform. 
I have thus far emphasized value conformity, but notice that conformity within 
groups also implies difference between groups. If social-emotional influence drives 
conformity to the group, then it also drives value differences between individuals who 
happen to identify with different groups. Of course, group value differences may be 
further exaggerated due to polarization between groups, that is, the movement of group 
                                                 
26 From William Graham Sumner’s Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs and Morals ([1907] 
2002). Page 39. 
 40 
members away from the values of out-group members due to their dislike of the out-
group. Because social-emotional influence (and social-emotional polarization) operates in 
social groups of all sizes, we should see value conformity within, and separation between, 
nations as well as a variety of groups at the subnational level. 
With respect to the United States, we observe that, while there exists a set of 
“American values” that are somewhat distinct from those of other nations, e.g., 
independence, egalitarianism, and religiosity, among others, it is also true that individual 
Americans’ commitments to these values vary. Frequently that variation falls along 
identity group lines. Previous scholars have discussed value and attitude differences 
between men and women (Sapiro 2003; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), racial and ethnic 
groups (Huntington 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Rokeach 1973), and religious 
groups (Barker and Carman 2000; Ellison and Sherkat 1993; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and 
Toth 2000), among others. However, with respect to differences among American 
identity groups, few scholars have attempted to examine a broad spectrum of politically 
relevant value differences across a wide range of groups.27 This is precisely what I do in 
the analyses below. Drawing on a recent Pew survey of Americans’ politically relevant 
values, I examine whether citizens’ values cluster according to age, class, gender, race / 
ethnicity, and religion. 
 Demonstrating that such clustering occurs is particularly important in the wake of 
Fiorina’s recent book Culture War? (2006). Fiorina’s argument—that vocal differences 
among a small band of ideologues and better ideological sorting into the two parties has 
created the false appearance of deep political divisions in the U.S.—is persuasive. Yet, 
                                                 
27 While scholars have not systematically examined value differences among subgroups within the U.S., 
scholars have done so with respect to value differences among nations and world regions (see, for example, 
Inglehart 1971 and Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
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while Fiorina corrects an exaggerated view of cultural rifts supposedly tearing America in 
two (see Hunter 1991; White 2003), he may have overcorrected somewhat, leaving many 
with the impression that there are few value differences of import among Americans. 
In seeking to illustrate value differences among social groups in America, I do not 
wish to argue that the concept of a “culture war” ought to be replaced by that of a “race 
war” or “class war.” After all, I argue that not only do our subnational identities, all else 
equal, pull our values apart, but also that our shared American identity causes them to 
draw closer. Below, I simply wish to demonstrate that a number of substantial differences 
in commitment to politically relevant values do exist among Americans, and that many of 
these differences fall along traditional identity group lines. 
 Identifying such differences is a necessary precondition to demonstrating that 
some type of social process is at work within social groups shaping members’ values. But 
it is just a start. Competing explanations exist for value differences among groups, one of 
the most well-known being Inglehart’s argument that the material well-being of a group 
(typically a nation in Inglehart’s analyses) influences its values.28 However, as Inglehart 
himself finds, economic development does not explain all value differences among 
groups. Taking into account economic factors, cultural differences among nations and 
regions persist (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
Thus, the second thing I wish to demonstrate in the analyses below with respect to 
identity groups in the U.S. is similar to what Inglehart and Baker demonstrate in their 
                                                 
28 Inglehart’s explanation for group values is a specific example of a more general argument put forward by 
Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960, ch. 12): Daily experiences influence people’s political 
attitudes; because group members share many experiences, they will have similar attitudes. (Campbell et al. 
also argue, as I do, that groups influence attitudes directly.) In this broader formulation, experiences 
relevant to political values are many indeed, ranging from having children to experiencing discrimination to 
being the victim of a crime. Unfortunately, such experiential variables are not available in the Pew survey. 
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2000 analysis of values at the national level. Once we account for variation in income and 
education,29 value differences remain among groups. In conducting such an analysis, the 
point is not to prove Inglehart’s original thesis wrong. Rather, the point is to demonstrate 
that there exists ample room outside of the “material well-being” thesis for a group 
socialization account of value formation. 
 
Data and Measures 
Data 
Data are drawn from the December 2006 Values Update Survey, sponsored by the Pew 
Research Center. The Values Update Survey30 not only explores opinion on a range of 
values, but it also taps those values with multiple measures, allowing me to create reliable 
value scales. The survey sample is a nationally representative sample of 2,007 adults 
living in the continental U.S.; however, in many cases, to increase the number of 
questions asked, questions were asked of only one-half of the sample. 
 
Value Scales 
I examine group differences with respect to six values. I chose this particular set of values 
for three reasons: the values’ political relevance, their prominence in the political science 
literature, and, from a practical perspective, the Pew survey’s inclusion of enough 
relevant items to build a reliable scale for each. Each of the values is represented by a 
value scale made up of a combination of Likert-type agree/disagree items and, in most 
                                                 
29 While Inglehart tends to focus on income levels, he clearly includes educational advances as among 
those factors that stem from economic modernization and ultimately influence values. Of course, other 
scholars have noted the apparent influence of education on values (e.g., Rokeach 1973). 
30 Telephone interviews were conducted by Princeton Survey Research International. The interviews were 
conducted in English (and Spanish in some cases) from December 12, 2006 to January 10, 2007.  
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cases, one or more questions in other formats.31 All of the scales met a minimum 
threshold of reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas of at least .60 (and most scales topping 
.70). To ensure that each scale represents just one latent value dimension, the items in 
each scale were factor analyzed. Eigenvalues for the first factors ranged from 1.14 to 
2.25; no other significant factors emerged in the analyses.32 Item correlations with the 
primary factor for each scale were then used to weight scale items. Each scale was then 
rescaled so as to range from 0 to 1. 
The Economic Populism Scale consists of two questions and four Likert-type 
agree/disagree statements that tap citizens’ beliefs regarding whether the government 
should aid poor and working class Americans.33 The Environmentalism Scale consists of 
one question and three Likert-type statements that reflect the citizen’s commitment to 
protecting the environment. The Hawkishness Scale consists of three questions and two 
Likert-type statements that capture to what extent citizens believe the nation should use 
force to achieve its goals. The alphas for the scale items are .77, .61, and .68 respectively. 
 The Limited Government Scale consists of one question and four Likert-type 
statements that measure whether citizens desire a relatively small and restrained federal 
government. The Civic Duty Scale consists of four Likert-type statements that tap the 
citizen’s commitment to following political events and voting. Finally, the Social 
                                                 
31 The various items making up the value scales are flawed in some respects. Most of the Likert items, in 
particular, are worded in the pro-value direction, causing concern with respect to acquiescence bias. 
However, the addition of non-Likert questions to the scales helps to correct this problem to some degree. In 
addition, some questions, in addressing specific public policies, such as the war in Iraq, are not themselves 
true value measures due to their specificity. This said, when such measures are included together with a 
number of related items, the resulting scale taps an underlying value dimension. Finally, several of the 
questions are factual rather than normative (e.g., asking whether one believes that government programs are 
inefficient). Although we can and should distinguish between facts and values, such factual claims tend to 
be closely related to citizens’ normative ones. It is my view that the gains in reliability that result from 
multiple-item scales outweigh the drawbacks of the imperfect nature of some of the individual items.  
32 Analyses are available in the Appendix. 
33 Question wording for all value scales is available in the Appendix. 
 44 
Conservatism Scale consists of two questions and five Likert-type statements that reflect 
whether citizens want to limit individual freedoms in favor of traditional mores. The 
Cronbach’s alphas for the scale items are, respectively, .70, .75, and .77. 
 
Identity Group Variables 
I examined value differences among five different types of social identity groups: age 
cohort, socio-economic class, gender, race and ethnicity, and religious affiliation 
(including whether respondents considered themselves to be evangelical Christians).34 
The group distributions are below in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Identity Variable Distributions 
 Gen-Y Gen-X Boomer Pre-War  
Age Cohort 241 642 601 523  
 Professional Working Struggling   
Class 685 892 269   
 Male Female    
Gender 1,026 981    
 White Black Hispanic Asian  
Race / Ethnicity 1,519 176 200 29  
 Protestant Catholic Jewish Mormon No Religion 
Religion 1,117 514 38 26 208 
 Evangelical Not Evangelical    
Evangelical 661 976    
                                                 
34 The conceptualization of group membership used for the purpose of this analysis differs somewhat from 
that used in other chapters. Here, respondents are categorized as possessing a group membership (or not), 
rather than being categorized according to their level of subjective identification. For example, the Catholic 
category includes nominal Catholics as well as devout Catholics, and the “professional class” category 
likely includes both patricians and those who were the first in their family to attend college. Such identity 
categorizations are somewhat rough, and, thus, the analyses will inevitably contain some error. 
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With respect to age, rather than grouping respondents according to whether they 
were younger adults, middle aged, retirement age, etc., the Age Cohort variable groups 
respondents by generation. Grouping was done in this way so as to better reflect the 
influence of respondents’ generational peers, as opposed to their life stage (Alwin, 
Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981). At the time of the survey, the 
youngest participants—Gen-Y, or the Millennial Generation—were between 18 and 27 
years old. Gen-X, or Baby Bust, participants were between 28 and 46 years of age. Baby 
Boomers were between 47 and 62 years of age. Finally, those in the Pre-War, or Silent, 
Generation were at least 63 years old.35 
The Class measure assessed whether participants considered their household to be 
“professional or business class,” “working class,” or “a struggling family or 
household.”36 The Race/Ethnicity variable was constructed from two questions asking 
respondents whether they were of Hispanic origin and whether they considered 
themselves to be white, black, or Asian. These measures were combined into a four-
category variable; the racial categories exclude Hispanics, all of whom were placed in the 
Hispanic category. The Religion variable identifies Americans of the Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, and Mormon faiths, as well as those who are either not affiliated with a religion 
                                                 
35 Sources disagree on the years demarcating these four generations. I ultimately settled on the years 1979 - 
1994 for Gen-Y, 1960 - 1978 for Gen-X, 1944 - 1959 for Baby Boomers, and 1943 and earlier for the Pre-
War Generation. This framework roughly reflects Carr (2002), Peltola, Milkie, and Presser (2004), and 
Howe, Strauss, and Matson (2000). 
36 Note that the class measure included in this Pew survey is different from those used by political 
scientists, who typically use the categories lower class, working class, middle class, upper-middle class, 
and upper class (or some similar permutation) to describe variation in socio-economic class. (See Chapter 
6. Also see the General Social Survey and the American National Election Study for similar examples.) 
The main benefit of the Pew formulation seems to be that more Americans are willing to place themselves 
in the lowest category when it is described as “struggling,” as opposed to “lower class.” It may also be the 
case that the categories “professional” and “working” class draw sharper distinctions between types of 
employment and educational backgrounds than the more typical “middle” versus “working” class 
categorizations (into which the vast majority of citizens tend to place themselves). 
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or are not religious. Finally, the Evangelical variable separates those Christians who say 
they have been “born again,” or are evangelical, from those who do not. 
As previously discussed, two important variables serve as controls to further 
refine the analyses. The Income variable separates respondents into nine income levels, 
and the Education variable separates respondents into seven different education levels.37 
See the Appendix for details with respect to these variables. 
 
Data Analyses 
The first question to be investigated is as follows: Is between-group variation in 
commitment to the six politically relevant values mentioned above greater than within-
group variation? In less academic language, are individuals’ social identities associated 
with their values? This question can be answered with analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
The second question is less straight-forward: If between-group variation is 
greater, is there any correlational evidence available that points toward social influence 
driving within-group value similarity, as opposed to material well-being or related 
factors? As discussed above, I address this question by adding controls for income and 
education. In addition, because group identities overlap—or, more to the point, because 
observed value differences between individuals in any two groups may be driven by their 
membership in overlapping identity groups—each of the ANOVAs in which control 
variables are introduced also controls for the full spectrum of identity groups examined 
                                                 
37 These controls are especially important with respect to social class. By holding income and education 
constant in the class analyses, we can be more certain that value differences among classes are due to 
subjective identification with a socio-economic class rather than to income or educational differences. 
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The first identity group we examine is age cohort. It is commonly asserted, in both the 
popular media and the academic literature, that value differences exist among the 
generations. Some of these differences are attributable to life cycle effects, but others are 
likely attributable to unique characteristics of the generations themselves (e.g., Alwin, 
Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981). Below I investigate whether 
value differences emerge across four generations of Americans. 
When we conduct simple ANOVAs to assess between-group differences, we find 
clear differences among the generations with respect to environmentalism, limited 
government, civic duty, and social conservatism. When control variables are introduced, 
these differences remain. See Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: ANOVA Results for Age Cohort / Generation 
 Without controls With controls39 
Economic Populism 
N = 793 
1.32 
p = .27 
1.38 
p = .25 
Environmentalism 
N = 833 
2.79 
p = .04 
3.34 
p = .02 
                                                 
38 Note that two versions of the identity group variables were used in the analyses. When the subject of an 
ANOVA, each identity variable included only those participants who could be placed in one of the identity 
group categories. I.e., those who said “don’t know,” who refused to answer, or who volunteered another 
response were excluded. However, when used as controls, the identity variables retained those “don’t 
know” (etc.) respondents. This ensured that the data used in the full ANOVAs would be the same as those 
used in the corresponding simple ANOVAs. 
39 Controls include all social identity variables discussed in this chapter as well as income and education. 
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Hawkishness 
N = 792 
.93 
p = .43 
.75 
p = .52 
Limited Government 
N = 777 
11.09 
p = .00 
8.52 
p = .00 
Civic Duty 
N = 897 
17.42 
p = .00 
11.27 
p = .00 
Social Conservatism 
N = 718 
9.02 
p = .00 
9.47 
p = .00 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
The group means for these four values are graphed below in Figures 3.1a - 1d.40 
Most of the value differences seem to reflect the changing zeitgeist of the times. The data 
suggest that support for limited government and socially conservative ideals have fallen 
with each successive generation since WWII. The difference between the youngest and 
the oldest generation is equivalent to 11% of the scale with respect to Limited 
Government, and 14% of the scale with respect to Social Conservatism. The difference 
between these two generations with respect to Environmentalism equals approximately 
6% of the scale range. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Throughout the chapter, the figures depict raw means for the various identity groups. Only those 
differences in means that remained significant when control variables were added are graphed. I used 
regression analyses with a complete series of dummy variables (as well as the income and education 
measures) to make sure that the relative group differences depicted in Figures 3.1 - 3.6 did not change 
direction with the introduction of controls. The comparison groups in the dummy variable analyses were as 
follows: age cohort (pre-war generation); class (struggling); gender (men); race / ethnicity (whites); religion 
(Protestant); Evangelical (non-Evangelical). The analyses revealed that just two relationships changed 
direction when controls were added. In the analysis of religion and social conservatism, the coefficients for 
those who were Jewish and who had no religious affiliation became positive (but nonsignificant). 
Additional analyses revealed that the reason for these reversals is the addition of the Evangelical control 
variable. In other words, when the Protestant category is emptied of the influence of Evangelicals, Jews and 
those with no religion are no more nor less socially conservative than Protestants. 
 49 


















Gen-Y Gen-X Baby Boomer Pre-War



















Gen-Y Gen-X Baby Boomer Pre-War



















Gen-Y Gen-X Baby Boomer Pre-War



















Gen-Y Gen-X Baby Boomer Pre-War
Social Conservatism by Age Cohort
 
 
With respect to the differences observed in participatory values, the large 
difference between Gen-Y, with the least sense of civic duty, and the dutiful Pre-War 
generation, stretches across 16% of the range of the scale. This said, the lower mean for 
Gen-Y may well be attributable not to cohort effects, but to the fact that younger people 
have far less life experience relevant to politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). 
 
Class 
Next, we examine socio-economic class: whether identifying oneself as part of a 
professional, working, or “struggling” household appears to affect one’s values. 
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What we find, first, is that notable differences among these three classes emerge 
for each of the six values examined. Once controls are introduced, however, most of 
these differences disappear; only differences in commitment to economic populism and 
environmentalism remain significant. See Table 3.3. 
 
Table 3.3: ANOVA Results for Class 
 Without controls With controls 
Economic Populism 
N = 765 
18.00 
p = .00 
4.96 
p = .01 
Environmentalism 
N = 801 
6.93 
p = .00 
2.98 
p = .05 
Hawkishness 
N = 771 
 6.82 
p = .00 
1.85 
p = .16 
Limited Government 
N = 753 
3.76 
p = .02 
1.14 
p = .32 
Civic Duty 
N = 832 
14.55 
p = .00 
.79 
p = .45 
Social Conservatism 
N = 678 
18.65 
p = .00 
.77 
p = .47 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
The differences in means across socio-economic classes for these two values are 
graphed below in Figures 3.2a - 2b. It is perhaps not surprising that those who identify 
themselves as “struggling” are the most likely to endorse economic populism.41 The 
difference in means between this group and the professionals equals 14% of the range of 
                                                 
41 This particular difference may in part reflect Pew’s unique choice of class labels, rather than group 
influence. Even when income is held constant, some will perceive their circumstances as more dire than 
others, and these individuals are more likely to embrace both a label like “struggling” and populist values. 
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the scale. More surprising is the fact that those who consider themselves to be struggling 
are more likely to endorse greater stewardship of the environment; here, the difference 
between them and the professional class is equivalent to 8% of the scale range. 
 











































In recent decades, scholars have documented a partisan “gender gap.” Scholars argue that 
women are more likely to vote Democratic because they are less hawkish and more 
supportive of the welfare state when compared to men (Conover and Sapiro 1993; 
Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Do the data discussed here 
bare these differences out? 
Below, differences emerge in the first analysis for hawkishness and social 
conservatism. When we introduce controls, these differences remain, with differences in 
social conservatism increasing in significance. Contrary to expectations, the data reveal 
no statistically significant differences between men and women with respect to economic 
populism; no differences emerge with respect to environmentalism, limited government, 
or civic duty either. See Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: ANOVA Results for Gender 
 Without controls With controls 
Economic Populism 
N = 807 
.57 
p = .45 
.05 
p = .83 
Environmentalism 
N = 848 
.79 
p = .37 
.27 
p = .61 
Hawkishness 
N = 806 
10.63 
p = .00 
8.53 
p = .00 
Limited Government 
N = 790 
.40 
p = .53 
.16 
p = .69 
Civic Duty 
N = 909 
1.09 
p = .30 
.05 
p = .82 
Social Conservatism 
N = 727 
2.85 
p = .09 
12.22 
p = .00 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
In Figures 3.3a - 3b, differences in means for hawkishness and social 
conservatism are graphed. Women are both less hawkish42 and less socially 
conservative43 than men. The mean for hawkishness among men is approximately .5, 
whereas for women it is .45 (a difference of 5% of the scale). Note that the pictured 
difference in social conservatism, a very slight difference of 3% of the scale, increases 
somewhat once controls are introduced. Overall, however, despite the statistical 
significance of these two findings, the data reflect Sapiro’s (2003) conclusion that 
opinion differences that emerge between women and men are often modest in size. 
                                                 
42 Some might argue that a missing variable—whether a woman is a mother—likely explains the 
differences observed between men and women with respect to hawkishness. Conover and Sapiro (1993) 
conducted such an analysis and found that the presence or absence of a child (or children) in the household 
made little difference to women’s attitudes related to war. 
43 One might wonder whether the small difference in social conservatism observed is driven by the scale 
question on women’s roles (with women offering much more liberal responses than men). However, if we 
remove the question about women’s roles, the results are nearly identical to those using the full scale. 
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Social Conservatism by Gender
 
 
Race and Ethnicity 
In the U.S., racial and ethnic identities appear to be accompanied by significant 
differences of opinion with respect to politics. Kinder and Sanders (1996) document a 
large black/white racial divide in public opinion. More recently, and more 
controversially, Huntington (2004) argues that Hispanic values differ considerably from 
those of non-Hispanic whites. Do large value differences emerge among these groups? If 
so, with respect to which values? 
 
Table 3.5: ANOVA Results for Race / Ethnicity 
 Without controls With controls 
Economic Populism 
N = 779 
13.88 
p = .00 
9.53 
p = .00 
Environmentalism 
N = 819 
6.11 
p = .00 
3.67 
p = .01 
Hawkishness 
N = 778 
6.04 
p = .00 
6.32 
p = .00 
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Limited Government 
N = 765 
3.27 
p = .02 
1.28 
p = .28 
Civic Duty 
N = 872 
6.03 
 p = .00 
1.05 
p = .37 
Social Conservatism 
N = 701 
1.78 
p = .15 
.33 
p = .81 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
Simple ANOVAs reveal highly significant differences across racial and ethnic 
groups with respect to five of the six values. However, when controls are introduced, 
significant differences remain with respect to just three values: economic populism, 
environmentalism, and hawkishness. See Table 3.5 above. 
Differences with respect to these three values are graphed below in Figures 3.4a - 
4c. The group differences are not uniform; there is no one racial or ethnic group 
consistently out-of-step with the others. With respect to economic populism, non-whites 
are more populist than whites; however, black and Asian Americans (M = .72 and M = 
.70, respectively) make a distinctively populist pair when compared to whites and 
Hispanics (M = .57 and M = .63). Environmentalism is also higher among non-whites; 
the difference here between black and white Americans, the groups most and least 
committed to the environment, respectively, equals 8% of the value scale. Finally, white 
and Hispanic Americans are similar in their high level of hawkishness (Hispanics are the 
most hawkish), with black and Asian Americans similar in their lower levels. Hispanic 
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Hawkishness by Race / Ethnicity
 
 
Overall, these data suggest that Kinder and Sanders are closer to the mark in 
focusing on opinion differences between black and white Americans than Huntington is 
in emphasizing differences between Hispanic and Anglo Americans. Non-Hispanic 
whites and Hispanics generally appear to be more similar than different. 
 
Religion 
Finally, we consider value differences among American religious groups. There is a long 
tradition of studying the political effects of religious affiliation in the U.S. (e.g., Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; 
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Tocqueville [1835/1840] 2004; Weber [1930] 1992). Recent public opinion analyses 
show that evangelical Christians tend to hold the most conservative political views and 
Jewish Americans the most liberal ones, with Catholics and mainline Protestants falling 
in between (Cohen and Liebman 1997; Hunter 1991; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 
2000; McConkey 2001). What patterns do we find in the Pew data? 
When we examine differences among Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Mormons, and 
those who claim no religious affiliation, differences emerge with respect to hawkishness, 
limited government and social conservatism; however, only differences in social 
conservatism remain once we add the control variables.44 See Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6: ANOVA Results for Religion 
 Without controls With controls 
Economic Populism 
N = 761 
.37 
p = .83 
.09 
p = .99 
Environmentalism 
N = 804 
1.24 
p = .29 
.45 
p = .77 
Hawkishness 
N = 765 
4.67 
p = .00 
.85 
p = .49 
Limited Government 
N = 749 
2.80 
p = .03 
.60 
p = .66 
Civic Duty 
N = 866 
1.66 
p = .16 
1.31 
p = .27 
                                                 
44 Further analyses revealed that differences in hawkishness were no longer significant in the control 
analysis primarily because of the addition of one control variable: whether the individual was an 
evangelical Christian. In other words, differences that emerged among religious groups with respect to 
hawkishness were largely driven by evangelical Christians. As we will see in the following analysis, 
Evangelicals tend to be more hawkish than others. 
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Social Conservatism 
N = 691 
27.99 
 p = .00 
11.34 
p = .00 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
Differences in social conservatism are graphed below in Figure 3.5. The data 
show that Jewish Americans and those claiming no religious affiliation are much less 
socially conservative than the various Christian denominations. In particular, the 
difference in means between Mormons and Jews is equivalent to 44% of the value scale. 
But differences between Protestants and Catholics should not be overlooked; they remain 
substantial, equaling 9% of the scale.45 
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Social Conservatism by Religion
 
 
Below, I look more closely at differences between Christians who do, and do not, 
consider themselves to be evangelical, or “born again.” Here, differences in 
environmentalism, hawkishness, limited government, and social conservatism emerge, 
                                                 
45 Of course, the differences observed among religious groups with respect to social conservatism might be 
attributable to religious traditions and teachings, as opposed to peer influence. Unfortunately, these 
influences cannot be untangled with the Pew data. Chapter 4 takes up this question and presents more 
compelling evidence, in the form of experimental data, for the influence of religious peers. 
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although differences with respect to limited government do not reach standard levels of 
significance once control variables are introduced. See Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7: ANOVA Results for Whether Evangelical 
 Without controls With controls 
Economic Populism 
N = 647 
.41 
p = .52 
.31 
p = .58 
Environmentalism 
N = 685 
2.70 
p = .10 
4.50 
p = .03 
Hawkishness 
N = 651 
11.54 
p = .00 
8.37 
p = .00 
Limited Government 
N = 640 
5.43 
p = .02 
.39 
p = .53 
Civic Duty 
N = 757 
.08 
p = .77 
 1.42 
p = .23 
Social Conservatism 
N = 604 
97.43 
p = .00 
71.83 
p = .00 
Cell entries are F statistics with associated p-values. Findings significant at the p ≤ .10 level are bolded. 
 
The three remaining differences are graphed in Figures 3.6a - 6c. Evangelical 
Christians are less committed to the environment (although only slightly—a 3% 
difference), more hawkish (6% difference), and more socially conservative (16% 
difference) than non-evangelical Christians. It would appear as though the high level of 
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Protestant social conservatism uncovered in the previous analysis is largely driven by the 
social conservatism of evangelical Christians.46 
 































































Overall, the results suggest that substantial differences exist among social groups in the 
U.S. with respect to commitment to politically relevant values. One’s generation, class, 
race/ethnicity, and religion seem to be particularly tied up with one’s values. 
                                                 
46 Although note that, while the majority of Evangelicals are Protestant, not all Evangelicals are. Over half 
(53%) of Protestants referred to themselves as evangelical or born again, but so did 15% of Catholics and 
19% of Mormons. 
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In the simple analyses of variance (those without the control variables), these 
identities were associated with value differences at least two-thirds of the time. When 
controls were added in our search for better evidence of social influence, the evidence 
was particularly compelling that one’s generational peers affect commitment to limited 
government and social conservatism, that one’s racial or ethnic group influences 
commitment to economic populism and level of hawkishness, and, finally, that one’s 
religion affects commitment to social conservatism. 
With perhaps the exception of social conservatism among religious (and non-
religious) folk, there exists little evidence of serious value rifts along identity group lines. 
This said, the evidence does suggest that group memberships play a meaningful role in 




1. / 2. As I read some programs and proposals that are being discussed in the country 
today, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose each. 
An increase in the minimum wage, from $5.15 an hour to $7.25 an hour. 
The U.S. government guaranteeing health insurance for all citizens, even if it 
means raising taxes. 
3. It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can’t take care of 
themselves.47 
4. The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper into 
debt. 
5. The government should guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep. 
6. Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs. 
Economic Populism Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.52   
Item 2      0.57 
Item 3      0.62   
Item 4      0.72    
Item 5      0.73    
Item 6     -0.42    
N 807 
Eigenvalue      2.20 
                                                 
47 Answer categories for this Likert item and all those that follow were: Completely agree / Mostly agree / 
Mostly disagree / Completely disagree. 
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Environmentalism 
1. Is your overall opinion of the environmentalist movement very favorable, mostly 
favorable, mostly unfavorable, or very unfavorable? 
2. There needs to be stricter laws and regulations to protect the environment. 
3. People should be willing to pay higher prices in order to protect the environment. 
4. We should put more emphasis on fuel conservation than on developing new oil 
supplies. 
 
Environmentalism Factor analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.41 
Item 2      0.69 
Item 3      0.57 
Item 4      0.42 
N 848 




1. Do you think that using military force against countries that may seriously threaten our 
country, but have not attacked us, can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be 
justified, or never be justified? 
2. Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military 
force against Iraq? 
3. Do you think the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important 
information can often be justified, sometimes be justified, rarely be justified, or never be 
justified? 
4. It is my belief that we should get even with any country that tries to take advantage of 
the United States. 
5. The best way to ensure peace is through military strength.  
 
Hawkishness Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.49 
Item 2      0.64 
Item 3      0.43 
Item 4      0.58 
Item 5      0.62 
N 806 




1. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer 
services, or a bigger government providing more services? 
2. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good. 
3. The federal government should run ONLY those things that cannot be run at the local 
level. 
4. When something is run by the government, it is usually inefficient and wasteful 
5. The federal government controls too much of our daily lives. 
 
Limited Government Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.53 
Item 2      0.50 
Item 3      0.62 
Item 4      0.57 
Item 5      0.30 
N 790 




1. I feel it’s my duty as a citizen to always vote. 
2. I’m interested in keeping up with national affairs. 
3. I’m pretty interested in following local politics. 
4. I feel guilty when I don’t get a chance to vote. 
 
Civic Duty Factor analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.69 
Item 2      0.74 
Item 3      0.67 
Item 4      0.50 
N 909 






1. / 2. As I read some programs and proposals that are being discussed in the country 
today, please tell me whether you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose each. 
Making it more DIFFICULT for a woman to get an abortion. 
Allowing gays and lesbians to marry. 
3. Women should return to their traditional roles in society. 
4. AIDS might be God’s punishment for immoral sexual behavior. 
5. I have old-fashioned values about family and marriage. 
6. There are clear guidelines about what’s good or evil that apply to everyone regardless 
of their situation. 
7. School boards ought to have the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals. 
 
Social Conservatism Factor Analysis 
 Factor 1 
Item 1      0.50 
Item 2     -0.67   
Item 3      0.53   
Item 4      0.55  
Item 5      0.58 
Item 6      0.52  
Item 7      0.61    
N 727 




Less than $10,000 / From 10 to under $20,000 / From 20 to under $30,000 / From 30 to 
under $40,000 / From 40 to under $50,000 / From 50 to under $75,000 / From 75 to 
under $100,000 / From 100 to under $150,000 / $150,000 or more 
 
Education 
None, or grade 1 - 8 / Some high school / High school graduate / Technical, trade, or 










Social-Emotional Influence and Catholics’ Commitment to 
Traditional Family Values 
 
 
Although religion in the United States never intervenes directly in government, it must be 
considered as the first of America’s political institutions, for even if religion does not 






This chapter is the first of three based on experimental evidence. Drawing on data from 
an experiment conducted with Catholics living in the Midwest, I test key mechanisms of 
the Social-Emotional Influence model with respect to traditional family values. My 
primary goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that, when it comes to social influence over 
values, identity matters. That is, we tend to be influenced by the values of peers with 
whom we identify, and we tend not to be influenced by the values of peers with whom we 
do not identify. A secondary goal is to begin to explore the emotional mechanisms that 
are an important part of SEI Theory. Finally, in a third set of analyses, I seek to verify the 
political relevance of the values under investigation. 
 Drawing on previous scholarship by public opinion scholars, I have argued that 
values have an enormous impact on citizens’ political decisions. Among the most 
influential are those that cluster together under the rubric of social conservatism. For 
example, Abramowitz found that a moral issues scale made up of items concerning 
abortion and gay rights had a stronger influence on candidate choice in the 1992 
                                                 
48 From Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Volume One ([1835] 2004). Page 338. 
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presidential election than any other variable in his model except partisanship (1997, 220). 
In a similar analysis, Mulligan (2008) found that moral traditionalism played a key role in 
presidential vote choice in 2004. While the political import of social conservatism has at 
times been overstated, especially in the wake of the 2004 election,49 the influence of 
socially conservative values on political choice is real and significant. 
 In the context of contemporary U.S. politics, many refer to conservative (or 
traditional) stands on the cluster of hotly debated social issues revolving around religion, 
the family, and sexuality as “moral values” or “family values.” Relevant issues include 
abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, religion in the public sphere, stem cell 
research, and women’s roles, among others. While colloquial usage of these terms may 
suggest that they are little more than labels for bundles of issue positions, citizens’ 
positions on such issues, which tend to lump together as consistently traditional or 
progressive, signify relatively coherent moral visions of how people ought to conduct 
their lives (Hunter 1991; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002). 
 Politically speaking, the popularization of the terms “moral values” and “family 
values” represents a framing coup for social conservatives in that the terms suggest that 
those who disagree with a specific socially conservative point of view are not moral or 
are anti-family. Academically speaking, the terms are, of course, problematic for the 
same reason. My solution, below, is to rely instead on the general term “social 
conservatism” as well as on the term “traditional family values” to refer more specifically 
to the range of views having to do with the family and sexuality that are endorsed by the 
Catholic Church and reflective of an underlying socially conservative outlook. 
                                                 
49 See Langer and Cohen (2005), Mulligan (2008), and Schuman (2006). 
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Where citizens stand with respect to the cluster of socially conservative issues 
described above depends to a significant extent on their religious faith (Brewer and 
Stonecash 2007; Hunter 1991; Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000; Leege, Wald, 
Krueger, and Mueller 2002). In considering religiously informed views, scholars are 
increasingly thinking about religion from the perspective of social identity (Djupe and 
Gilbert 2008; Leege 2001; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). If religious communities are 
social groups just as family or ethnic communities are, then, from the perspective of SEI 
Theory, subjective identification and self-conscious emotions may work together to 
encourage individuals to conform to their religious community with respect to its views 
on traditional morality. In this chapter, I test these ideas with an experimental study of 
American Catholics living in the Midwest. 
Things have changed since voting scholars first studied Catholics in the mid-
twentieth century (e.g., Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, and Stokes 1960). Catholics are no longer dependable Democratic voters. In 2004, 
Bush enjoyed a 13-point margin of victory among white Catholics (Pew Research Center 
2008). In 2008, Catholics are an important “swing” group in the presidential election. 
Some of this movement to the political right in recent decades is due to Catholics’ 
transformation from white, urban “ethnics” to mainstream suburbanites occupying a more 
elevated position in the socioeconomic order (Prendergast 1999; Wolfe 2006). However, 
as the data discussed in this chapter will make clear, Catholics’ gravitation toward the 
Republican Party also reflects practicing Catholics’ conservatism on moral issues related 
to the family and sexuality, especially abortion. As such issues have become more 
politically salient and the parties have polarized on them, more Catholics have had reason 
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to vote Republican (Brewer and Stonecash 2007; Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 
2002; Prendergast 1999). 
 This said, there is a notable divide among Catholics. Committed Catholics (those 
with higher levels of religious practice and religious orthodoxy) are more socially 
conservative than other Americans. However, less committed Catholics are in fact less 
socially conservative than other Americans (Kohut, Green, Keeter, and Toth 2000).50 
This difference is reflected in the fact that 57% of committed Catholics say that they are 
Republican (compared to 30% who are Democrats), whereas only 38% of less committed 
Catholics are Republican (compared to 51% who are Democrats) (Dionne 2006). 
Why are committed Catholics so much more socially conservative than less 
committed Catholics? Is it their greater exposure to traditional Church teachings, unique 
personal religious experiences, or the fact that they are surrounded by peers who hold 
traditional values? While each of these factors likely matters, I focus here on the often 
overlooked influence of religious peers. The often hidden influence of religious peers is 
evident in a New York Times article describing Pope Benedict’s Mass at Yankee Stadium 
in April of 2008. While the Pope emphasized authority and obedience to the Church in 
his sermon, the attendees were just, if not more, taken with the crowd of 60,000 fellow 
believers. One woman who attended the Mass said that being there with so many other 
worshippers made her feel like she was part of a big family of Catholics. She added, 
“You were proud to be Catholic….It helped reaffirm our faith” (Vitello 2008). 
 Of course, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is not just the values and attitudes of in-
group members that affect our own; the views of out-groups matter as well, albeit in a 
                                                 
50 This “committed” versus “not committed” categorization scheme is somewhat problematic in that it fails 
to distinguish between level of devotion and level of orthodoxy. While most devoted Catholics do also have 
more orthodox views, not all do. 
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different fashion. While in some cases political alliances have been formed between 
orthodox members of various religious groups (see Hunter 1991), there still exists much 
palpable dislike among religious groups. Consider the suggestion by the evangelical 
minister Reverend John Hagee that the Catholic Church is the “great whore” discussed in 
Revelations, or consider the prejudice faced by Jews running for public office (Berinsky 
and Mendelberg 2005). Perhaps it is not surprising then that group polarization is not 
unheard of in religion’s hallowed sphere of influence. For example, in 1973 the Southern 
Baptist Convention endorsed Roe v. Wade in part because of their distrust of Catholics, 
who were resolutely anti-abortion (Wolfe 2006). In a similar vein, we expect that 
Catholics sometimes distance themselves from the values of perceived out-groups also. 
These hypotheses with respect to the relevance of social identity to our values lie 
at the heart of the Social-Emotional Influence model. Below, I describe an empirical 
study of Catholics’ values that will allow me to test these basic ideas. 
 
The Catholic Values Experiment 
Study Administration and Sample Characteristics 
The experimental study was conducted during the months of March and April of 2008 
and included 220 church-going Catholics from five churches in a large Archdiocese in 
the Midwest. The Archdiocese approved the study at the outset, easing the recruitment of 
individual churches and participants. Participants were recruited via a combination of 
flyers placed in weekly church bulletins and announcements from the pulpit. Participants 
were asked to take part in a short, anonymous, on-line study of Catholic opinion being 
conducted by University of Michigan researchers in return for a $5 donation to their 
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church and a $5 donation to a Catholic charity of their choice. Participants had to be at 
least 18 years of age, and only one person was allowed to participate per household. 
 An effort was made to recruit participants from both the more numerous 
traditional churches in the Archdiocese as well as from more progressive churches. 
Progressive churches were more eager to participate and, thus, three of the five churches 
fit this description. However, this progressive trend was counterbalanced somewhat by 
the fact that the parishioners who chose to participate from each church appeared to be 
significantly more committed to Catholicism—and, therefore, somewhat more 
ideologically conservative—than their fellow parishioners. 
I presumed at the outset that participating parishioners would be more devoted 
Catholics than non-participating parishioners for two reasons. First, most participants, 
having been recruited in church on Sunday morning, are regular church-goers. Second, it 
is likely that those most motivated to take part in a study of Catholic opinion, especially 
when participation yields donations to Catholic organizations, are those who are more 
committed to the Church. Participants’ high level of commitment to Catholicism is 
confirmed by their answer to the question “How important is being Catholic to you?” 
Thirty-four percent said “very important,” and 44% said “extremely important.” For the 
purposes of comparison, a recent Pew study found that 55% of Midwestern Catholics 
described religion as “very important” (the top commitment category) in their lives.51 In 
addition, an astonishing 73% of participants reported attending Catholic school for at 
least some of their education. For a rough comparison, consider that, at any given point in 
recent years, about 20% of Catholic schoolchildren were attending Catholic school 
                                                 
51 Most of the statistics related to Catholics in the Midwest and nationally were taken from the Pew report 
“A Portrait of American Catholics on the Eve of Pope Benedict’s Visit” (2008). 
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(Meyer 2007). (Although note that participants’ high level of attendance is in part due to 
their older age; Catholic school attendance has declined markedly in recent decades.) 
In terms of political ideology, the sample is roughly equivalent to the national 
Catholic average, identifying as somewhere between moderate and slightly conservative 
on average. However, the sample is more Republican than U.S. Catholics overall (41% as 
compared to 27%) and less Democratic (26% as compared to 37%). Finally, with respect 
to traditional family values specifically, 71% of participants indicated in the pre-test that 
they agreed with traditional church teachings on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. 
(The precise wording of this pre-test question is available in Appendix B.) 
 In terms of demographic characteristics, the sample is racially homogeneous, with 
98% of participants identifying as white (in the Midwest generally, 84% of Catholics are 
white). The age range for the study is 18-84, with a median age of 54, older than the 
national Catholic median of 46. The majority of the sample is female (69%). In addition 
to the factors cited above, these age and gender characteristics also help to explain the 
relative religiosity on the part of participants (see Pew 2008). The sample is also more 
upper-income than Catholics as a whole, with 50% calling themselves middle class and 
40% upper-middle class. 
 
Study Design 
Participants began the on-line study by filling out a pre-test that addressed Catholic 
identity and basic political views and demographic characteristics. Afterward, 
participants were randomly assigned to an experimental group. The experiment had a 
simple 1x4 design. As previously discussed, the primary goal of the experiment was to 
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demonstrate that psychological identification plays a key causal role in group influence. 
Given that the “gold standard” in demonstrating causation in social science is the 
exogenous manipulation of a cause in a random experiment, I sought to experimentally 
vary identification by exposing some participants to the values of the Catholic in-group 
and other participants to the values of a religious out-group, Evangelicals.52 
More specifically, those in the “Catholics conservative” treatment condition 
learned that a majority of American Catholics shun divorce, oppose abortion, and oppose 
gay marriage. Those in the “Catholics progressive” treatment condition learned that, to 
the contrary, most Catholics believe that one can be a good Catholic without following 
Church teachings on divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. Finally, those in the 
“Evangelicals conservative” condition learned that most Evangelicals share the Catholic 
Church’s socially conservative views on divorce, abortion, and gay marriage. Those in 
the control group received no such information. 
 








49 46 65 60 
 
To increase the external validity of the experimental stimuli, as well as to reduce 
the extent to which participants were misled during the course of the study, all of the 
public opinion information presented to participants was taken from reputable public 
                                                 
52 As touched on in the last chapter, only a very small percentage of Catholics refer to themselves as 
Evangelicals. Among participants in the Catholic Values Study, only one participant referred to him or 
herself as Evangelical. 
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opinion surveys.53 The “Catholics socially conservative” / “Catholics socially 
progressive” contrast was achieved by presenting the results of different survey questions 
to participants. The various stimuli are available in Appendix A. 
Following the stimulus, participants filled out a post-test that included questions 
on their emotions and social and political values and attitudes. After completing the 
study, all were debriefed regarding the study goals and experimental manipulations. 
 
Key Measures 
Traditional Family Values Scale     The Traditional Family Values Scale is an original, 
additive scale intended to tap moral conservatism in the domain of the family and 
sexuality. Most of the scale items are Likert-type statements presented in pairs—one 
worded in the traditional (positive) direction and one in the progressive (negative) 
direction—for each of five themes (divorce, pre-marital sex, homosexuality, sexuality 
and teens, and working mothers).54 An additional question on abortion, borrowed from 
the National Election Study, constituted the final scale item. Each pair of Likert items and 
the abortion item were weighted equally. The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 
representing the most conservative response. The scale mean is .56. While the scale is 
made up of attitudes on specific issues, the high Cronbach’s alpha of .83 demonstrates 
                                                 
53 Information on Catholics’ traditional family values is taken from the General Social Survey. Information 
on Catholics’ progressive values is taken from a Gallup poll of American Catholics presented in D’Antonio 
(2007). Information on Evangelicals’ values is taken from a poll conducted by the Pew Research Center. 
54 How one best measures commitment to traditional family values or social conservatism is subject to 
debate. Here I combine many items on specific issues into an eleven-item scale. While each individual 
item, taken in and of itself, is not a value measure (due to the specificity of each), taken together, the items 
ought to accurately represent variation in social conservatism. I argue that this approach to measuring 
social conservatism is better than an alternative in which a smaller number of more general items are 
combined. (For example, consider an item taken from the ANES’ four-item moral values scale: “The newer 
lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”) This is because social conservatism is 
typically expressed in public debate not as a commitment to abstract principles (although individuals may 
in fact be committed to such principles) but, rather, as a commitment to a unified set of policy stands. 
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that a coherent value dimension underlies the scale. Scale items for this variable, as well 
as the ones discussed below, are available in Appendix B. 
Catholic Identity Scale     The Catholic Identity Scale includes four questions 
adapted from Huddy and Khatib’s American identity scale (2007) for the purpose of 
measuring Catholic identity. The additive scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 
maximum Catholic identity. The mean for the scale is .71 and the alpha .77. 
Emotion Measures     Participants were asked “How proud are you of your views 
on….” following each of the six distinct themes covered by the traditional family values 
scale. These items were additively combined into a Pride-in-Values Scale. The scale 
ranges from 0 to 1, and its mean is .58. The alpha for the scale is .92. 
In addition, at the end of the study, participants were asked to reflect on the public 
opinion information (i.e., the stimulus) they received and to indicate to what extent the 
information made them feel proud or ashamed. Unfortunately, most participants skipped 
these questions due to a weakness in the study design.55 Originally intended to allow me 
to conduct a statistical mediation analysis, data from these two questions are used in the 




                                                 
55 Participants were presented with the following question: “Earlier in the questionnaire, some participants 
read general poll / survey results on where others stand on traditional family values related to marriage, 
abortion, and homosexuality. Other participants did not receive this information. What about you? Did you 
receive this survey information?” Those who answered “yes” were directed to the emotion questions. 
Unfortunately, most of the participants who received a public opinion stimulus either said that they had not 
received it or were unsure whether they had received it. Conversations with two test subjects suggested that 
the problem was not that individuals had skipped the stimuli or did not remember receiving it but, rather, 
that participants had difficulty recognizing the brief description of Catholic or Evangelical opinion that they 
received as the “poll / survey results” described in the question. In hindsight, the emotion measures would 
have ideally followed a second presentation of the stimulus. 
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Hypotheses 
We can investigate four hypotheses relevant to the Social-Emotional Influence model and 
one related to the model’s political import with data from the Catholic Values Study. 
The first two hypotheses stress the role of subjective identity in group influence 
(and polarization). First, whereas participants’ values will “move” in the direction of the 
perceived values of their identity group (Catholics), they will move away from the values 
of an out-group (Evangelicals) (H1). This hypothesis depends on three distinct sub-
hypotheses. Compared to the control group, participants who learn that Catholics hold 
traditional family values will express greater conservatism with respect to these values, 
participants who learn that Catholics hold progressive stances on traditional family values 
will express less social conservatism, and, finally, participants who learn that 
Evangelicals are pro-traditional family values will also express less social conservatism. 
The second hypothesis (H2) takes advantage of the Catholic Identity Scale to 
propose a secondary test of identity’s critical role in influence: The group influence and 
polarization observed in response to the stimuli will be stronger for those who identify 
more closely with other Catholics. 
The next set of two hypotheses involves the role of self-conscious emotions in 
group influence. Our first expectation with respect to emotion (H3) is that those whose 
values reflect dominant group values tend to feel proud as a result. Specifically, more 
conservative Catholics will feel more pride in their values on average than more 
progressive Catholics. The second emotion hypothesis (H4) suggests that patterns of 
pride and shame in reaction to the opinion stimuli will reveal evidence of emotional 
mediation of opinion change. In particular, participants will feel more pride (and less 
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shame) when they learn that other Catholics share their traditional values, and 
participants will feel more shame (and less pride) when they learn both that other 
Catholics hold more progressive values and Evangelicals more conservative ones. 
Our final hypothesis (H5) involves the political import of traditional family 
values: Participants’ socially conservative value beliefs will be closely tied to their 
political views, and, in particular, their electoral intentions. 
 
Data Analyses 
We first examine the identity hypotheses. Figure 4.1 displays the means for the different 
experimental groups with respect to traditional family values. 
 




































Control Catholics cons. Catholics prog. Evangelicals cons.
 
 
All three treatment groups expressed less support for traditional family values 
than the control group. As expected, participants who learned that other Catholics are less 
supportive of traditional family values shifted in the progressive direction, and 
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participants who learned that Evangelicals support family values also shifted in the 
progressive direction (i.e., away from the out-group). On the other hand, the fact that 
participants in the “Catholics conservative” condition also appeared to shift in the 
progressive direction is contrary to our expectation. 
A regression analysis allows us to test whether these differences are statistically 
significant. The Traditional Family Values Scale was regressed onto dummy variables 
representing the three treatment groups; the control group was excluded so that it could 
act as a comparison group. The model is as follows: Family Values = β0 + β1Catholics 
Conservative + β2Catholics Progressive + β3Evangelicals Conservative + ε.
56 Regression 
results are available in Table 4.2. 
What we find is that, while all of the coefficients are negative, only those with 
respect to the “Catholics progressive” and “Evangelicals conservative” conditions are 
significant (b2 = -.08; b3 = -.07; p ≤ .10). The overall pattern of results supports H1: 
While participants moved in the direction of Catholic peers in the “Catholics progressive” 
condition, they moved away from the views of the Evangelical out-group. The “Catholics 
conservative” condition had no effect. 
 
Table 4.2: Effect of Treatment on Values for Whole Sample and by Strength of Identity 





Constant      .607  (.030)***      .743  (.043)***      .508  (.036)*** 
                                                 
56 I checked whether randomization failed with respect to several key variables, including social 
conservatism and general support for traditional Catholic Church teachings, across the four experimental 
groups, paying special attention to the all-important control (or comparison) group. Randomization was 













    -.073  (.040)^     -.118  (.059)*     -.027  (.047) 
N 207   91 116 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
In order to test H2—whether group influence is more evident among strong 
Catholic identifiers— the above equation was re-estimated with each of the variables 
representing the experimental stimuli also interacted with a dummy variable representing 
strong versus weak Catholic identity.57 This second model is as follows: Family Values = 
β0 + β1Catholics Conservative + β2Catholics Progressive + β3Evangelicals Conservative 
+ β4Identity + β5Catholics Conservative x Identity + β6Catholics Progressive x Identity + 
β7Evangelicals Conservative x Identity + ε. The coefficients on the interaction terms with 
respect to the “Catholics progressive” and “Evangelicals conservative” conditions 
approached, but did not reach, standard levels of statistical significance (b6 = -.10, p = 
.17; b7 = -.09, p = .23). However, the coefficients imply stronger experimental results for 
strong as compared to weak identifiers. 
If we re-run the original regression equation separately for strong and weak 
identifiers, the results reveal that it is the strong identifiers who are driving the original 
                                                 
57 Strong identifiers were those who scored above the Catholic Identity Scale median, and weak identifiers 
those who scored at or below the scale median. Those above the scale median chose the fourth or fifth 
response option on a 5-point scale for each of the four identity questions (see Appendix). E.g., in response 
to the question “When talking about Catholics, how often do you say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’?” strong 
identifiers answered “most of the time” or “all of the time.” 
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experimental results. See again Table 4.2. Those with strong Catholic identities were 
more influenced by the “Catholics progressive” and “Evangelicals conservative” stimuli 
than the sample as a whole (b2 = -.14; b3 = -.12; p ≤ .05). The coefficient representing the 
“Catholics conservative” stimulus group remained negative for strong identifiers, again 
contrary to expectations, but did not reach standard levels of significance. Among weak 
identifiers, there is no evidence of influence in response to any of the three sets of stimuli. 
Overall, the evidence supports the idea that group influence—both conformity to the in-
group, and deviation from the out-group—is mediated by identity. 
We turn next to the two emotion hypotheses. Because we expect that most 
participants understand traditional stands on family values to be dominant among 
Catholics, we expect that those participants with more traditional, or orthodox, views will 
feel prouder of their values overall (H3). The data show that this certainly is the case. 
Restricting our analysis to participants in the control group (to avoid any contamination 
of the post-test Pride-in-Values measure by the experimental stimuli), we find a very 
strong, positive correlation between participants’ conservatism on traditional family 
values and how proud they are of their values (r = .43, p ≤ .01). 
 Our final stop in testing the mechanisms of Social-Emotional Influence Theory is 
the examination of emotional patterns in response to the experimental stimuli (H4). 
Recall that 71% of participants said in the pre-test that they agreed with traditional church 
teachings on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality. In short, at least at the outset of the 
study, our sample was relatively conservative with respect to traditional family values. 
Therefore, we expect that participants will feel the most proud, and the least 
ashamed, in the “Catholics conservative” condition, as they reflect on the fact that their 
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values are in line with a majority of American Catholics. On the other hand, we expect 
that participants will feel less proud, and more ashamed, in the other two conditions: in 
response to the “Catholics progressive” stimulus (because participants’ values are out-of-
step with a progressive majority) and the “Evangelicals conservative” stimulus as well 
(because their values are in sync with a disliked out-group). See Figure 4.2. 
 


























Catholics conservative Catholics progressive Evangelicals conservative
Mean pride Mean shame
 
 
This is indeed what we find. Study participants felt more pride when they 
perceived that other Catholics are socially conservative and more shame when they 
learned either that Catholics are socially progressive or that Evangelicals are socially 
conservative. The differences in mean pride and shame between the “Catholics 
conservative” group and the other two groups are statistically significant (p ≤ .10).58 
                                                 
58 The total N for the analysis is 46, less than expected because many participants skipped these questions, 
which appeared at the end of the study and were preceded by a screening question that many participants 
found to be confusing. 
 84 
Finally, we ask one last question: Is any of this consequential with respect to 
American Catholics’ electoral behavior? Below, I assess the impact of participants’ views 
on traditional family values on three political variables closely related to voting behavior: 
how important it is that the president shares one’s moral values, approval of how Bush is 
handling his job as President, and whether one plans to vote for John McCain or Barack 
Obama in November of 2008.59 
These three variables were regressed separately onto an equation that included the 
Traditional Family Values Scale, Party Identification, Political Ideology, Age, Gender, 
and Class.60 The model investigated was as follows: DV = β0 + β1Family Values + 
β2Party + β3Ideology + β4Age + β5Gender + β6Class + ε.
61 All variables in the analyses 
were coded 0 to 1, with 1 representing the more conservative response. 
The analyses were first conducted with ordinary least squares regression. Those 
results are available in Table 4.3. The equation was then re-estimated with maximum 
likelihood probit regression with respect to the one dichotomous dependent variable 




                                                 
59 Precise question wording is available in the Appendix. 
60 Age is a continuous variable representing participants’ ages at the time of the study. Class is a five-
category variable ranging from lower class to upper class. Race and ethnicity were not included as control 
variables because of the racial/ethnic homogeneity of the sample. 
61 Using experimental data as one would survey data in this way necessitates that one check to make sure 
that the experimental manipulations have not affected one’s results. I first checked whether the 
experimental manipulations had direct effects on the three dependent variables by re-estimating the above 
equation with the three treatment variables included. No such effects were found. Second, I checked 
whether the treatment conditions primed traditional family values among participants or otherwise altered 
the effect of the Traditional Family Values Scale on the dependent variables. (I did this by re-estimating the 
above equation with two additional variables included: a variable representing receipt of a treatment and a 
Treatment x Family Values interaction term.) I found no evidence of priming or other interactive effects. 
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Table 4.3: Effect of Values Scale on Political Opinions (OLS Regression) 




Vote for McCain 
(over Obama) 
Constant      .145  (.087)^     -.181  (.084)*     -.242  (.137)^ 
Family Values Scale      .471  (.104)***      .301  (.101)**      .257  (.161) 
Party      .024  (.055)      .303  (.053)***      .372  (.087)*** 
Political Ideology      .174  (.097)^      .353  (.094)***      .767  (.148)*** 
Age      .065  (.080)     -.020  (.078)      .048  (.122) 
Gender       .004  (.037)     -.020  (.036)     -.106  (.055)^ 
Class      .072  (.077)      .028  (.074)      .181  (.118) 
R2      .261      .557      .560 
N 184 185 164 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Table 4.4: Effect of Values Scale on Vote Choice (Probit Regression) 
 Vote for McCain 
(over Obama) 
Marginal effects 
Family Values Scale      .532  (.303)^  
Party      .464  (.148)** 
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Political Ideology     1.250  (.295)*** 
Age      .121  (.251) 
Gender     -.204  (.096)^ 
Class      .320  (.235) 
Number of obs. 
Log likelihood 
Likelihood ratio chi-square 




    0.000 
Table entries are probit regression marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses. (Independent 
variables held at their means.)  ^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we see that the answer to the question of whether these 
values are relevant to electoral behavior among Catholics in the sample is “yes.” 
Participants who held more conservative stances on traditional family values were more 
likely to say that it is important that the president shares their moral values (b1 = .47, p ≤ 
.001) and to approve of President Bush’s performance in office (b1 = .30, p ≤ .01). In the 
latter case, the import of the Family Values Scale is on par with both political ideology 
and party; in the former case, the import of the scale far outpaces the other variables. 
Conservative stances on family values were also associated with intending to vote 
for McCain over Obama in November 2008 (ME1 = .53, p ≤ .10).
62 This said, note that, 
while the marginal effect of the Traditional Family Values Scale with respect to vote 
intention is quite large, the standard error is large as well, diminishing its statistical 
significance. It is likely that the relatively large standard errors attached to the vote 
                                                 
62 Because of the unintuitive nature of probit regression coefficients, the marginal effects of each of the 
independent variables (with the other independent variables held at their mean) are reported instead.  
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intention variable (in both the OLS and probit analyses) stem from the fact that Obama 
and McCain had not considerably differentiated themselves with respect to many socially 
conservative issues at the time of the study. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, the pattern of results observed largely reflect expectations: Catholics who 
learned that other Catholics hold “progressive family values” themselves moved in a 
liberal direction when compared to the control group. And Catholics who learned that 
Evangelicals (a religious out-group) hold traditional family values also moved in a liberal 
direction. As expected, the above findings were sharpened among those who highly 
identified as Catholics and were not evident among those who weakly identified as 
Catholics. These findings are especially compelling when we consider that most 
practicing Catholics are deeply respectful of Church hierarchy and, thus, likely less open 
to peer influence than members of other religious groups. 
 That participants’ values shifted in similar directions in response to news that 
most Catholics are progressive on traditional family values and that most Evangelicals 
are conservative may surprise some. Do Catholics dislike evangelical Protestants so much 
that they will rebel against traditional Church teachings in order to differentiate 
themselves from this out-group? The answer, which we assume to be “yes” from the 
regression analyses, is confirmed by evidence in the post-test. There, participants were 
given the opportunity to rate Catholics, Christians, and Evangelicals on a feeling 
thermometer, ranging from 0 to 100. On average, participants rated Evangelicals 
approximately 25 points lower than Catholics on the scale, whereas Christians in general 
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were rated only about 5 points lower. Ratings did not depend in any way on which 
experimental stimulus participants had received. The 25-point difference is just slightly 
less than conservatives’ and liberals’ average dislike for one another. 
 That the experimental results, which found Catholics moving in a progressive 
direction in response to the stimuli, were driven by highly identified Catholics may also 
surprise some. Those who highly identify as Catholics tend to be the most committed to 
orthodox views. Therefore, wouldn’t we expect these individuals to be the least likely to 
be swayed by progressive Catholic “public opinion”? If we take another look at our group 
identity measure, we are reminded why the answer, in keeping with Social-Emotional 
Influence Theory, is “no.” The items in the scale do not measure identification with the 
formal Church but to Catholics as a group. (One item—on the importance of being 
Catholic—is more ambiguous but yielded little variation.) Thus, we indeed expect highly 
identified participants to be quite sensitive to what Catholics as a group believe. 
 It is worth noting that the group influence and polarization described above 
occurred in a sample whose median age was 54. These were not impressionable youth. In 
fact, according to theories of political socialization, it is likely that the majority of the 
sample is at an age when their values and attitudes are at their most stable (Alwin, Cohen, 
and Newcomb 1991; Sears and Levy 2003). The fact that such mature participants were 
influenced by a brief exposure to group opinion weighs in favor of a lifelong openness 
model of political socialization (Kinder and Sears 1985; Sigel 1989).63 
 Before we move on to the emotion hypotheses, we must also note that the group 
influence aspect of the experiment did not go exactly as expected. One hypothesis was 
                                                 
63 In Chapters 5 and 6, the question of age-specific effects will arise. Note that I did not observe any 
interactions between the experimental stimuli and age in this experiment. That said, only about 10% of the 
sample was 35 or under, making it difficult to detect varying levels of influence according to age. 
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not supported:  that participants would become more socially conservative with respect to 
traditional family values when they perceived other Catholics to be supportive of those 
values. Why this particular disjuncture? 
 A helpful line of inquiry leads us back to the Catholic participants’ recruitment. 
Participants were recruited in church and, in some cases, were encouraged to participate 
by their parish priests; prospective participants read in the recruitment materials that the 
study was approved by their Archdiocese. With these facts in mind, one might guess that 
participants began the study on their best Catholic behavior. In other words, there likely 
existed an unseen, unspoken influence in addition to the experimental stimuli—the parish 
priest, the Church itself—that affected all participants, including those in the control, or 
comparison, group. Under such a scenario, it might be difficult to get participants to 
move further toward traditional Church points of view. 
 With respect to the emotion hypotheses, patterns of participants’ self-conscious 
emotions support the idea that these emotions play an important role in group influence. 
First, the strong relationship between feeling proud of one’s values and holding 
conservative values (i.e., values in line with the Catholic Church) suggests that pride—
again, a positive emotion stemming from the approval of important others—is tightly 
wrapped up with Catholics’ views on traditional family values. This correlation suggests 
that if we dislodge participants’ perceptions of what views garner others’ approval, then 
we will dislodge the views as well. 
Second, study participants, most of whom expressed support for traditional family 
values at the outset of the study, felt the most proud and the least ashamed when they 
learned that most Catholics support traditional family values; by contrast, they felt the 
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least proud and the most ashamed when they learned that most Catholics oppose 
traditional family values or, notably, that most Evangelicals support family values. These 
patterns do not prove emotional mediation of the observed influence, but they strongly 
suggest that self-conscious emotions played a role. 
 Finally, the last analysis strongly suggests that social-emotional influence among 
Catholics over traditional family values matters deeply to Catholics’ electoral behavior. 
For example, those who held more traditional views on morality were more likely to 
approve of President Bush’s performance in office and to say that they intend to vote for 
McCain over Obama in November 2008. 
While there is much to appreciate in the Catholic Family Values study, it has its 
weaknesses as well. Perhaps the study’s greatest weakness is the fact that it suggests, but 
does not demonstrate, emotional mediation of group influence over values. Furthermore, 
each test of the emotion hypotheses relies on emotion measures embedded in the 
questionnaire, which can be problematic. Even if we were to conduct a careful statistical 
analysis of emotional mediation relying on our questionnaire measures of emotion, we 
could not be certain that emotions are causal agents; they may be epiphenomenal, simply 
co-varying with the “real” source of group influence. In addition, questionnaire measures 
of emotions are prone to error because people are often unaware of their emotional 
reactions, and, when they are aware, they will sometimes purposefully misstate them for 
normative reasons. Thus, a clearer demonstration of the emotional aspects of SEI theory 
would find a way to exogenously manipulate participants’ emotional reactions to peer 
opinion stimuli. This is the territory into which we venture next in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix A: Stimuli 
 
Catholics conservative condition 
 
PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY. 
 
WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER  
SOME RELATED QUESTIONS 
 
Recent Polls Indicate Catholics Are Strong Supporters of Family 
Values 
 
As you may know, the issue of “family values” continues to be discussed in 
the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find 
out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For 
example, one recent survey indicates that American Catholics today 
continue to strongly support traditional family values. According to the 
survey: 
 
• The majority of Catholics who marry stay married and never divorce. 
• A majority of Catholics oppose abortion. 
• A majority of Catholics oppose gay marriage. 
 
What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values. 
 
Catholics progressive condition 
 
PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY. 
 
WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER 
SOME RELATED QUESTIONS 
 
Recent Polls Indicate Catholics Are Less Supportive of Family Values 
 
As you may know, the issue of “family values” continues to be discussed in 
the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find 
out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For 
example, one recent survey indicates that American Catholics today seem 
to question the importance of traditional family values. According to the 
survey: 
 
• A majority of Catholics say one can be a good Catholic without obeying the 
Church’s teaching on divorce. 
• A majority of Catholics say one can be a good Catholic without obeying the 
Church’s teaching on abortion. 
• A majority of Catholics say the Church’s opposition to gay marriage is not 
very important to them. 
 
What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values. 
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Evangelicals conservative condition 
 
PLEASE READ THE TEXT BELOW CAREFULLY. 
 
WHEN YOU ARE DONE, ADVANCE TO THE NEXT PAGE TO ANSWER 
SOME RELATED QUESTIONS 
 
Recent Polls Indicate Evangelicals Are Strong Supporters of Family 
Values 
 
As you may know, the issue of “family values” continues to be discussed in 
the media. From time-to-time, public opinions polls are carried out to find 
out what different types of Americans believe regarding family values. For 
example, one recent survey indicates that American Evangelical (or “born 
again”) Christians today are strong supporters of traditional family values. 
According to the survey: 
 
• A majority of Evangelicals say that divorce should be avoided, even in the 
event of an unhappy marriage. 
• A majority of Evangelicals oppose abortion. 
• A majority of Evangelicals oppose gay marriage. 
 
What about you? We would like to know your opinion on family values. 
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Appendix B: Measures 
 
Traditional Family Values Scale
64 
Divorce in this country should be more difficult to obtain than it is now. 
Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to work out their marriage 
problems. 
It is wrong for a man and a woman to have sexual relations before marriage. 
It’s a good idea for a couple who intend to get married to live together first. 
Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is wrong.  
Homosexual couples should have the right to marry one another.  
Sex education has no place in the nation’s public schools.  
Methods of birth control should be available to teenagers who need them.  
Mothers should stay home to raise children, especially when children are young.  
Women should feel free to work full-time outside the home even if they have young 
children.  
There has been discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions 
below best represents your view? (By law, abortion should never be permitted. / The 
law should permit abortion only in the case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life 
is in danger. / The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or 
danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly 
established. / By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a 
matter of personal choice. / Other, please specify.) 
                                                 
64 Answer categories for all of the Likert statements were: Strongly agree /Agree / Slightly agree / Neither 
agree nor disagree / Slightly disagree / Disagree / Strongly disagree. 
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Catholic Identity Scale 
How important is being Catholic to you? (Not very important / Somewhat important / 
Moderately important / Very important / Extremely important) 
To what extent do you see yourself as a typical Catholic? (Not at all typical / Not very 
typical / Somewhat typical / Moderately typical / Very typical) 
How well does the term “Catholic” describe you? (Not very well / Somewhat well / 
Moderately well / Very well / Extremely well) 
When talking about Catholics, how often do you say “we” instead of “they”? (Never / 





Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on divorce? 
Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on pre-marital sex 
and co-habitation? 
Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on homosexuality? 
Reflecting on your answer above, how proud are you of your views on abortion? 
Reflecting on your answers above, how proud are you of your views on sex education 
and birth control for teens? 




                                                 
65 Each of the items had five answer choices: Not proud at all / Somewhat proud / Moderately proud / Very 
proud / Extremely proud. 
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Emotional Reactions to Stimuli
66
 
Did the information make you feel [proud / ashamed]? 
 
Agreement with Traditional Church Teachings 
To what extent would you say you agree with traditional Church teachings on issues like 
marriage, abortion, homosexuality, etc.? (Completely agree / Mostly agree / Somewhat 
agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Somewhat disagree / Mostly disagree / Completely 
disagree) 
 
Important that President Shares Values 
How important is it to you that the President of the United States shares your moral 




Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as 
president? (Strongly approve / Approve / Neither approve nor disapprove / Disapprove / 
Strongly disapprove) 
 
Candidate Preference in 2008 Presidential Election
67
 
With respect to the upcoming Presidential election (in November 2008), if John McCain 
is the Republican candidate and Barack Obama is the Democratic candidate, then who do 
                                                 
66 Answer categories ranged from “not at all” (0) to “extremely” (4). 
67 This question was recoded to create a dichotomous variable: 1 = McCain vote, 0 = Obama vote. 
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you think you will vote for? (John McCain / Barack Obama / None of the above / I do not 





Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent? (Republican / Democrat / Independent / Other) 
 
Political Ideology 
There is a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. How would you 
describe your own political viewpoint? (Very conservative / Conservative / Slightly 
conservative / Middle of the road–moderate / Slightly liberal / Liberal / Very liberal) 
                                                 










Social-Emotional Influence and College Students’ 
Belief in the Protestant Ethic 
 
 
The peculiarity of this philosophy of avarice appears to be…above all the idea of a duty 
of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. 
Truly what is here preached is not simply a means of making one’s way in the world, but 
a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated not as foolishness but as 






In the previous chapter, I presented experimental evidence to bolster the claim that group 
influence over values depends on individuals’ psychological identification with the 
group. That chapter also included suggestive evidence that the self-conscious emotions 
pride and shame mediate the effect of identity but stopped short of demonstrating such 
mediation. In this chapter, again drawing on experimental data, I examine the role self-
conscious emotions play in group influence more carefully by exogenously arousing the 
emotions pride and embarrassment. I also seek to verify the role of subjective 
identification in influence with respect to a new social group, college peers. 
 The experiment discussed in this chapter focuses on social-emotional influence 
over the value economic individualism for two reasons. First, economic individualism 
represents a sharp contrast to traditional family values, allowing us to test whether SEI 
Theory is relevant to a broad range of politically relevant values. I conceptualize 
economic individualism as the sum of two sub-components: a belief in “hard work” and 
                                                 
69 From Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism ([1930] 1992). Page 51. 
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financial self-reliance (Feldman 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Second, economic 
individualism occupies perhaps an even more central place in American political culture 
(Feldman 1999; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Weber 1992) and plays a very important role 
in shaping the public’s attitudes toward the welfare state and social welfare policy 
(Feldman 1988; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Markus 2001). If social-emotional 
influence can be shown to affect Americans’ adherence to so popular and important a 
value, then the “real world” political implications are all the greater. In addition, 
demonstrating influence over a value so ingrained in American culture represents a 
conservative, and, if successful, more persuasive test of the theory. 
 The relevant identity (or reference) group in the experiment is University of 
Michigan undergraduates. While it is somewhat unusual in political science to consider a 
college community to be a politically important identity group, social identity theories 
(Brown 2000; Fiske 2004; Turner 1991) certainly would consider school peers to be 
reference or identity group members. And research suggests that, for college students, 
their university identity is an important one. In a study by Moskalenko, McCauley, and 
Rozin (2006), University of Pennsylvania students rated their university as more 
important to them than their ethnic or religious groups; only family and country were 
more important to students than their university affiliation. Identification with college 
peers was so important in Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb’s (1991) study that it affected 
participants’ post-college spousal and friendship choices and political views many years 
later. Anecdotally, note that the second-most popular social networking website in the 
United States, Facebook, was until recently organized around colleges and universities. 
With respect to the University of Michigan, a visit to Ann Arbor on “game day”—when 
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tens of thousands of maize and blue bedecked students and alums pack into Michigan 
stadium—suggests a strong identification with the university among those who attend it. 
 In conjunction with subjective identification with college peers, I test the effects 
of the self-conscious emotions pride and embarrassment. I chose embarrassment, rather 
than shame, because embarrassment is a less uncomfortable emotion than shame. Given 
that the design, as I explain below, includes priming participants’ emotions, I prefer 
examining embarrassment over shame, ceteris paribus, for ethical reasons. 
 
The Economic Individualism Experiment 
Study Administration and Sample Characteristics 
Participants were recruited from the University of Michigan’s Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool and participated in person during the spring of 2006. In order to counteract 
the isolating effects of the sterile lab environment, I took steps to create a somewhat 
“natural” group environment. All but three students took part in groups of two or more; 
almost 90% took part with at least three other students. Participants were seated around a 
large table, and they were allowed to talk prior to the experiment if they chose. Group 
identity was also subtly primed by placing the same light blue University of Michigan 
folder in front of each participant prior to the study (the folder contained two copies of 
the consent form) and by giving each student a University of Michigan pen with which to 
fill out the questionnaires. Four identical-looking versions of a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire were randomly distributed to participants. 
 100 
After all students had finished filling out the questionnaires, they were thoroughly 
debriefed regarding the deceptive manipulations present in the study as well as the 
essential roles that these manipulations played in testing the experimental hypotheses. 
The sample was restricted to U.S. citizens but otherwise any member of the 
Subject Pool could take part. Most of the student participants were nineteen years of age 
(this was also the mean age) and college freshman. Fifty-two percent were men and 48% 
women. In response to the question “What racial or ethnic group, or groups, best 
describes you?” 78% identified as white on their first mention and 8% as African 
American.70 Fifty-nine percent of the sample considered themselves to be “liberal,” 27% 
“conservative,” and 14% considered themselves “moderate.” Forty-seven percent were 
Democrats, 23% Republican, and 31% Independent or “other.” 
 
Study Design 
The experiment had a 2x2 design. I randomly varied two factors: participants’ 
perceptions of whether most University of Michigan undergraduates support or oppose 
economic individualism, and whether or not participants’ self-conscious emotions were 
primed. The experimental design, including the number of participants in each cell whose 




                                                 
70 Figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number. In addition, approximately 5% of students 
identified as Hispanic, 7% as Asian, 2% as Native American, and 1% as Jewish. Data were also collected 
on students’ religious preference: 59% were Christian, 20% Jewish, 4% Muslim, 2% Hindu or Buddhist, 
and 16% agnostic or atheist. 
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Table 5.1: Experimental Design 
 No emotion Emotion 
Pro-value / Agree 23 20 
Anti-value / Disagree 22 20 
 
The study questionnaires contained a pre-test immediately preceding the stimuli 
which contained value, political ideology, and identification measures and a post-test 
following the stimuli which contained emotion and various dependent measures. 
Let me discuss the experimental design in more detail. The study was designed to 
examine social influence over only those individuals who were unambiguous supporters 
of economic individualism (i.e., most American college students). Because there was no 
good opportunity to pre-screen according to value-belief, two pro-economic 
individualism statements were included in the pre-test (“Individuals should strive to be 
financially self-reliant” and “One ought to work hard in life”) and data from those who 
did not agree with both statements were set aside from the analyses reported on below.71 
Half of participants read poll results that most University of Michigan 
undergraduates support economic individualism; the other half read poll results that most 
of these students oppose economic individualism. All poll results were in fact fabricated. 
Because all participants (whose data are analyzed below) supported economic 
individualism, those in the pro-value condition learned that they were in agreement with 
the majority of their peers with respect to economic individualism, and those in the anti-
value condition learned that they were in disagreement with the majority. Participants 
who learned that they agreed with the majority of their peers were expected to feel some 
                                                 
71 As expected, only a small number of participants—approximately 15% of the initial sample—did not 
wholeheartedly support economic individualism; most of these individuals were not opposed to the value 
per se but, rather, expressed ambivalence (i.e., neutrality) with respect to one of the two statements. 
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pride as a result; participants who learned that they in fact disagreed with the majority 
were expected to feel some embarrassment or shame. 
The opinion information was presented to participants as the results of a study 
conducted by UCLA during the prior year. Students read a short paragraph describing the 
fictional study72 and then were presented with the percentages of Michigan undergrads 
who supposedly believed in the values of “hard work” and “financial self-reliance.” The 
information was conveyed with text as well as pie-charts. The two questions that 
University of Michigan undergraduates had supposedly answered for the UCLA poll 
were exact copies of the economic individualism items that study participants answered 
in the pre-test. At the bottom of the page on which the UCLA poll results were presented 
was a question intended to get students to think actively about whether their answers to 
the two items placed them in agreement or disagreement with the majority. See Appendix 
A for a reproduction of the “pro-value” value-belief stimulus. 
Next, the study tested for emotional mediation by experimentally arousing the 
presumed mediator (self-conscious emotions) in participants (MacKinnon, Fairchild, and 
Fritz 2007). The pro-value / anti-value factor was crossed with an emotion factor: 
whether or not relevant self-conscious emotions were exaggerated with emotion primes 
preceding the value stimulus.73 Emotions were exogenously manipulated for two reasons. 
First, exogenous manipulation allowed me to isolate the causal effects of emotion. In 
                                                 
72 Details were given about the fabricated research study in order to increase the believability of the 
information being conveyed. UCLA was chosen as the institution supposedly conducting the research 
because they had actually conducted a somewhat similar study of university students in years past. A post-
test probe did not turn up any skepticism with regard to the veracity of the opinion stimuli. 
73 Some may be skeptical of the fact that the emotion primes preceded the opinion stimulus. But nothing is 
out of order causally; the primes were expected to change how participants perceived the experimental 
stimuli that followed and, therefore, participants’ emotional reactions to those stimuli. Emotion primes 
(and inductions) are commonly used in this way in psychology (e.g., see Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and 
Fischhoff 2003; Small and Lerner 2005). 
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contrast, relying primarily on measures of “natural” emotional reactions to the opinion 
stimuli runs the risk of confusing emotional states with traits (see Lazarus 1991) or of 
confusing causal factors with epiphenomena. Second, for a variety of reasons, it is simply 
difficult to measure emotions with great accuracy.74 
In the pro-value condition, approximately half of the participants were randomly 
assigned to read three emotional scenarios intended to prime pride. In the anti-value 
condition, approximately half of participants read three emotional scenarios in a similar 
format but intended to prime embarrassment. See Appendix A for these stimuli. 
Emotion priming is still a new technique in political science, and, therefore, 
further explanation of the nature and role of emotion primes is needed. Typically, the 
goal of priming is to unobtrusively evoke an emotion in order to test its effects. In one set 
of studies, a subliminal (i.e., “suboptimal”) happy face caused study participants to 
evaluate subsequent neutral stimuli more positively on average (Zajonc 1980; 
Winkielman, Zajonc, and Schwarz 1997). In another study, emotional movie clips caused 
participants to evaluate a congruent emotional display as more intense (Hansen and 
Shantz 1995). These and other findings have significant implications with respect to 
theories in psychology; however, for our purposes, we are interested in the fact that 
emotion primes ought to alter participants’ reactions to stimuli that follow accordingly. 
 In the Economic Individualism Experiment, among those who would have 
experienced pride or embarrassment spontaneously in reaction to the opinion stimuli, we 
                                                 
74 Emotion is difficult to measure for two key reasons. First, much of the workings of our emotions are 
outside of conscious awareness (LeDoux 1996), meaning that asking people questions about their emotions 
is of somewhat limited value. Second, often cultural norms that regulate emotional expression will motivate 
individuals to either exaggerate or hide emotions that they are experiencing (Lewis 2000); such efforts 
introduce error into question-based, as well as observation-based, emotion measures. It is in part because of 
these difficulties that biological measures of emotion are gaining in popularity (e.g., testing for chemical 
compounds in body fluids, such as saliva; skin conductance tests; fMRI studies); however, these methods 
generally have not advanced to the point where they can accurately measure self-conscious emotions. 
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expect that the primes will ensure that these emotions will be felt with greater intensity. 
Among those who would not have experienced these emotions naturally in response to 
the opinion stimuli, we expect that the primes will increase the likelihood that pride or 
embarrassment will be felt in reaction to those stimuli.75 In so doing, the primes allow us 
to test whether pride and embarrassment mediate social influence. 
Also note that experimental participants in general are typically either unaware of 
the emotion-inducing purpose of a prime or they are unaware of the prime’s presence 
altogether (e.g., see Zajonc 1980). Thus, participants remain unaware that their emotions 
are being manipulated. This is considered to be a good thing by experimentalists, given 
that awareness of the intended manipulation may cause participants to act unnaturally, try 
to “outsmart” the experiment, etc. In the study described in this chapter, the emotion 
primes were disguised as study questions for this reason. 
Finally, emotion primes ought to be as simple as possible, and any non-emotional 
content of a prime ought to be unrelated to the stimuli that follow; otherwise, the 
researcher will have difficulty knowing whether the effect of the prime was due to 
emotional arousal or something else. For example, this study could have primed pride by 
exposing participants in the pro-value condition to peer quotes praising people who 
believe in hard work, but then we would not be certain whether the increased 
persuasiveness of the opinion polls was due to pride or more cognitive reactions (e.g., 
perceiving that the opinions represented in the poll were more strongly held). 
 
                                                 
75 This is because experiencing an emotion increases the likelihood that one will appraise situations as 
containing structural elements that are congruent with the emotion (Lazarus 1991). For example, if a person 
feels angry about something and then, a moment later, has a conversation with a stranger, that person is 
much more likely to perceive that the stranger has said something offensive, leading to anger. 
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Key Measures 
The study gauged the effects of the stimuli on participants’ beliefs regarding economic 
individualism with two dependent measures. The first dependent measure was the 
averaged “rank,” or importance, participants assigned to two statements in support of the 
value economic individualism: “To make ends meet, people should rely on their own 
hard work, not on other people or the government,” and “The government should see to it 
that all Americans have the basic necessities: food, clothing, and shelter.”76 (Participants 
were asked to rank six political value statements in all; see Appendix B.) These two 
statements were correlated at -.28. Both statements were re-coded so that high numbers 
reflect greater individualism. The short scale ranges from 0 to 1, with a mean of .45. 
Note that the ranking variable is “ipsative,” meaning that, each time a number is 
assigned to one of the value statements, it cannot be assigned to any of the other 
statements. An important result of this quality is that it is more difficult to experimentally 
influence how individuals rank a particular value because that ranking depends on the 
ranks of so many others. For this reason, the economic individualism ranking is the most 
conservative of the two dependent measures. 
The second dependent measure is the average of responses to two questions on 
government policy which heavily implicate the value “economic individualism.” The first 
question asked participants whether the federal government ought to give scholarships to 
all low-income high school graduates or only to those who have taken rigorous courses in 
                                                 
76 The ranking variable was used (as opposed to a variable assessing participants’ relative support for 
economic individualism) because it was thought that the reappearance of the two pre-test economic 
individualism items, or similar Likert-style items, in the post-test would clue participants in to the purpose 
of the experiment. The ranking variable, with its novel format and six different value statements to grapple 
with, promised to help disguise the intent of the study. While the ranking method is not typically used by 
political scientists, it is one that Rokeach (1973) forcefully recommends. 
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high school. The second asked participants whether the federal government should 
provide welfare benefits to all low-income single mothers or only to those who are 
willing to work for those benefits. (See Appendix B for exact question wording.) 
Answers to these questions are correlated at .33.77 The additive scale was recoded to 
range from 0 to 1, and so that relatively individualistic answers are represented by higher 
numbers. The mean is .54. The format of both questions was modeled on a format 
frequently used by the American National Election Study. These two questions offered 
the benefit of measuring value change in an unobtrusive way, as well as illustrating the 
impact the stimuli could have on “real” political attitudes, as opposed to abstract values.78 
The questionnaire included measures of two other important variables: 
participants’ subjective membership in the identity group in question, and participants’ 
feelings. In order to test whether variations in identification contributed to greater or 
lesser social influence, the pre-test included the following question: “Generally speaking, 
how close do you feel to U of M undergraduates—to what extent do you feel that they are 
like you in terms of their ideas and interests and feelings about things?”79 
In addition, a battery of emotion items was asked immediately following the 
opinion stimulus to provide a secondary test of emotional mediation. The instructions 
read: “Describe how you feel right now by indicating the extent to which you feel each 
emotion.” Answer choices, arrayed on a five-point scale, ranged from “not at all” to 
                                                 
77 The alpha for this short scale is .49. Reliability is low in part because only two measures were used. Note 
that patterns of regression results presented below are similar when the variables are assessed separately. 
78 Even though they focus on specific policies, these questions can ably assess value change because one of 
the key underlying values used to evaluate the locus of value (Rescher 1982), i.e., welfare recipients 
working or not and scholarship recipients taking rigorous courses or not, is economic individualism. 
Certainly other values may be used to evaluate the various response options (e.g., sympathy for the poor), 
but these other values are not being experimentally manipulated and, thus, their effects should not vary 
across the experimental groups. 
79 The format of this question has been used for many years by the American National Election Study and 
was introduced by Gurin and Townsend (1986). 
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“extremely.” This battery of questions was based on a widely-used emotion measure 
called the “Profile of Mood States” (POMS) created by McNair and Droppleman (1971). 
The emotions were listed in alphabetical order. Responses in the “embarrassment” family 
(“embarrassed” and “insecure”) were added to responses in the “pride” family (“proud” 
and “self-confident”) to create a measure of subjective self-conscious emotional intensity. 
The scale ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing greater emotional intensity. The mean 
for this measure was .31. 
 
Hypotheses 
We can investigate several hypotheses that stem from the Social-Emotional Influence 
model with data from the Economic Individualism Experiment. 
The first hypothesis test (H1) focuses on simple group influence: The (perceived) 
values of college peers will generate conformity among participants. In other words, 
when no emotions are aroused, participants in the pro-value condition will express more 
individualistic views than participants in the anti-value condition. 
The second hypothesis (H2) relates to the import of emotion: Self-conscious 
emotions will increase conformity to peers’ perceived values. In other words, self-
conscious emotions, measured objectively via assignment to the “emotion” condition and 
subjectively via participants’ stated emotional reactions to the stimuli, will increase value 
differences between the pro-value and anti-value experimental groups. 



































Finally, the third hypothesis (H3) turns to social identity: The above relationships 
will be mediated by participants’ sense of identification with college peers. Those 
participants who said that they feel closer and more similar to other UM undergraduates 
will on average conform more than others; those few who suggest they do not identify 
with other Michigan students should not conform at all. 
 
Data Analyses 
Statistical analyses were carried out with ordinary least squares regression. I regressed 
the value and policy scales onto a binary variable representing the pro-value condition, a 
binary variable representing the emotion condition, and an interactive variable (also 
binary) representing those who were assigned to both the pro-value and the emotion 
condition. The general regression model is as follows: DV = β0 + β1Value + β2Emotion + 
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β3Value x Emotion + β4, β5Controls + ε. Because of the interaction term, the Value 
variable represents the subset of participants also in the “no emotion” condition (i.e., 
when Emotion = 0), and the Emotion variable represents participants also in the “anti-
value” condition (i.e., when Value = 0). The excluded group, represented by the constant 
term, is those assigned to the anti-value, no emotion condition. 
 Randomization across the treatment groups failed with respect to gender, and so 
gender was added as a control variable. While there were no statistically significant 
differences across the treatment groups with respect to political ideology,80 ideology was 
also added as a control variable because of the close association between ideology and 
the dependent variables and the small size of the sample. 
 For H1 to be supported, b1 must be positive and statistically significant. For H2 to 
be supported, b2 must be negative and statistically significant, and the combination of b2 
+ b3 must be positive and statistically significant. Table 5.2, below, explains how the 
means for each experimental group are calculated from the regression results. For H3 to 
be supported, the aforementioned relationships must show evidence of being mediated by 
peer group identification. 
 
Table 5.2: Calculating Experimental Group Means 
 No emotion Emotion 
Pro-value / Agree b0 + b1 (+ controls) b0 + b1 + b2 + b3 (+ controls) 
Anti-value / Disagree b0 (+ controls) b0 + b2 (+ controls) 
 
                                                 
80 Ideology was measured in the pre-test with a seven-point scale, ranging from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. 
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 The value ranking scale variable was first regressed onto the independent 
measures and control variables. The value scale variable yielded disappointing results; 
none of the coefficients of interest were close to reaching standard levels of significance. 
However, the policy scale variable yielded much more encouraging, if modest, results. 
See the first column of results below in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Results for Policy Scale Variable with Two Different Emotion Measures 
 
Policy Scale 
Emotion group assigned 
Policy Scale 
Subjective emotion intensity 
Constant   .459  (.074)***    .617  (.108)*** 
b1 Pro-value  -.061  (.071)   -.246  (.125)* 
b2 Emotion  -.105  (.073)  -.579  (.261)* 
b3 Value x Emotion   .183  (.108)^    .835  (.364)*  
b4 Ideology   .212  (.095)*    .215  (.094)*  
b5 Gender   .041  (.057)    .002  (.053)  
N 79 77 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
There is no significant difference between the pro-value and anti-value treatment 
groups when emotion is held at zero. (The coefficient b1 is not statistically significant.) 
H1 is, therefore, not supported. However, the b2 coefficient nears significance, and the 
sign is in the expected direction (b2 = -.11, p = .16). Among those who received the anti-
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individualism opinion stimulus, post-test views were less individualistic on average if 
participants also received the emotion (i.e., embarrassment) stimulus. In addition, the b3 
coefficient (.18) is significant at the p ≤ .10 level. This reveals that there is indeed an 
interactive relationship; participants’ reaction to the two sets of value stimuli changed 
when self-conscious emotions were primed. Finally, if we add b2 and b3, we get .08; the 
sum is significant at p = .07.81 This is the final evidence we need to support H2. Among 
those who received the pro-individualism stimulus, post-test views were more 
individualistic on average if participants also received the emotion (i.e., pride) stimulus. 
To clarify these relationships, the estimated group means are graphed below in 
Figure 5.2. 
 



















                                                 
81 To calculate the significance level of the effect of emotion on those who received the pro-value stimulus, 
i.e., the sum of b2 and b3, I took the square root of the following: var(b2) + (Value)
2var(b3) + 
2(Value)cov(b2, b3). See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006). 
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In the graph, ideology is held at its median (“slightly liberal”) and gender is held 
at zero (males), although note that this latter decision makes little difference as gender 
has no significant effect on the dependent variable. We see in the graph that, although the 
opinion stimuli on their own did not affect attitudes as expected, participants’ opinions 
moved in the direction of conformity with the stimuli when pride or embarrassment was 
primed.82 
One important drawback of the above analysis, however, is that it only takes into 
account whether or not participants were assigned to receive an emotion prime. It does 
not include any measure of participants’ subjective emotional experiences, including any 
strong emotional reactions (pride or embarrassment) participants may have had to the 
value stimuli when the emotion primes were not present. Therefore, I carried out a second 
analysis, replacing assignment to an emotion group with participants’ subjective 
emotional reactions. The statistical model is the same as that used above, except that 
“emotion” ranges from zero to .625 (the top of the scale, 1, is not reached). Findings with 
this second emotion measure are presented in the second column of Table 5.3 (above). 
Here, there is a significant difference between the pro-value and anti-value 
treatment groups when emotion is held at zero. The coefficient b1 (-.25) is statistically 
significant at p ≤ .10. However, the sign is in the wrong direction: In response to the pro-
individualism stimulus, participants who had no self-conscious emotional reaction to the 
stimuli (they may or may not have received the emotion prime) expressed less of a 
commitment to individualism. Thus, H1 is not supported in this analysis either. However, 
both the b2  (-.58) and the b3  (.84) coefficients reach a significance level of p ≤ .05 and 
                                                 
82 The raw means show the same pattern of results. Means were .51 for the pro-value message group, and 
.59 for the pride plus pro-value message group; one-tailed t-test p=.12. Means were .58 for the anti-value 
message group and .47 for the embarrassment plus anti-value message group; one-tailed t-test p=.08. 
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are in the expected direction. Among those who received the anti-individualism stimulus, 
post-test views became less individualistic—as we would expect and as we saw in the last 
analysis—as the intensity of embarrassment, pride, etc. increased. When we add b2 and 
b3, we get .26, which implies that, in the pro-value condition, emotion intensity pushes 
opinion in the individualism direction, again as we expect and saw before. However, 
while the magnitude of this effect is large, the significance level is only p = .25. 
Again, these effects are easier to digest when graphed. Predicted values are 
graphed below in Figure 5.3. 
 




















The effect of emotion is examined at 0, at its mid-point (.3125), and at its end-
point (.625); ideology is set to its median and gender to zero.83 It is of note that the two 
lines cross when the self-conscious emotion intensity scale is at its median. Those who 
experienced a less intense emotional reaction than most tended to counter-argue against 
the value stimuli, whereas those who experienced a more intense emotional reaction than 
most were increasingly persuaded by the stimuli. It may be that not only are self-
conscious emotions associated with conformity, but that low levels of self-conscious 
emotion are actually associated with resisting conformity. 
There is one more hypothesis yet to test. H3 suggests that these results are 
mediated to some extent by participants’ identification with the “in-group” (i.e., 
University of Michigan undergraduates). To test this hypothesis, I estimated the basic 
regression model with the assigned emotion groups separately for three levels of 
identification: low, median, and high.84 As we see below in Table 5.4, the key 
coefficients are not significant when closeness to UM undergraduates is low or moderate, 
but they are significant when closeness is high. This implies that the relationships 
specified in H2 are indeed mediated by identity; high identifiers appear to be the ones 
most affected by the emotion primes. However, the findings also reveal that the 
counterintuitive effect observed among those who received the pro-value opinion 
stimulus but no emotion prime (B1) is also mediated by identity; high identifiers were the 
only ones to move away from the opinion stimulus when emotion was not primed. 
                                                 
83 Note also that results for the value scale dependent variable grow closer to standard levels of significance 
when emotional intensity is included in the statistical model rather than assignment to an emotion priming 
group. Coefficients are signed as they are in the policy scale analysis, but the interaction term only reaches 
a p-level of .34. 
84 The identification variable—a feeling of closeness or similarity to other UM students—technically had 
five possible values. However, the lowest (“not close at all”) and highest (“very close”) values were chosen 
by only a handful of participants, and so I assigned the next closest value to these participants. 
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Constant      n.s.      .415 (.074)***          .618  (.132)*** 
b1 Pro-value      n.s.      n.s.     -.249  (.142)^ 
b2 Emotion      n.s.      n.s.     -.298  (.151)^ 
b3 Value x Emotion      n.s.      n.s.      .399  (.207)^ 
b4 Ideology      .606^      n.s.      n.s. 
b5 Gender      n.s.      n.s.      n.s. 
N 15 36 25 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
This said, note that the pattern of results displayed in Table 5.4 emerged only with 
respect to the assigned emotion variable; when the analysis was repeated with the 
subjective emotion intensity variable, the findings were not significant for high identifiers 
and no similar pattern emerged. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, the findings suggest that the self-conscious emotions pride and embarrassment 
play an important role in increasing individuals’ susceptibility to social influence by 
peers. When student participants simply read opinion information about other students’ 
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beliefs regarding economic individualism, they were not influenced on average; however, 
when their sense of pride or embarrassment was primed preceding the stimulus, 
participants on average did respond to the stimulus as expected by conforming their 
views on economic individualism to the perceived views of their college peers. The same 
pattern occurred with respect to the measured intensity of participants’ self-conscious 
emotional reactions to the stimuli. 
 While Hypothesis 1 was not supported, these somewhat disappointing results can 
be interpreted as lending even stronger support to Hypotheses 2: Only with self-conscious 
emotional priming, or self-conscious emotional reactions above the median, did the 
information regarding the value-beliefs of college peers influence participants. Returning 
to the critique of Turner’s (and self-categorization theory’s) emphasis on cognition in 
Chapter 1, these findings suggest that emotion may be important because it has the 
potential to problematize ways in which we are different from our peers, or make ways in 
which we are similar appear to be great successes. In other words, we differ from peers in 
many respects, and we are similar to peers in many respects. But only when we feel 
emotionally self-conscious about these similarities or differences—self-consciously lousy 
or self-consciously elated—are we motivated to conform. 
 There is an important caveat to these findings, however: The value ranking 
variable proved tough to experimentally manipulate. Regression findings with respect to 
the value scale dependent variable tended to push in the same direction as the policy scale 
findings, but the value scale findings never reached standard levels of significance. 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 posited that high identifiers would be more susceptible to 
social influence in general, and to social-emotional influence in particular. High 
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identifiers did not appear to be more susceptible to social influence in the absence of the 
emotion primes; in fact, high identifiers were the only participants who, on average, 
moved opposite the opinion stimuli in this condition. However, these participants were 
also the only ones who appeared to be susceptible to social influence when either pride or 
embarrassment was primed. Why might this pattern exist? 
We can leverage additional information from the experiment to understand better 
why the high identifiers were not susceptible to influence in the absence of emotion 
primes. Seventeen participants, whose data are not analyzed in the OLS regressions 
above, were part of a “pure” control group. If we restrict our focus to just those control 
participants who were high identifiers, we find that their mean position on the policy 
scale (M = .5) was almost exactly the same as the mean among those who received just 
the pro-value stimulus (M = .49). Those who received just the anti-value stimulus 
expressed views that were more individualistic than both the control and the pro-value 
group (M = .68). In sum, it was those who received the anti-economic individualism 
stimulus who polarized against their peers’ views. 
One way of understanding these results is by hypothesizing that Michigan 
students who highly identify with the student body feel more confident in their values. In 
a low intensity social situation like the one represented in the Economic Individualism 
Experiment, the well-integrated students may label disagreeing peers as a value out-
group—in this case, “lazy” student peers—and recoil against those perceived inferior 
values, championing their own values even more strongly. This said, if indeed these 
results are due to a greater feeling of confidence, or subjective validity, this feeling 
dissipated once the students’ self-conscious emotions were primed. I argue that the pride 
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and embarrassment primes increased the salience of peer approval in these participants’ 
minds, motivating them to loosen their commitment to their previously held values. The 
only problem with this interpretation is that it does not mesh with the finding in Chapter 4 
that strong Catholic identifiers exhibited the most influence, even when peers were 
perceived as championing values with which participants largely disagreed at the outset. 
This discrepancy will be taken up in the concluding chapter. 
 Moving on, an important counterargument can be made that challenges the 
observed effects of the emotion primes. Perhaps participants’ emotional arousal, in 
general—and not self-conscious emotions, in particular—motivated greater attention to 
the experimental stimuli. To address this argument, I additively combined subjective 
measures of three “basic” emotions—anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm—just as I had 
combined subjective self-conscious emotion measures (i.e., pride, self-confidence, 
embarrassment, and insecurity). If the same pattern appears when anger, anxiety, and 
enthusiasm are substituted for the four self-conscious emotions, then it may well be that 
emotional arousal was in fact at work instead. However, the same pattern did not emerge. 
  A second important counterargument challenging the observed effects flows from 
Affective Intelligence theory (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Perhaps self-
conscious emotions co-vary with anxiety, and anxiety is a critical “missing variable” 
causing the observed effects by increasing participants’ attentiveness to the opinion 
stimuli. This hypothesis is similar to the arousal hypothesis above. A simple correlational 
analysis reveals that the self-conscious emotion intensity scale and the single anxiety 
measure do in fact co-vary (r = .31). And, when we replace the self-conscious emotion 
variable with the anxiety variable in our regression analysis, a pattern emerges that is 
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similar to that discussed in the previous section, although the statistical significance of 
the emotion coefficients are slightly lower. See the first column of Table 5.5 below. 
 
Table 5.5: Results for Policy Scale Variable with Anxiety 
 Policy Scale Policy Scale 
Constant      .464  (.070)***       .602  (.109)***  
b1 Pro-value      -.054  (.069)     -.246  (.125)*  
b2 Self-Conscious Emotion      --     -.413  (.280) 
b3 Value x Emotion      --      .672  (.389)^  
b4 Anxiety     -.341  (.161)*      -.274  (.174) 
b5 Value x Anxiety      .395  (.217)^       .274  (.232) 
b6 Ideology      .229  (.094)*      .224  (094)* 
b7 Gender      .464  (.055)      .026  (.056) 
N 79 77 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
When both the self-conscious emotion intensity variables and the anxiety 
variables are entered into the regression equation simultaneously, the self-conscious 
emotion results are weakened (b2 = -.41, p = .15; b3 = .67, p = .09) but they remain 
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stronger than the anxiety results (b4 = -.27, p = .12; b5 = .27, p = .24). Looking closely, if 
anxiety has any effect at all, it seems to push participants who have received the anti-
individualism stimulus further in the anti-individualism direction. This result makes sense 
within the “affective intelligence” framework: Only when the information contained 
within the stimulus is surprising—Michigan students reject individualism!?—does 
anxiety result and produce some opinion change. The two theories appear to be 
complementary to one another in this analysis. 
In closing, this chapter has described a more stringent test of the emotional 
mechanisms that are a critical part of Social-Emotional Influence Theory. The results 
suggest that, where pride and embarrassment are greater, whether because of 
characteristics particular to the individual or to the context in which he or she finds him 
or herself, the individual is more likely to internalize the political values of his or her 
peers. In so doing, the findings bolster the more tentative findings with respect to self-
conscious emotional mediation presented in Chapter 4. The findings with respect to 
identity are more ambiguous: They suggest that identity plays a key role in social-
emotional influence but that, in some settings, strong identification—perhaps due to the 
confidence that stems from social status—can in fact cause individuals to resist influence. 
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Take a moment to imagine each of the following scenarios, focusing on how each 
situation would make you feel.  Then circle the situation that you believe would make 
you feel the best. 
 
a.  You leave school in April to spend the summer at home.  
One of your goals is to improve the way you look—get in 
shape, buy some new clothes, maybe get a new haircut, etc.  
When you return to school in the fall, everyone tells you 
how great you look.  You go to a party the first weekend 
back, and two cute guys (or girls) approach you during the 
evening and ask you out. 
 
b.  You attend a family gathering over winter break with 
various family members.  One of your relatives asks you 
how school is going.  As it happens, you got straight As in 
the fall semester and have secured a really prestigious 
summer internship, all of which you tell your relatives.  
The group gushes about your accomplishments, and your 
mom looks especially pleased. 
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c.  You are standing on the curb of a busy street, waiting 
for the light to turn green so that you can cross, when you 
see a little girl wander away from her mother and dart into 
the street.  You run after her into the traffic, pick her up, 
and return her to her mother.  A small crowd that has 
gathered on the sidewalk to watch breaks into applause. 
 
Embarrassment 
Take a moment to imagine each of the following scenarios, focusing on how each 
situation would make you feel.  Then circle the situation that you believe would make 
you feel the worst. 
 
a.  You are on a first date with someone you really like.  
You go to dinner, then to a party.  As the evening is coming 
to an end, both of you are sitting together on a couch.  Your 
date leans in close to you, and you’re thinking it is finally 
time for a kiss.  But, instead, your date whispers to you, 
“Sorry to tell you this, but, uh, the zipper on your pants has 
been down since we left the restaurant.” 
 
b.  It’s a warm spring day, and you are walking through the 
Diag, which is filled with students socializing, studying, 
playing Frisbee, etc.  All of a sudden you trip and, with a 
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loud grunt, fall down.  Several books and the bag you had 
been carrying scatter all around you.  Everyone on the Diag 
seems to stop what they are doing to stare at you sprawled 
out on the pavement. 
 
c.  You are attending the wedding ceremony of a family 
member.  The room is quiet, except for the bride and groom 
exchanging their vows.  All of a sudden you get a case of 
the hiccups.  Hiccup!  Hiccup!  A number of people sitting 
around you turn to you and say “shhhhh……”  You put 
your hand over your mouth, but you can’t stop hiccupping. 
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Opinion Stimuli (Pro-Economic Individualism Version) 
HOW DO YOU COMPARE? 
(PLEASE READ THE INFORMATION BELOW AND THEN ANSWER THE QUESTION THAT 
FOLLOWS.) 
 
   In the spring of 2005, researchers at UCLA (University of California, Los Angeles) carried out 
opinion polls of college students at ten major universities throughout the United States, including the 
University of Michigan.  UCLA researchers asked random samples of undergraduate students at each 
university about what majors they chose and why, about study habits and extracurricular activities, 
about Internet use, about their consumer habits, and, finally, about various social attitudes and 
political opinions. 
 
   Two of the survey questions focused on attitudes regarding “economic individualism.”  According 
to results published last year in Public Opinion Quarterly, most University of Michigan students 
agree with this principle. 
 
64% of Univ. of Michigan undergraduates either agreed or strongly agreed with 
the statement “Individuals should strive to be financially self-reliant.” 
 
N = 325 
 
61% of Univ. of Michigan undergraduates either agreed or strongly agreed with 




19. You were asked to respond to the same two statements on page 2.  Compare your answers to the 
published data and then check the appropriate response below. 
I am in agreement with the majority of U of M undergraduate students…. 
____  on both survey items. 
____  on one of the survey items. 


















Appendix B: Measures 
 
Value Ranking Measure 
Below is a list of six opinions.  Please rank them according to how important you 
believe each one is. The most important opinion should receive a “1,” the second most 
important a “2,” the third most important a “3,” and so on.  If you disagree with a 
statement, place an “X” in the blank space provided. 
All citizens ought to have an equal chance to influence the government. 
RANK _____ 
The government should see to it that all Americans have the basic necessities: food, 
clothing, and shelter. 
RANK_____ 
Schools and businesses should not discriminate according to race, gender, or religion. 
RANK _____ 
To make ends meet, people should rely on their own hard work, not on other people 
or the government. 
RANK _____ 
People should be free to think and behave however they would like. 
RANK _____ 




Government Policy Questions 
The federal government currently gives money for college to many low-income high 
school graduates.  Some people believe that these college grants should go only to those 
low-income graduates who have taken rigorous courses in high school.  Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.  Other people feel that such college grants 
should go to all low-income high school graduates, regardless of what courses they have 
taken.  Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.  And, of course, some other 
people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Where would 
you place yourself on this scale? (Money for poor grads only if rigorous courses (1), 
Neutral (4), Money for all poor grads (7)) 
 
Currently, the government in Washington provides aid to low-income, single mothers 
who have dependent children; this program is typically referred to as “welfare.”  Some 
people feel that the government should require these women to work in order to receive 
welfare benefits.  Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1.  Others feel 
that the government should provide welfare regardless of work status.  Suppose these 
people are at the other end, at point 7.  And, of course, some other people have opinions 
somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  Where would you place yourself on 
this scale? (Require welfare recipients to work (1), Neutral (4), Provide welfare 
regardless of work status (7)) 
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Political Ideology 
There is a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point 
scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely 
liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or 
haven’t you thought much about this? (Extremely liberal / Liberal / Slightly liberal / 
Moderate / Slightly conservative / Conservative / Extremely conservative) 
 
Emotions Assessed Following Stimuli 
Angry, annoyed, anxious, discouraged, embarrassed, enthusiastic, happy, insecure, 
interested, pleased with myself, proud, sad, self-confident, surprised 
 
Identification with UM Undergraduates 
Generally speaking, how close do you feel to U of M undergraduates—to what extent do 
you feel that they are like you in terms of their ideas and interests and feelings about 










Social-Emotional Influence and Americans’ Support 
for Economic Equality 
 
 
Maria is in a bind. She knows that she works as hard as she can, that she hasn’t enough 
money, that her employers underpay her, that many people deserve neither their wealth 
nor their poverty, and that her descendents seem destined to relive her frustrations. But 
she believes that the rich should keep their wealth, that a hardworking cleaner deserves 
less than a lazy executive, that work and education are supposed to bring upward 





In Chapter 5, I examined experimental evidence for social-emotional influence among 
college students and with respect to the value economic individualism. This chapter 
builds on that discussion by testing the emotional mechanisms of the model with a fuller 
experimental design and by examining social-emotional influence with respect to a new 
politically relevant value (economic equality), identity group (Americans), and mode of 
public opinion (letters to the editor). I also take advantage of a representative sample of 
Americans to test whether influence varies according to certain demographic factors, 
such as age. Finally, the chapter examines the political relevance of economic equality 
with an analysis of its influence on presidential approval and vote choice. 
Let me discuss these aspects of the Economic Equality Experiment in more detail. 
First, the study focuses on social-emotional influence over the value economic equality. 
The value economic equality refers to what Hochschild calls “strict equality” with special 
                                                 
85 From Jennifer Hochschild’s What’s Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice (1981). Page 114. 
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reference to the economic realm: “All community members deserve equal amounts of the 
good being divided” (1981, 52). When one is committed to economic equality, one 
believes that equality of income and wealth among members of a society is normatively 
desirable.86 Achieving perfect equality is an impossibility, of course. In more practical 
terms, citizens’ commitment to economic equality may reflect “a desire…for a limited 
range of wealth—a floor on income or an income limit” (Feldman 1999, 161). 
Levels of economic inequality in the U.S. have reached record levels, making 
understanding the dynamics underlying public sentiment toward economic equality and 
inequality particularly relevant. In addition, Americans’ ambivalence with respect to 
economic equality (Feldman 1999; Hochschild 1981)87 suggests that beliefs regarding 
this value may be more susceptible to peer influence than other value beliefs. 
 Second, social-emotional influence is examined among Americans. This may 
seem an odd choice to some scholars of American politics because the field has tended to 
view “identity groups” as those subsumed by the nation, not the nation itself. However, 
researchers in American politics are increasingly recognizing the American nation as an 
identity group, in keeping with psychological theories on social identity (Citrin, Sears, 
Muste, and Wong 2001; Huddy and Khatib 2007; Transue 2007). Further, many studies 
of social influence and socialization find that perceptions of what “the nation” thinks,  
whether interpreted as majority opinion or elite views, influence individual Americans’ 
opinions (e.g., Bartels 1985, 1987; McClosky and Zaller 1984). A practical advantage to 
                                                 
86 Many prefer the term “equality of results.” I believe the term “economic equality” best represents the 
ideal of equality of economic resources in a society. The terminology reflects Verba and Orren’s (1985) use 
of “income equality,” with “economic” substituted for “income” to denote a focus on both wealth and 
income equality. Note that the term “equality of results,” originally coined to stand in contrast to “equality 
of opportunity,” contains no reference to income, wealth, or economics. 
87 Although see Markus (2001) for empirical analyses suggesting that Americans are far more willing to 
advocate government intervention in the economy than is assumed by many. 
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studying Americans as a group is that, given the immense interest in representative 
surveys of the nation, it is relatively easy to procure data from a representative sample. 
(Indeed, Americans’ great interest in polling one another is yet another indication that to 
be American is of great importance to them.) 
Third, the Economic Equality Experiment builds on the previous experiment by 
examining another source of social influence. Rather than looking at opinion polls, this 
experiment examines the effects of what we might call more “qualitative” opinions that 
appear in the media: lengthy, original opinion statements made by a small number of 
identifiable individuals. In this case, newspaper letters to the editor are examined. 
 Fourth, and finally, the study makes two substantive changes with respect to its 
examination of emotion. First, instead of embarrassment, shame is the negative self-
conscious emotion aroused. Given shame’s theoretical importance in the SEI model, its 
effects need testing. Second, instead of emotion primes, this experiment uses emotion 
inductions. The inductions are described in detail in the next section. 
 In addition to changes intended to extend the theoretical reach of the SEI model, 
the study also includes a number of design improvements. The experiment assesses the 
emotional mechanisms of social-emotional influence among a representative sample of 
Americans. Also, a larger and more reliable set of dependent variables is tested. 
 However the most important improvement addresses a key shortcoming of the 
experimental design of the Economic Individualism Experiment. That study, as you will 
recall, employed a 2x2 design. Participants were exposed to a student poll that indicated 
that peers were either in favor of economic individualism or against economic 
individualism. About half of participants were exposed to a relevant emotion prime 
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(either pride or embarrassment) preceding the poll. The simplicity of the design was 
necessitated because of the small number of participants; however, in its simplicity, the 
design potentially masked some important effects. 
In particular, it is possible that pride had the direct effect of increasing 
commitment to economic individualism, and embarrassment the direct effect of 
decreasing it. If this were the case, then what appears to be an interaction taking place 
between the opinion and emotion stimuli is really the result of additive effects. On the 
other hand, it is also possible that direct effects worked in the opposite direction to 
dampen the opinion / emotion interactions. For example, if pride, on its own, tends to 
decrease enthusiasm for economic individualism, then the observed effects would have 
underestimated the interaction effect. In short, as do most survey analyses that 
incorporate interaction terms, experiments ideally will investigate the direct effects of the 
relevant variables by including them separately in the design, as well as in combination. 
The implementation of this design improvement is described in detail in the next section. 
 Finally, despite the improvements, there is one noticeable weakness of the 
Economic Equality Experiment: “American identity” was not measured. The survey 
instrument accompanying the experiment had extremely limited space, and national 
identity (or patriotism) was not included for two reasons: First, studies suggest that 
American patriotism is high but varies little across the population (Pei 2003; Smith and 
Jarkko 1998); second, patriotism measures tend to be confounded with ideological 
conservatism (Huddy and Khatib 2007), an overlap that would make separating the 
effects of identity from conservatism quite difficult, if not impossible. This said, as this 
study was being put into the field, Huddy and Khatib (2007) introduced a measure of 
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American identity that is not confounded with conservatism. A replication of the 
Economic Equality Study, carried out with University of Michigan students and including 
the Huddy and Khatib measure, will be discussed in future work. 
 
The Economic Equality Experiment 
Study Administration and Sample 
The company Polimetrix administered the survey-experiment88 via the Internet in 
February 2007. Participants were told that they would be participating in a survey. After 
completing the study, participants were thoroughly debriefed as to the goals of the 
research project and the experimental manipulations. 
Polimetrix specializes in “matching” samples of participants pulled from their 
large panel to census data in order to ensure a representative sample. The sampling and 
matching procedures were as follows. First, a random sample of 300 Americans was 
drawn from the U.S. census and then randomly assigned to one of the six treatment 
groups. A larger sample was then randomly drawn from the Polimetrix panel; those who 
agreed to participate were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment groups. After 
completing the experiment, the data from participants in each Polimetrix treatment group 
were “matched down” to the appropriate treatment group in the census sample in order to 
increase the representativeness of the experiment.89 
 
 
                                                 
88 The study is formally considered a “survey-experiment” because it includes both an experimental 
manipulation as well as survey questions that were administered to a probability sample. 
89 The sample drawn from the Polimetrix panel was partially adjusted for a response model and was larger 
than necessary so that each of the six treatment groups could be “matched down” to the appropriate census 
group. The matching variables used were age, gender, race, education, and party affiliation. 
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Study Design 
The experiment had a 3x2 design. Participants were presented with a pride induction, a 
shame induction, or no induction, and then participants either did or did not read a pro-
economic equality opinion stimulus. The basic experimental design, including the size of 
each cell, is represented below in Table 6.1. The experimental manipulations were 
followed by a post-test which contained the various dependent measures. Demographic 
information, such as gender, and general political attributes, such as partisanship and 
political ideology, were measured prior to the study by Polimetrix. 
 
Table 6.1: Experimental Design 
 Letters to the Editor No Letters 
Pride 50 50 
Shame 50 50 
No Emotion 50 50 
 
Half of the participants received five excerpts from real pro-equality letters to the 
editor from U.S. newspapers;90 the other half did not receive any excerpts. To enhance 
the experiment’s internal validity, the letter excerpts were selected and edited so that they 
focused tightly on the writer’s commitment to economic equality; other information, such 
as references to policy proposals or specific political leaders, was left out. The letters 
were not intended to be perceived by participants as representative of U.S. opinion but 
rather to communicate that a large portion of the American electorate supports economic 
equality. In order to increase the perceived authenticity of the letter excerpts, several 
steps were taken. The abbreviated names of letter writers and the newspapers from which 
                                                 
90 Two of the excerpts were actually made up of parts of two different letters. 
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the excerpts were drawn91 were retained. In addition, the layout and design of the 
excerpts were intended to evoke the online versions of the newspapers in question. See 
Appendix A for the letters as they appeared to participants. 
As in the previous study, this study tests for emotional mediation via experimental 
arousal of the presumed mediator. Thus, the letters / no letters factor was crossed with a 
second factor: whether pride, shame, or no emotion was induced preceding participant 
exposure to the letter excerpts. The emotion inductions in this experiment took the form 
of a pair of “thought exercises” in which participants were asked to think about aspects of 
themselves and past events that made them feel proud or ashamed (see Appendix A for 
exact wording).92 The inductions were expected to motivate increased commitment to the 
value espoused in the opinion stimuli that followed. 
A brief word about emotion inductions is in order. In many respects, emotion 
inductions are similar to emotion primes; they are intended to arouse a specific emotion, 
and they often precede a stimulus with the expectation that they will emotionally color 
the participant’s reaction to the stimulus. However, as the name suggests, “inductions” 
tend to be lengthier and more conscious exercises that are intended to arouse the target 
emotion to a greater degree than primes. That was expected to be the case in this study. 
The emotional mechanisms presumed to be at work were slightly different than 
those at work in the study described in Chapter 5. Recall that, in the Economic 
Individualism Experiment, all participants endorsed economic individualism, and their 
                                                 
91 In cases where two letters from different newspapers were combined, obviously only one name and 
newspaper was chosen to be associated with the letter excerpt. 
92 The choice to use a thought-exercise, as opposed to a written exercise (e.g., Lerner et al. 2003; Valentino 
et al. 2008), was deliberate. While written exercises are preferred under normal circumstances (they are 
likely to generate stronger emotions because of the greater mental effort involved in putting one’s thoughts 
to paper, as well as because of the increased likelihood that participants will seriously engage with the task 
if they perceive themselves to be potentially held accountable via a written record), it was determined that 
such a record of response to the shame inductions would create substantial privacy concerns. 
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support for that value was made salient during the course of the study. In contrast, it was 
assumed that most of the participants in the Economic Equality Experiment came to the 
study feeling ambivalent about economic equality, in other words, not being sure where 
they stood with respect to the value because of conflicting beliefs (and feelings). 
It was hypothesized that participants in the Economic Equality Experiment who 
received the pride induction would apply their pride to the social situation that the 
opinion stimulus presented in a manner similar to that in the preceding experiment. Only 
now, participants would be rewriting the past somewhat: emphasizing evidence (i.e., their 
set of beliefs supporting economic equality) congruent with the feeling of pride. Pride 
would then reinforce those beliefs, consistent with SEI Theory. On the other hand, I 
hypothesized that participants who received the shame induction would emphasize 
evidence (i.e., their set of beliefs opposing equality) congruent with the feeling of shame. 
Shame would then mark those beliefs as disvalues, again, consistent with the theory. 
After each emotion induction, participants answered a short question regarding 
the relevant emotion. These follow-up questions were intended to encourage participants 
to take the thought-exercises seriously, to provide a manipulation check regarding 
whether the inductions had successfully aroused the emotion in question, and to provide a 




                                                 
93 Participants in the pride condition had a mean level of pride of .78 on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 representing 
no pride reported in response to either induction, and 1 representing extreme pride in response to both. 
Participants in the shame condition had a mean level of shame of .48, again with 0 representing no shame 
reported in response to either induction, and 1 representing extreme shame in response to both. 
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Dependant Variables 
Economic Equality Scale  There are several extant scales that measure beliefs regarding 
economic equality, i.e., equality of results; however, these measures are problematic as 
value measures for a number of reasons. A scale by Kluegel and Smith (1986) measures a 
mix of factual beliefs, self-interest tied to equality, and values; often these various 
components are in the same question, leading to double-barreled items. The General 
Social Survey has asked a number of questions regarding economic equality over the 
years; however, most focus on factual beliefs, not value beliefs. Finally, Verba and Orren 
(1985) take an original approach to the topic of economic equality by asking respondents 
to indicate what they believe the average annual salary to be for various occupations 
(e.g., grade school teacher, plumber, star center of an NBA basketball team) and then to 
indicate what fair average salaries would be. Such a measure has the advantage of being 
highly specific rather than hypothetical (Converse and Presser 1986). That said, it is so 
specific to an era—in terms of both the occupations and salaries listed—that 
comparability over time is difficult. The measure is also restricted to notions of income 
inequality, leaving beliefs regarding overall earnings, or wealth, untapped. 
Given the weaknesses of past measures, I created an original measure94 of the 
value economic equality for the purpose of this study. The scale includes eight Likert-
type agree/disagree items. The “top” of the scale is intended to represent endorsement of 
the value economic equality, and the “bottom” of the scale to represent opposition to 
equality (or endorsement of inequality). Each of four related themes contains one pro-
equality and one anti-equality item, creating a balanced scale. 
                                                 
94 Although note that some of the themes in the scale and wording of the items are loosely drawn from 
items found in the General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and Kluegel and 
Smith’s Egalitarianism Scale (1986). 
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The first four items are the purest measures of belief in economic equality. These 
items address the respondent’s notions of economic fairness and his or her vision of what 
an ideal society would look like (Rokeach 1973; Hochschild 1981). The items are 
abstract and do not depend on the respondent’s perception of “facts on the ground.”  
The second set of four items is somewhat more concrete. These items ask respondents for 
their opinions on the gap between the rich and the poor and whether inequality is a 
problem. In focusing on the here-and-now, they were intended to question respondents 
about their commitment to economic equality in a second, more accessible way.95 It was 
thought that these questions would make the scale more reliable, and, in fact, they did; 
these items were more closely correlated with the overall value scale. The additively 
combined items create a continuous scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 and a mean of 
.48. The Economic Equality Scale, as well as all of the dependent variables that follow, 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the pro-equality, or more liberal, response. Exact 
question wording for all dependent variables is available in the Appendix B. 
 Policy Opinion Scales  I used two additional scales to gauge whether participants 
would apply hypothesized value changes to the realm of government policy, i.e., whether 
they would be more willing to advocate governmental means to the end of greater 
equality. The Public Policy Scale additively combined two questions on actual policy 
items being considered by Congress at the time of the experiment: adjusting the 
minimum wage and healthcare spending.96 The alpha for this scale was .74 and the mean 
                                                 
95 One important problem with value questions that focus on actual circumstances is that participants’ 
perceptions of those circumstances will affect their answers. For example, a supporter of economic equality 
might argue that the gap between the rich and the poor is not too big if she believes that incomes in the U.S. 
are approximately equal. To help equalize information about economic inequality, all participants read 
information stating that economic inequality in the U.S. has recently been on the rise. 
96 The healthcare item was modeled on questions on federal spending that have often appeared in the 
American National Election Study (ANES); the minimum wage question is original to this study. 
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.61. The Tax Policy Scale additively combined two questions on tax policy: whether 
wealthy Americans pay an appropriate amount of taxes and whether the federal 
government should amend the estate tax. The alpha was .71 and the mean .52.97 
 Electoral Opinion Scales  Two variables were used to gauge the link between 
relative commitment to economic equality and the ballot box. Participants were asked a 
standard question regarding approval of President Bush as well as a question intended to 
tap their expected vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. 
 
Hypotheses and Exploratory Investigations 
We can investigate several hypotheses related to the Social-Emotional Influence model 
and its political import with data from the Economic Equality Experiment. 
 The first hypothesis (H1) examines group influence: In response to the letters to 
the editor, participants will become more committed to economic equality. 
 The second hypothesis (H2) examines emotional mediation of the above group 
influence: When an emotion is induced preceding the letters to the editor, participants’ 
commitment to economic equality will be strengthened (relative to the effect of the 
letters). Increased commitment to economic equality will be expressed directly via the 
Economic Equality Scale and indirectly via endorsement of government intervention in 
the economy to promote equality. 
 The third hypothesis (H3) examines the political relevance of social-emotional 
influence. It is expected that, controlling for partisanship and political ideology (as well 
                                                 
97 An additional tax policy question asked participants whether poor Americans ought to be taxed more or 
less (with wanting to tax the poor less being the liberal response); unfortunately, answers to this question 
did not “hang together” well with the other two tax items, the reason being that liberals and conservatives 
alike tended to believe that the poor should pay fewer taxes. 
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as demographic factors), the Economic Equality Scale will be closely associated with 
both relative (dis)approval of President Bush’s performance in office and expected vote 
choice in the 2008 presidential election. 
 Finally, we take advantage of the relatively large and representative sample to 
explore potential interactions with age. While previous work has suggested that 
socialization is more prevalent among the young (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and 
Stokes 1960; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Jennings, 
Stoker, and Bowers 2007; Sears and Valentino 1997), the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 in 
fact suggest that influence may be more likely among older than younger adults. Thus, I 
explore whether social-emotional influence varies by age in the sample.98 
 
Data Analyses 
The first two hypotheses were tested with ordinary least squares regression. The effects 
of pride and shame were investigated separately. The effects of the stimuli on three 
dependent variables were examined: the Economic Equality Scale, the Public Policy 
Scale, and the Tax Policy Scale. The first model investigated was: DV = β0 + β1Letters + 
β2Pride + β3Shame + β4Letters x Pride + β5Letters x Shame + β6Ideology
99 + ε. 
This basic model allows us to estimate the “main effects” of the letters and the 
pride and shame inductions separately, and then test whether the pride and shame 
                                                 
98 Interactions were also explored with respect to political ideology. As discussed in Chapter 2, when 
participants’ pre-existing value and attitude commitments are strong and they disagree with the opinions 
expressed in the stimuli, individuals may resist being influenced or even polarize, becoming more 
committed to their original views. This said, I could find no evidence of ideological polarization in these 
data. In some instances, conservatives reacted to the stimuli somewhat differently than did moderates and 
liberals, but the differences were not pronounced or consistent across the dependent measures. 
99 ANOVAs were conducted to check whether the experimental groups differed with respect to 
demographic and political variables possibly correlated with the dependent variables. Randomization with 
respect to political ideology failed (p=.08), and so that variable was included as a control variable. 
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inductions when combined with the letters had an effect over and above the additive 
effect of the two variables (i.e., an emotion induction and the letters). The coefficients 
that represent these important interactive effects are β4 and β5. 
If the relationships among the experimental groups are as expected, then graphed 
results should resemble Figure 6.1a or 6.1b. H1 predicts that the “letters” line (dashed 
with triangular markers) will be above the “no letters” line (solid with circular markers). 
H2 predicts that the difference between the two lines will increase (by b4 or b5) when an 
emotion is induced. 
Extant research suggests no particular hypotheses regarding the direct effects of 
pride and shame on this set of dependent variables. Thus, the pattern in Figure 6.1a shows 
one possible set of results should there be no direct emotional effects and should the two 
hypotheses be upheld. Figure 6.1b shows another possible set of results should there be 
small direct emotional effects and, again, should the two hypotheses be upheld. 
 




















































Contrary to these expectations, however, the initial cut at the results largely 
revealed null findings. P-values for the coefficients of interest (b1, b4, and b5) were 
generally high. The exception was the Tax Policy regression analysis. Here, participants 
expressed more egalitarian views with respect to taxes if they received the pro-equality 
letters to the editor (b1 = .11, p ≤ .10). This analysis also revealed a direct effect for 
shame (b3 = .14, p ≤ .05). No interaction effects were observed. 
While the stimuli appeared to have minimal effects on participants’ views on 
average, further analyses revealed differential effects among age groups in the sample. I 
first divided up participants according to three standard age categories: 35 and under 
(young adults); 36-64 (middle aged adults); and 65 and older (retirement age adults). 
Regression analyses revealed a number of significant age interactions. Closer analysis 
revealed that patterns of results for the two older groups were similar to one another and 
distinct from the youngest age group. Or, in other words, the youngest age group (35 and 
under) reacted to the stimuli differently than did older participants. 
The above model (DV = β0 + β1Letters + β2Pride + β3Shame + β4Letters x Pride + 
β5Letters x Shame + β6Ideology + ε) was re-estimated with respect to the three dependent 
variables for the two age groups separately. Below, regression results with respect to the 
younger group are presented first, followed by those for the rest of the sample. 
Note that the raw experimental group means according to age group reveal 
roughly the same pattern of results as do the regression analyses (in which ideology is 
held constant); those means are available in Appendix C. 
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Results are presented in Table 6.2 for those 35 and under and with respect to the 
Equality and Public Policy Scales. (Findings with respect to the Tax Policy Scale were 
non-significant for all variables except for political ideology in this age group.) 
 
Table 6.2: Experimental Results for Participants 35 and Under 
 
Economic Equality Scale Public Policy Scale 
Constant      .530  (.068)***      .700  (.093)*** 
b1 Letters     -.098  (.088)     -.219  (.123)^ 
b2 Pride     -.047  (.089)     -.047  (.119) 
b3 Shame     -.125  (.084)     -.248  (.114)* 
b4 Letters x Pride      .044  (.116)     -.002  (.155) 
b5 Letters x Shame      .242  (.113)*      .393  (.159)* 
b6 Ideology      .494  (.079)***      .509  (.108)*** 
N 73 65 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
We find that b1 is consistently negative across the two equations and is significant 
in the Public Policy equation. Participants in this age group not only were not persuaded 
by the stimuli on average, but, compared to the control group, became less egalitarian in 
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response to the opinion stimulus. Thus, H1 is not supported. However, we do see 
evidence for social-emotional influence when shame (b5), although not pride (b4), is 
aroused in participants. The Letters/Shame interaction is large, positive, and significant at 
the p ≤ .05 level in both equations. Thus, H2 is supported with respect to shame. Finally, 
participants who received a shame induction but no letters to the editor were less 
supportive of equality than the control group (see b3), although this effect is only 
significant (p ≤ .05) in the Public Policy equation. These patterns are more easily seen if 
we examine the graphed results in Figures 6.2a and 6.2b. 
 

















































The patterns are very similar across the two graphs: Relative pro-equality views in 
the pure control group become more anti-equality (contrary to expectations) when the 
letters are presented; however, participants opinions’ move back toward equality when 
shame is aroused in combination with the presentation of the letters. We also see an 
                                                 
100 In this set of graphs and the set below, political ideology is set to the scale mid-point (i.e., moderate). 
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opposite pattern among those who received no letters; exposure to the shame induction 
alone caused movement in an inegalitarian direction. 
One difference between the Economic Equality and Public Policy analyses 
emerged: The experimental stimuli influenced participants’ stances on egalitarian policy 
more than their stances on the abstract value economic equality. This pattern also 
emerged among the older participants. This difference is in keeping with previous 
research on values, which suggests that they are more stable than attitudes generally. 
Results with respect to participants over the age of 35 are presented next. Table 
6.3 displays results for the Economic Equality and Tax Policy analyses among this age 
group. (Results with respect to the Public Policy Scale were similarly patterned but not 
statistically significant.) 
 
Table 6.3: Experimental Results for Participants over 35 
 Economic Equality Scale Tax Policy Scale 
Constant      .430  (.031)***      .439  (.045)*** 
b1 Letters      .077  (.045)^      .147  (.067)* 
b2 Pride      .014  (.045)      .019  (.066) 
b3 Shame      .084  (.045)^      .160  (.065)* 
b4 Letters x Pride     -.032  (.066)      .041  (.097) 
b5 Letters x Shame     -.069  (.065)     -.095  (.097) 
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b6 Ideology      .589  (.048)***      .686  (.071)*** 
N 200 182 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Here, H1 is supported: b1 is positive and statistically significant in each of the 
equations (respectively: b1 = .08, p ≤ .10; b1 = .15, p ≤ .05). H2 is not supported, 
however. There is no evidence for social-emotional influence; b4 and b5 are not 
statistically significant. Also in contrast to younger participants, older participants 
became more pro-equality on average compared to the control group when their sense of 
shame was aroused. Let us look at these results graphed in Figures 6.3a and 6.3b.101 
 
















































                                                 
101 Given that results were non-significant in the Tax Policy analysis with respect to the younger group, we 
can conclude that reactions among older participants are clearly driving the group-influence Tax Policy 
results for the whole sample reported previously. 
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Again, the patterns are very similar across the two graphs, and they are almost 
mirror opposites of the patterns of reactions among the younger age group. Relative anti-
equality views in the pure control group shift to become more pro-equality (in line with 
expectations) when the letters are presented. However, this persuasive effect does not 
increase when pride or shame is aroused. In fact, the gap between the two lines closes as 
the shame stimulus moves participants who received no letters in the pro-equality 
direction but does not similarly move participants who did receive the letters. 
Finally, our last set of analyses examine whether relative commitment (or 
opposition) to economic equality affects individuals’ electoral preferences. We expect 
that economic egalitarians will be more likely to support political candidates who 
champion egalitarian government policies. In order to test this hypothesis, I regressed two 
measures of candidate evaluation and choice (approval of President Bush and preference 
in the 2008 presidential election) onto a model that included the Economic Equality 
Scale, party and political ideology, and several demographic control variables: age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, income, and education.102 The model investigated was as follows: 
DV = β0 + β1Equality Scale + β2Party + β3Ideology + β4Age + β5Gender + β6Black + 
β7Hispanic + β8Income + β9Education + ε.
103 Note that all variables were placed on the 0 
                                                 
102 Age is a continuous variable representing the respondents’ age at the time of the survey. Black and 
Hispanic are dummy variables representing self-identification in response to the question “What racial or 
ethnic group best describes you?” Income is a five-category item representing incomes under $25,000 and 
then from $25,001 - $50,000, $50,001 - $100,000, $100,001 - $200,000, and above $200,000. (Note that 
those who chose to answer the question placed themselves in only the first three categories.) Education is 
made up of six categories ranging from “No high school degree” to “Postgraduate degree.” 
103 As with the similar analyses in Chapter 4, I checked to see whether the experimental manipulations may 
have affected the regression results. The treatments may have constituted “missing variables,” i.e., absent 
variables correlated with both the independent and dependent variables, or they may have primed (or 
otherwise interacted with) the Economic Equality Scale. I first checked whether the experimental 
manipulations had direct effects on the dependent variables. As it turns out, inducing pride reduced 
approval of the President (b = -.13, p = .01) and reduced support for the Republican candidate in 2008 (b = 
-.11, p = .02). However, the inclusion of the treatment variables did not substantively alter the coefficients 
on the other variables. With respect to interaction effects, the above equation was re-estimated with two 
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to 1 interval. In addition, the dependent variables, the Equality Scale, party, and ideology 
were all coded so that the more Democratic/liberal positions take on higher values. 
Results are displayed below in Table 6.4. As expected, the Economic Equality 
Scale is closely linked to disapproval of President Bush (b1 = .57, p ≤ .001). Note that it 
has a bigger impact on the dependent variable than both political party (b2 = .35, p ≤  
.001) and ideology (b3 = .21, p ≤ .01). 
 
Table 6.4: OLS Regression Results for Electoral Variables 
 
Bush Approval 
Party Preference in ’08 
Presidential Election 
Constant      .450  (.086)***      .440  (.080)*** 
Equality scale      .574  (.084)***      .391  (.079)*** 
Party      .350  (.063)***      .556  (.059)*** 
Political Ideology      .207  (.079)**      .295  (.075)*** 
Age     -.045  (.065)      .086  (.060) 
Gender      .034  (.030)      .036  (.028) 
Black     -.104  (.056)^     -.082  (.051) 
Hispanic     -.065  (.051)     -.008  (.047) 
                                                                                                                                                 
additional variables included: a dummy variable representing receipt of a treatment and a Treatment x 
Economic Equality interaction term. I found no evidence of priming or other interactive effects. 
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Income      .095  (.040)*     -.008  (.038) 
Education     -.015  (.058)     -.021  (.054) 
R2      .608      .722 
N 239 236 
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
^ p ≤ .10   * p ≤ .05   ** p ≤ .01   *** p ≤ .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
The next dependent variable we examine is the participant’s candidate preference 
with respect to the 2008 presidential election. Because the study occurred very early in 
the election cycle (long before the nominees would be decided), participants were asked 
to indicate whether they would rather see a Democrat or Republican win the Presidency 
in 2008, or whether it depended on the particular candidates. The “depends” option, 
which was quite popular, was coded as .5, in-between Republican (0) and Democrat (1). 
The analysis reveals that the Equality Scale is in fact closely associated with one’s 
preference in the 2008 presidential election. Not surprisingly, the most important 
predictor in this analysis was partisanship; with no specific candidates named, partisans 
reported that they would like to see a candidate from their own party elected (b2 = .56, p 
≤ .001). However, the Economic Equality Scale still had a large and highly significant 
coefficient (b1 = .39, p ≤ .001),
104 again larger than political ideology (b3 = .30, p ≤ .001). 
 
                                                 
104 The fact that the 2008 presidential election variable had just three categories raised the possibility that 
OLS regression would lead to biased results. Thus, I repeated the analysis with maximum likelihood 
ordered probit regression but found no substantive differences between the two analyses. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Looking back on the results for the Economic Equality Experiment, patterns emerge that 
complement the findings in Chapters 4 and 5. First, older participants tended to be 
influenced when they were exposed to information suggesting that the nation values 
economic equality (i.e., the pro-equality letters to the editor); this influence took place 
with respect to two of the three dependent variables. However, influence among older 
participants did not increase as expected when pride and shame were aroused. 
Second, mirroring the findings from the Economic Individualism Experiment, 
younger participants in the Economic Equality Experiment were not influenced when 
exposed to the value stimulus on its own; these participants even showed some evidence 
of polarizing away from the dominant group values expressed in the stimuli. This said, 
and again mirroring the Chapter 5 findings, younger participants were susceptible to 
influence when a sense of shame was aroused; two of the three dependent variables 
revealed evidence for influence when shame was induced. No such evidence emerged, 
however, when pride was induced. 
 My first hypothesis with respect to explaining the pattern of results among the 
younger participants was that this group was more economically conservative than the 
older participants, and that they therefore polarized against the “liberal” letters 
accordingly (until a sense of shame was aroused, that is). However, the best evidence we 
have on hand suggests otherwise: Overall, the younger participants were more liberal and 
Democratic than the older ones, and, in any case, conservatives across the sample did not 
show evidence of polarization in the “no emotion” condition. 
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The better interpretation, reflecting on the pattern of results in this chapter as well 
as those in Chapters 4 and 5, may be that younger adults simply are less susceptible to 
group influence than others—unless pride, embarrassment, or shame are explicitly 
aroused. In the experiments described in Chapters 5 and 6, self-conscious emotions were 
aroused experimentally; in the real world, such emotions among younger people are 
likely to be aroused by active peer judgments, i.e., through overt admiration or shaming. 
Let me suggest that self-conscious emotions may arise more easily in mature 
adults when they perceive themselves to be in-step or out-of-step with their peer group. 
As a result, they quickly get into line with peers. That said, in this experiment, the 
emotion inductions unexpectedly had no additional influence effect among older 
participants. Why this may be the case is taken up in the conclusion. 
 Are previous socialization studies wrong to suggest that young people are more 
susceptible to social influence? Perhaps not. Socialization scholars are most insistent that 
heavy socialization—from parents, teachers, and peers—occurs among children and 
teenagers (Bandura 1977; Easton and Dennis 1965, 1967; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 
2007). In contrast to childhood, young adulthood may be a time during which many 
individuals strike out on their own, trying to find their own voice. 
 A second possibility is that these results reflect the zeitgeist of the current time 
period. Young adults today are more liberal than in any other time period since the 1970s, 
and they are especially socially liberal (Nagourney and Thee 2007). Social liberalism is 
associated, among other things, with an individualistic bent, a tendency not to conform 
(Altemeyer 1996; Feldman 2003a). Or, it may be that both life stage and the liberal 
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zeitgeist of the times together dampen social-emotional influence among the young—that 
is, until their self-conscious emotions are explicitly aroused. 
 Next, let us consider the direct effects we uncovered with respect to shame. 
Shame alone tended to push older participants in an egalitarian direction and younger 
participants in an anti-egalitarian direction. Why might this be? 
 One possibility, in keeping with the hypothesis that younger adults are at a more 
autonomous life stage and older adults a relatively more social one, is that the different 
age groups called to mind different types of thoughts in response to the shame inductions. 
Many of those 35 and under are trying to establish themselves in the world, both 
financially and socially, and are either in school or working their way up in a career. On 
the other hand, many of those who are over 35 are likely to be more focused on raising 
and providing for children (and perhaps other family members). 
Given these differences, we might expect that the younger age group’s main 
source of shame is the failure to achieve social status or a career goal, and such thoughts 
may have aroused feelings of frustration or anger, in addition to shame. On the other 
hand, we might expect that the older age group’s main source of shame is failure with 
respect to social responsibilities, resulting in feelings of guilt (again, in addition to 
shame). While frustration and anger are likely to discourage pro-social sentiments 
(Lazarus 1991), guilt appears to motivate pro-social behavior (Carlson and Miller 1987). 
 Finally, the last analysis demonstrated the political import of the value economic 
equality. Those who were more committed to economic equality were much more likely 
to disapprove of President Bush’s performance in office and to say that they would vote 
for a Democrat for President in November. The strong link between economic equality 
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and electoral behavior suggests that, as the effects of social-emotional influence 
accumulate with respect to our values, electoral behavior is affected as well. 
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Appendix A: Stimuli 
 
Pride Inductions 
First, please think of a specific aspect of yourself that makes you feel especially proud. 
For example, some people might feel proud of a personality trait or a physical trait. 
Others might feel proud of a particular skill they have. Still others might feel proud of 
an aspect of their identity or family history. 
Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on what about yourself makes you feel 
proud. Form a detailed image of it in your mind: In what way are you admirable, 
impressive, and/or talented? 
When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed. 
When you think about this aspect of yourself, how proud do you feel? Not at all proud, A 
little bit proud, Moderately proud, Very proud, Extremely proud 
__________ 
Next, we’d like you to reflect back on a past event in your life. 
Think of a specific moment in your life when you did something that, upon reflection, 
makes you feel really proud of yourself. Maybe you did something especially nice for 
someone, maybe you were “the life of the party” at a social event, or maybe in 
achieving a particular goal you exceeded the expectations of peers, friends, and/or 
family. 
Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on something you did in the past that makes 
you feel especially proud. Form a detailed image of the event in your mind: What 
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exactly did you do that makes you feel proud? Where did the event occur? Who, if 
anyone, was there? 
When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed. 
How proud are you of your accomplishment or actions on this occasion? Not at all proud, 
A little bit proud, Moderately proud, Very proud, Extremely proud 
 
Shame Inductions 
First, please think of a specific aspect of yourself that makes you feel ashamed 
sometimes. For example, some people might feel ashamed of a personality trait or a 
physical trait. Others might feel ashamed of their lack of skills in a certain area. Still 
others might feel ashamed of an aspect of their identity or family history. 
Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on what about yourself makes you feel 
ashamed sometimes. Form a detailed image of it in your mind: What exactly about 
yourself do you feel is problematic or sub-par? 
When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed. 
When you think about this aspect of yourself, how ashamed do you feel? Not at all 
ashamed, A little bit ashamed, Moderately ashamed, Very ashamed, Extremely 
ashamed 
__________ 
Next, we’d like you to reflect back on a past event in your life. 
Think of a specific moment in your life when you behaved in such a way that you felt 
ashamed of your actions. Maybe you treated someone unfairly, maybe you acted in an 
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inappropriate manner at a social event, or maybe in failing to achieve an important 
goal you disappointed respected peers or loved ones. 
Stop and take a minute or two now to reflect on something you did in the past that made 
you feel ashamed. Form a detailed image of the event in your mind: What exactly did 
you do that made you feel ashamed? Where did the event occur? Who, if anyone, was 
there? 
When you have a detailed image in mind, click on Next to proceed. 
How ashamed are you of your actions on this occasion? Not at all ashamed, A little bit 
ashamed, Moderately ashamed, Very ashamed, Extremely ashamed 
 156 










                                                 
105 Newspapers were selected to reflect geographic diversity. Note that I had intended to indicate next to the 
masthead the state from which a newspaper came if it was not obvious from the paper’s name. Due to 







Appendix B: Measures 
 
Economic Equality Value Scale 
In an ideal society, incomes should be about equal, with every family making roughly the 
same amount of money.106 
In an ideal society, there should be a range of incomes from very low to very high.  
A fair and just nation will try to make sure that the nation’s wealth is shared equally by 
all citizens.  
It is only fair that those who work hard and are skilled make more money than those who 
are lazy or have little to contribute.  
Economic inequality in America is an important problem that we need to address.  
Economic inequality is not something that we, as a nation, ought to worry about.  
The gap between how much rich people earn and how much poor people earn in the U.S. 
is too big.  
The fact that some Americans earn a lot more than others do is a good thing, not a bad 
thing.  
 
Public Policy Scale 
The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate recently voted to raise the federal 
minimum wage, from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour. Opinions differ as to whether this new 
wage is appropriate: Some think the new wage is too high, some think the new wage 
is too low, and some think the new wage is about right. What do you think the federal 
                                                 
106 Answer categories for all of the statements were: Strongly agree /Agree / Slightly agree / Neither agree 
nor disagree / Slightly disagree / Disagree / Strongly disagree. All survey items included a “not sure” 
option. 
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minimum wage should be? Choose the answer below that comes closest to your view. 
$5.15, $6.25, $7.25, $8.25, $9.25, $10.25, More than $10.25 
With regard to the issue of healthcare, would you like to see federal government spending 
on healthcare for low-income Americans increased a lot, increased somewhat, kept 
about the same, decreased somewhat, or decreased a lot? 
 
Tax Policy Scale 
Do you think that wealthy families today pay too much in taxes or not enough, or is their 
tax burden about right? (Too much / About right / Not enough) 
Currently, the federal government issues an “estate tax” on estates worth $2 million or 
more at the time of a person’s death. The estate tax rate is approximately 45%. Do 
you think that this 45% estate tax rate should be increased, kept as it is, decreased, or 
repealed altogether? Please choose the answer below that comes closest to your view. 
(Increase estate tax rate / Keep estate tax rate at 45% / Decrease estate tax rate to 30% 
/ Decrease estate tax rate to 15% / Repeal estate tax altogether) 
 
Bush Approval 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as 






Party Preference in ’08 Presidential Election 
Would you rather see a Democrat or a Republican win the Presidency in 2008? 
(Democrat / Depends on the candidates / Republican) 
 
Political Ideology 
Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own political 
viewpoint? (Very liberal / Liberal / Moderate / Conservative / Very conservative) 
 
Political Partisanship 
Partisanship was assessed with a standard branching question, resulting in seven 
categories: Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean 
Republican, Weak Republican, Strong Republican. 
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Appendix C: Additional Empirical Results 
 
Raw Means for Economic Equality Scale (Two Age Groups) 
35 & under 
 Control Pride Shame 
Letters .519 .478 .571 
No letters .609 .460 .466 
Over 35 
Letters .480 .492 .463 
No letters .438 .430 .485 
 
 
Raw Means for Public Policy Scale (35 & Under) 
 Control Pride Shame 
Letters .592 .502 .694 
No letters .781 .630 .506 
 
 
Raw Means for Tax Policy Scale (Over 35) 
 Control Pride Shame 
Letters .527 .664 .553 














America’s attachment to liberty must…be evaluated in light of the elementary fact that no 
society is, or can be, absolutely free. A society professing special reverence for liberty is 
thus bound to experience a profound tension between the forces of social cohesion and 





The Import of Identity 
In the last several decades, many political scientists have become preoccupied with 
identity. The literature and evidence discussed in this dissertation suggests that that 
preoccupation is well-placed. However, most political scientists interested in identity 
have focused on the role it plays in inter-group dynamics, most often prejudice or 
discrimination as manifested in the political arena (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Kinder and 
Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001). The Social-Emotional Influence model focuses on 
intra-group dynamics, suggesting that phenomena of equal political consequence play out 
within the boundaries of identity groups. 
This study has also sought to expand traditional notions in political science of 
what a politically relevant identity group may be. Group identity is not just race or 
religion or gender or class. Any given citizen will also subjectively identify with some 
combination of family, friends, school, neighborhood, place of work, political party, 
                                                 
107 From Herbert McClosky and John Zaller’s The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and 
Democracy (1984). Page 21. 
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generational peers, nation, etc. While those groups that generate a stronger sense of 
identity are likely to wield more influence over the individual, I argue that all of these 
groups will generate some degree of social-emotional influence over their members’ 
politically relevant values and accompanying attitudes or beliefs. 
 The evidence presented in this dissertation supports the contention that citizens’ 
identifications with a variety of groups opens them up to value socialization by those 
groups. In Chapter 3, we reviewed evidence suggesting that social groups in the U.S. 
develop distinct levels of commitment to politically relevant values. Controlling for 
income, education, and overlapping group memberships, value commitment varied 
according to citizens’ generation, race or ethnicity, religion, social class, and, to a lesser 
extent, gender. In Chapter 4, we found that a sample of American Catholics were 
influenced by the views of Catholic peers with respect to social conservatism only if they 
highly identified as Catholics; we also learned that strong Catholic identifiers were the 
most likely to recoil from the views of out-group members (American Evangelicals). 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the relationship of identity to influence was more 
complicated. Those college students who took part in the Economic Individualism 
Experiment and who identified strongly with college peers either resisted group influence 
or actively differentiated themselves from group values. However, priming pride or 
embarrassment reversed students’ resistance to influence. In Chapter 6, younger 
Americans resisted influence as well unless their sense of shame was aroused. 
I have put forward a tentative explanation for these unexpected results: Young 
adults may embrace social autonomy more than do older adults. Such a hypothesis has a 
certain face validity: Younger people are more likely to “do their own thing,” whereas 
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older adults are more likely to play it safe and “go along with the crowd.” Particularly in 
an experiment in which no strong sense of social jeopardy is experienced (in Chapters 5 
and 6, participants read opinion poll information and letters to the editor), self-confident 
young people may well choose to do their own thing. However, the motivation among 
this group to resist influence was curbed in three of the four conditions in which self-
conscious emotions were experimentally aroused. I argue that the emotion primes and 
inductions inserted into the experiments an otherwise missing sense of social and 
emotional consequences for these younger participants’ thoughts and actions. 
 The specific discrepancy that arose between the findings in Chapters 4 and 5 with 
respect to identity—in Chapter 4, strong Catholic identifiers were the most likely to be 
influenced, while, in Chapter 5, strong college identifiers were the least likely to be 
influenced (when no emotions were aroused)—may be at least partially resolved by 
appealing to such a generational divide. If autonomy is truly valued by young adult peer 
groups, then it will be most expressed by highly identified members of such groups. This, 
of course, does suggest that, where autonomy is valued, high identifiers will be pushed 
and pulled between doing their own thing and following the crowd. 
 
Enter Emotion 
Political scientists have much more recently taken up the study of emotion and its 
political effects. In this growing literature, the focus has been thus far on “basic” 
emotions, like enthusiasm or anxiety, that are older (in evolutionary terms) and likely 
more central to human survival but also less relevant to human social—and, by extension, 
political—life than other types of emotions. This project expands the field’s focus to the 
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set of cognitively rich self-conscious emotions that play key roles in the way in which we 
relate to others. In this dissertation, we have looked at pride, embarrassment, and shame. 
In formulating the Social-Emotional Influence model in Chapter 2, I argued that 
pride, embarrassment, and shame help to explain why it is that social groups are able to 
successfully socialize their members. SEI Theory posits that these self-conscious 
emotions mediate identity group influence over individuals’ values and other attitudes. 
People feel pride when they are approved of by their peers, and embarrassment or shame 
when they are derogated by peers. Together, these emotions motivate value conformity. 
In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, we reviewed experimental evidence suggesting that these 
emotions mediate group influence over politically relevant values. Data presented in 
Chapter 4 showed that pride is associated with holding dominant group values and 
suggested that pride and shame mediate group influence. Chapters 5 and 6 provided 
clearer evidence for such mediation, although results in Chapter 6 were inconsistent.  
In Chapter 6, it was shame alone that encouraged value conformity, and it did so 
only among the younger participants. Among the older participants, influence did not 
increase as expected when pride or shame was induced. The failure of pride and shame to 
consistently mediate influence may be linked to the nature of the experimental 
manipulations of emotion, particularly to the thought-exercise inductions in Chapter 6. 
As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, emotion primes and inductions, under many 
conditions, have distinct advantages with respect to theory testing. In short, it is thought 
that they increase internal validity by ensuring that the emotion itself is causing an 
experimental effect. However, the science of emotion primes and inductions relies on the 
idea that experimental participants will seamlessly import the primed or induced emotion 
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into a second experimental situation, an assumption that may not hold for all emotions, 
especially cognitively rich emotions, such as self-conscious emotions. Self-conscious 
emotion primes and inductions inevitably conjure up thoughts of identity and values that 
may introduce error into the study and even compete with the subject under study. These 
potential problems are of particular concern with respect to open-ended inductions, like 
those in Chapter 6, in which participants draw on a wide variety of experiences. It may be 
for these reasons that the Chapter 6 inductions were not tremendously successful. 
In sum, whereas emotion primes and inductions may be the gold standard in 
experimental tests of the effects of more basic emotions, they may be less effective with 
respect to the more cognitively rich social and self-conscious emotions. The effects of 
such emotions are inevitably quite context dependent and, therefore, it is possible that we 
will test them with greater success by evoking them within a relevant context. 
How might we better test the effects of pride, embarrassment, and shame within 
the context of Social-Emotional Influence Theory in the future? Experimentally arousing 
these emotions via more natural influence situations may be the best direction in which to 
head. For example, we might imagine a two-by-two experiment in which confederates 
exert some social influence (e.g., exhort the importance of voting) and then increase that 
social influence via explicit emotional pressure (e.g., mildly derogating those who refuse 
to vote). One could verify that emotions, as opposed to accompanying cognitive 
reactions, were causing influence by measuring both the self-conscious emotional 
reactions and the cognitive reactions of participants and then employing statistical 
mediation tests (e.g., see Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Such an experiment would 
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have the added advantage of demonstrating that pride and shame naturally arise and vary 
in response to social influence situations. 
 
Stones Left Unturned 
In seeking to build a new theory of influence from the ground up, I left a number of 
complications unaddressed as I described and tested the nuts and bolts of that theory. It is 
my belief that further refinements of Social-Emotional Influence Theory are necessary, 
and it is my intention to make such refinements a part of future work. 
 First and foremost, the theoretical and empirical work carried out thus far limits 
our attention to what occurs inside an identity group in isolation from others. What do we 
make of the fact that citizens are embedded in multiple identity groups simultaneously? 
We might extrapolate the version of Social-Emotional Influence Theory described herein 
to make predictions about the effects of multiple groups impinging on each citizen’s 
values. Citizens’ identifications with multiple identity groups helps to explain why 
perfect value conformity within any given group is impossible. A person who belongs to 
two or more groups with competing values can conform only to one. To which group will 
the individual conform? We might expect that subjective identification and self-conscious 
emotions are key not only to explaining influence in general but to explaining the results 
of competition between groups for influence. Whichever group can generate the most 
loyalty among its members and/or make salient members’ sense of pride, embarrassment, 
and shame will succeed in generating the greatest amount of value conformity. At the 
same time, multiple group memberships place limits on the extent to which groups can 
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emotionally pressure deviating members to conform. A group that shames deviant 
members ceaselessly will be in danger of losing those members to competing groups. 
 Second, there is the important question of whether positive and negative self-
conscious emotions operate exactly in parallel as I suggest they do. For example, perhaps 
pride is the weaker causal force. Not only did pride fail to cause influence in Chapter 6, 
but the pride and embarrassment primes in Chapter 5 led to somewhat lopsided results as 
well, with embarrassment creating the most influence. In addition to differences with 
respect to relative strength, are there more qualitative differences among these emotions 
that we ought to consider? For example, could it be that higher status individuals are 
more able to resist group influence in any given instance because they have a reserve of 
pride to draw on? One might imagine that influential group members or leaders may 
move past social influence to become confident trend setters. On the other end of the 
social hierarchy, what about individuals who are in danger of experiencing an excess of 
shame due to low social status? Such individuals might be greater champions of group 
value conformity because of a greater need for self-pride. 
 A third path of inquiry leads to another source of variable effects: inter-individual 
differences. There is a long tradition in the social sciences of studying conforming and 
nonconforming personalities. Such research is often carried out under the heading of 
authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Altemeyer 
1996; Feldman 2003a; Stenner 2005). Might it be the case that a “conforming 
personality” stems in part from a tendency to experience higher levels of pride, 
embarrassment, or shame in response to social influence situations? 
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 Fourth, and finally, the theory of influence described in this dissertation has left 
out a discussion of what drives influence at the individual level: the approval, or 
admiration, and disapproval, or contempt, of one’s peers. While there is little doubt that 
such admiration and contempt is real and generates the pride and shame reactions that are 
an essential part of social-emotional influence, we know little about why such judgments 
occur. Can Social-Emotional Influence Theory help to explain why group members tend 
to view value conformists with admiration and value deviants with contempt? It may be 
the case that the link that is created in the individual’s mind between pride and group 
values, and shame and group disvalues not only cause her to conform but also cause her 
to judge others positively or negatively accordingly. Once pride is associated with a 
particular value in an individual’s mind, we might expect that that individual will judge 
others as worthy of pride and admiration when they express or embody said value. And 
once shame is associated with a particular disvalue in an individual’s mind, we might 
likewise expect that that individual will judge others as worthy of shame and contempt 
should they come to express or somehow embody group disvalues. 
In short, I am suggesting that social-emotional influence is part of a larger, 
endogenous system of value-based prejudice and conformity. Individuals learn from 
other group members to associate pride with group values and shame with group 
disvalues. Once that mental association is made, individuals not only conform 
themselves, but they also actively pressure other group members to conform. And so the 
cycle perpetuates itself. Such an expanded theory again emphasizes the importance of 
intra-group phenomena. Not only does prejudice take place within group boundaries (as 
well as across them), but also value conformity within group boundaries can inspire out-
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group prejudice. As Sumner writes in his description of ethnocentrism: “Each group 
nourishes its own pride and vanity…and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group 
thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have 
other folkways, these excite its scorn” ([1907] 2002, 13). 
 
Normative Implications 
Before we end our discussion of social-emotional influence, it bears asking whether the 
phenomenon represents a positive or negative aspect of social and political life. Perhaps 
the most notable aspect of social-emotional influence is its role in generating shared 
norms and values within groups. Accordingly, it is from this aspect that most of the 
advantages and disadvantages of social-emotional influence stem. 
 First, norms and values are of tremendous value to overall group success. As 
Elster (who focuses on social norms) argues: 
 
There is no question that these norms serve an ulterior 
purpose. Even if on any given occasion they may work 
against the general interest, these cases are infrequent. On 
the whole, they are immensely beneficial. Civilization as 
we know it would not exist without them (1989a, 117). 
 
A shared set of norms and values encourages group members to strive toward the same 
set of goals, enabling coordination of their actions and preventing discord. 
 Societies with strong shared norms and values can flourish even without 
organized and codified governmental structures, as Miller (1990) describes in his work 
on the Icelandic Sagas. And where systems of law are built on shared values, those laws 
will be imbued with greater legitimacy by the public. As Tocqueville writes, “Laws are 
 171 
always shaky unless they are supported by mores. Mores are the only robust and durable 
power in any nation” ([1835] 2004, 315). Rousseau goes so far as to argue in On Social 
Contract that morals and customs represent a distinct type of law in and of themselves. 
These laws are “engraved…in the hearts of citizens” and form the true constitution of the 
state “upon which the success of all the other laws depends” ([1762] 1988, 118).108 
 Because shared norms and values are enforced informally through social-
emotional influence, laws based on them will be more likely to be followed when narrow 
self-interest argues in favor of breaking them (whether due to the power of a given 
individual or organization or the absence of external sanctions). In the American context, 
consider that the President and Congress, as well as the legal community, respect and 
follow the decisions of the Supreme Court despite the fact that the Court on its own 
wields no financial or military might. Or consider that our most powerful elected officials 
voluntarily leave office when they lose an election, as do our generals when they are 
asked to retire. In other words, our strong embrace of our Constitution and democratic 
institutions helps to ensure a smoothly functioning government. 
Further, most ordinary citizens abide by the law regardless of the presence or 
absence of law enforcement officials or potential witnesses. We generally do not take 
what is not ours and restrain our violent impulses; we recycle, wait patiently in lines, and 
pull over to the side of the road when we hear an ambulance siren blaring in the distance. 
Such cooperative actions would be far less likely without a sense of pride and shame. 
                                                 
108 Of course, laws imposed on a populace with a conflicting set of values leaves individuals in the 
population in an unhappy condition. They must either follow the law and experience the shame of value 
deviance, or remain in good standing with the group while risking state sanction. Resistance among 
nineteenth century southern whites to Reconstruction can be viewed through this lens, as can current-day 
resistance among some Mormon fundamentalists to laws against polygamy. 
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Without these emotions, our political choices would border on the Hobbesian: either a 
war of all against all or a pact among all to submit to a military dictatorship. 
 While social-emotional influence may be essential to group cooperation, it can 
cause great harm as well. Its greatest harm is inevitably tied up with its greatest benefit: 
Social-emotional influence imbues shared norms and values within a group with a sense 
of subjective validity, i.e., right or truth. As Sumner writes, “[M]ores have the authority 
of facts” ([1907] 2002, 76). This leads to two main problems: value-based prejudice and 
value inertia within the group. 
 We have already touched on value-based prejudice. Holding a value implies that 
one knows how others (and oneself) ought to behave. When others obviously flout our 
values, we are likely to feel disapproval and contempt. Expression of these emotions may 
range from a raised eyebrow to ostracism or even violence. Those who feel contemptuous 
will always feel as though the value offender “deserves what he or she got,” but whether 
or not that is actually the case is difficult to judge. Furthermore, because social-emotional 
influence causes groups to coalesce around distinct sets of shared norms and values, it 
vastly increases the occurrence of value-based prejudice across group boundaries. 
 A second problem is that social-emotional influence tends to maintain over time 
whatever values are adhered to by a majority of individuals within a group. 
Unfortunately, norms and values sometimes develop that direct action toward an end that 
is harmful to subgroups within a society, or even to the entire society itself. Once such 
values have become entrenched, the mechanisms of social-emotional influence can make 
them difficult to undo. Those who criticize a group’s dominant values are likely to be 
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viewed with suspicion and contempt, making it unlikely that such criticism will be 
considered and discouraging further criticism. 
 This scenario in many ways resembles the “tyranny of the majority” Mill so 
worried about in On Liberty: “[T]here needs protection…against the tyranny of 
prevailing opinion and feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means 
than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent 
from them” ([1859] 1980, 63). Mill wished not only to defend the freedom of the 
individual for his or her own sake; he also argued that liberty of opinion and modes of 
living were necessary to understanding truth and making societal progress. Mill’s book 
On Liberty was, in and of itself, a project to persuade fellow citizens that they ought to 
value such liberty and reject social coercion: “The object of this essay is to assert one 
very simple principle….That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community…is to prevent harm to others” (68). 
 The good news with respect to both value-based prejudice and inertia in the 
American context is that Americans have self-consciously adopted two related values that 
counteract social-emotional influence: tolerance and individual autonomy. We are more 
likely than citizens of many cultures to follow the credo “live and let live,” especially 
where behavior does not harm others. We carve out space for dissenters. We often try to 
resist obvious attempts to influence us without reasoned argument. The result is not the 
eradication of social-emotional influence but a lessening of it and, therefore, of its effects, 
both good and bad. Of course, the irony here is that tolerance and freedom are themselves 
strongly held values that are likely maintained in part via social-emotional influence. 
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There are benefits and drawbacks of social-emotional influence to consider at the 
individual level as well. Social-emotional influence implies that citizens do not have a 
tremendous amount of control over the value formation process. Once they are embedded 
within a social group, some degree of value conformity is difficult to avoid. One reason 
for this lack of control is a lack of conscious awareness of group pressure acting on the 
individual. As Sumner argues, “We learn the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk 
and eat and breathe” ([1907] 2002, 77). A second reason for this lack of control is the 
combination of the automaticity and power of emotions. It is difficult to escape the 
feeling of pride when respected peers admire you, or to escape the feeling of 
embarrassment or shame when those same peers look askance at your behavior. I have 
argued that once these emotions occur, they become associated with relevant values and 
disvalues, marking them as subjectively valid and invalid. 
Such lack of control implies that one is likely to adopt at least some values that 
undermine one’s interests. In fact, this is the very point of social-emotional influence: to 
give group members a reason to ignore their selfish or idiosyncratic desires in favor of 
group conventions. Consider the working class guy whose peers are economically 
conservative and who champions low tax rates for the wealthy as a result, or the gay man 
who has been socialized by his family to feel ashamed of homosexual sex, or the woman 
who has internalized conservative religious ideals that mandate the wearing of 
cumbersome clothing. At the individual level, our power over our own values rests to a 
significant extent in choosing with whom to associate. These are choices we should make 
carefully. Of course, where individuals do not have the power to associate with whom 
they choose, personal autonomy is limited even further. 
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But despite such problems, we should not consider social-emotional influence to 
be only burdensome at the individual level. Pride is, in and of itself, a pleasant reward of 
group life. Recent evidence suggests that perceiving social acceptance and social status 
stimulate the same reward centers in the brain that monetary awards stimulate (Saxe and 
Haushofer 2008). More important, while embarrassment and shame may be 
uncomfortable emotions, they, along with pride, help to better knit us into the cooperative 
social groups we value for both our personal happiness and survival by efficiently 
ensuring that we are respected by peers. It is likely for this reason that these emotions 




Abramowitz, Alan I. 1997. “The Cultural Divide in American Politics: Moral Issues and 
Presidential Voting.” In Understanding Public Opinion, eds. Barbara Norrander and 
Clyde Wilcox. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Abrams, Dominic, Margaret Wetherell, Sandra Cochrane, Michael A. Hogg, and John C. 
Turner. 1990. “Knowing What to Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-
categorization and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group 
Polarization.” British Journal of Social Psychology 29 (June): 97-119. 
 
Adorno, T.W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. 
The Authoritarian Personality. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers. 
 
Alford, John R., Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. “Are Political Orientations 
Genetically Transmitted?” American Political Science Review 99 (May): 153-167. 
 
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. 1965. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. Boston, MA: Little, Brown. 
 
Altemeyer, Bob. 1996. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Alvarez, R. Michael and John Brehm. 1995. “American Ambivalence Towards Abortion 
Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values.” 
American Journal of Political Science 39 (November): 1055-1082. 
 
Alwin, Duane F., Ronald L. Cohen, and Theodore M. Newcomb. 1991. Political 
Attitudes over the Lifespan: The Bennington Women after Fifty Years. Madison, WI: 
The University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Asch, Solomon E. 1951. “Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and 
Distortion of Judgments.” In Groups, Leadership, and Men: Research in Human 
Relations, ed. Harold Guetzkow. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. 
 
Back, Kurt W. 1951. “Influence through Social Communication.” Journal of Abnormal & 
Social Psychology 46 (January): 9-23. 
 
Bandura, Albert. 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Bargh, John A. and Tanya L. Chartrand. 1999. “The Unbearable Automaticity of Being.” 
American Psychologist 54 (7): 462-479. 
 
Barker, David C. and Christopher Jan Carman. 2000. “The Spirit of Capitalism? 
Religious Doctrine, Values, and Economic Attitude Constructs.” Political Behavior 
22 (March): 1-27. 
 177 
Barrett, Karen Caplovitz. 1995. “A Functionalist Approach to Shame and Guilt.” In Self-
Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride, 
eds. June Price Tangney and Kurt W. Fischer. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
Bartels, Larry M. 1985. “Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominating 
Campaigns.” The American Political Science Review 79 (September): 804-815. 
 
———. 1987. “Candidate Choice and the Dynamics of the Presidential Nominating 
Process.” American Journal of Political Science 31 (February): 1-30. 
 
———. 2006. “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?” Quarterly 
Journal of Political Science 1: 201–226. 
 
Bengtson, Vern L., Timothy J. Biblarz, and Robert E.L. Roberts. 2002. How Families 
Still Matter: A Longitudinal Study of Youth in Two Generations. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. Voting: A Study 
of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Berinsky, Adam J. and Tali Mendelberg. 2005. “The Indirect Effects of Discredited 
Stereotypes in Judgments of Jewish Leaders.” American Journal of Political Science 
49 (October): 845-864. 
 
Bowers, Jake. 1995. “NES Pilot Study Efforts to Measure Values and Predispositions.” 
American National Election Study Technical Report #18. 
 
Brader, Ted. 2006. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in 
Political Ads Work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Brader, Ted, Nicholas Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. “What Triggers Public 
Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat.” 
American Journal of Political Science 52 (October): 959-978. 
 
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Understanding 
Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political Analysis 14 (Winter): 
63-82. 
 
Brewer, Mark D. and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. 2007. Split: Class and Cultural Divides in 
American Politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
 
Brewer, Paul R. 2001. “Value Words and Lizard Brains: Do Citizens Deliberate About 
Appeals to Their Core Values?” Political Psychology 22 (March): 45-64. 
 
 178 
Brown, Rupert. 2000. Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell. 
 
Burke, Edmund. [1790] 1953. Reflections on the French Revolution. New York, NY: 
Dutton & Co. 
 
Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. 
The American Voter: Unabridged Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Caprara, Gian Vittorio, Shalom Schwartz, Cristina Capanna, Michele Vecchione, and 
Claudio Barbaranelli. 2006. “Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political 
Choice.” Political Psychology 27 (February): 1-28. 
 
Carlson, Michael and Norman Miller. 1987. “Explanation of the Relation Between 
Negative Mood and Helping.” Psychological Bulletin 102 (July): 91-108. 
 
Carr, Deborah. 2002. “The Psychological Consequences of Work-Family Trade-Offs for 
Three Cohorts of Men and Women.” Social Psychology Quarterly 65 (June): 103-
124. 
 
Chong, Dennis. 2000. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Christakis, Nicholas A. and James H. Fowler. 2007. “The Spread of Obesity in a Large 
Social Network over 32 Years.” The New England Journal of Medicine 357: 370-379. 
 
Citrin, Jack, David O. Sears, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 2001. 
“Multiculturalism in American Public Opinion.” British Journal of Political Science 
31 (April): 247-275. 
 
Clark, Russell D. and Anne Maass. 1988. “The Role of Social Categorization and 
Perceived Source Credibility in Minority Influence.” European Journal of Social 
Psychology 18 (Oct./Nov.): 381-394. 
 
Cohen, Steven M. and Charles S. Liebman. 1997. “American Jewish Liberalism: 
Unraveling the Strands.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, 61 (Autumn): 405-430. 
 
Conover, Pamela Johnston and Virginia Sapiro. 1993. “Gender, Feminist Consciousness, 
and War.” American Journal of Political Science 37 (November): 1079-1099. 
 
Converse, Philip E. 1964. “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology 
and Discontent, ed. David Apter. London, U.K.: Free Press of Glencoe. 
 
Converse, Jean M. and Stanley Presser. 1986. Survey Questions: Handcrafting the 
Standardized Questionnaire. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
 179 
Cooley, Charles Horton. [1922] 2006. Human Nature and the Social Order. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
 
Damasio, Antonio. 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. 
New York, NY: Penguin Books. 
 
D’Antonio, William V. 2007. American Catholics Today: New Realities of Their Faith 
and Their Church. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Dawkins, Richard. 1976. The Selfish Gene. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Deutsch, Morton and Harold B. Gerard. [1955] 1965. “A Study of Normative and 
Informational Social Influences upon Individual Judgment.” In Basic Studies in 
Social Psychology, eds. Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg. New York, NY: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
 
Dionne, E.J., Jr. 2006. “Polarized by God? American Politics and the Religious Divide.” 
In Red and Blue Nation? Volume One. Characteristics and Causes of America’s 
Polarized Politics, eds. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings / Hoover. 
 
Djupe, Paul A. and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2008. The Political Influence of Churches. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Easton, David and Jack Dennis. 1965. “The Child’s Image of Government.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 361, Political Socialization: Its 
Role in the Political Process (September): 40-57. 
 
———. 1967. “The Child’s Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy.” The 
American Political Science Review 61 (March): 25-38. 
 
Elias, Norbert. [1989] 1996. The Germans, ed. Michael Schröter and trans. Eric Dunning 
and Stephen Mennell. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. 
 
Elliot, Andrew J. and Patricia G. Devine. 1994. “On the Motivational Nature of Cognitive 
Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 67 (3): 382-394. 
 
Ellison, Christopher G. and Darren E. Sherkat. 1993. “Obedience and Autonomy: 
Religion and Parental Values Reconsidered.” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 32 (December): 313-329. 
 




———. 1989b. The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 1999. Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 2007. Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fein, Steven, George R. Goethals, and Matthew B. Kugler. 2007. “Social Influence on 
Political Judgments: The Case of Presidential Debates.” Political Psychology 28 
(April): 165–192. 
 
Feldman, Stanley. 1988. “Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core 
Beliefs and Values.” The American Journal of Political Science 32 (May): 416-440. 
 
———. 1999. “Economic Values and Inequality.” In Measures of Political Attitudes, 
eds. John P. Robinson, Phillip R. Shaver, and Lawrence S. Wrightsman. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press. 
 
———. 2003a. “Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism.” Political 
Psychology 24 (March): 41-74. 
 
———. 2003b. “Values, Ideology, and the Structure of Political Attitudes.” In Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert 
Jervis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Feldman, Stanley and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2001. “The Humanitarian Foundation of 
Public Support for Social Welfare.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (July): 
658-677. 
 
Festinger, Leon. 1950. “Informal Social Communication.” Psychological Review 57: 
271-282. 
 
———. 1957. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. 
 
Fiorina, Morris P. 2006. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (Second ed.). 
New York, NY: Pearson Longman. 
 
Fischhoff, Baruch, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Jennifer S. Lerner, and Deborah A. Small. 
2005. “Evolving Judgments of Terror Risks: Foresight, Hindsight, and Emotion.” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 11 (June): 124-139. 
 
Fiske, Susan T. 2004. Social Beings: A Core Motives Approach to Social Psychology. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
 181 
Fredrickson, Barbara L. 1998. “Cultivated Emotions: Parental Socialization of Positive 
Emotions and Self-Conscious Emotions.” Psychological Inquiry 9 (4): 279-281. 
 
Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social Pressure 
and Vote Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment.” American 
Political Science Review 102 (February): 19-31. 
 
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, NY: 
Anchor Books. 
 
Grant, J. Tobin and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2003. “Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the 
Issue of Campaign Finance.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (July): 453-
469. 
 
Gurin, Patricia and Aloen Townsend. 1986. “Properties of Gender Identity and Their 
Implications for Gender Consciousness.” British Journal of Social Psychology 25 
(June): 139-148. 
 
Hansen, Christine H. and Cynthia A. Shantz. 1995. “Emotion-specific Priming: 
Congruence Effects on Affect and Recognition Across Negative Emotions.” 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21 (June): 548-557. 
 
Hardin, Russell. 1995. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Hartz, Louis. 1955. The Liberal Tradition in America. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace. 
 
Herzog, Don. 1998. Poisoning the Minds of the Lower Orders. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Hobbes, Thomas. [1651] 1994. Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company. 
 
Hochschild, Jennifer L. 1981. What’s Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
 
Howe, Neil, William Strauss, and R.J. Matson. 2000. Millennials Rising: The Next Great 
Generation. New York, NY: Vintage Books. 
 
 182 
Huckfeldt, Robert, Paul E. Johnson, and John Sprague. 2004. Political Disagreement: 
The Survival of Diverse Opinions within Communication Networks. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Huckfeldt, Robert and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics, and Social 
Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, and Erin Cassese. 2007. “On the Distinct Political 
Effects of Anxiety and Anger.” In The Affect Effect: The Dynamics of Emotion in 
Political Thinking and Behavior, eds. Russell W. Neuman, George E. Marcus, 
Michael MacKuen, and Ann N. Crigler. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Huddy, Leonie and Nadia Khatib. 2007. “American Patriotism, National Identity, and 
Political Involvement.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (January): 63-77. 
 
Hume, David. [1739/1740] 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature, eds. David Fate Norton 
and Mary J. Norton. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hunter, James Davison. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York, 
NY: Basic Books. 
 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1981. American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
———. 2004. Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Inglehart, Ron. 1971. “The Silent Revolution in Europe.” The American Political Science 
Review 65 (December): 991-1017. 
 
Inglehart, Ron and Wayne Baker. 2000. “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the 
Persistence of Traditional Values.” American Sociological Review 65 (February): 19-
51. 
 
Jacoby, William G. 2006. “Value Choices and American Public Opinion.” American 
Journal of Political Science 50 (July): 706-723. 
 
Jennings, M. Kent and Richard Niemi. 1981. Generations and Politics: A Panel Study of 
Young Adults and Their Parents. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. 2007. “Politics Across Generations: 
Family Transmission Reexamined.” ms. 
 
Katz, Elihu and Paul F. Lazarsfeld. 1955. Personal Influence: The Part Played by People 
in the Flow of Mass Communications. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
 183 
Kaufmann, Karen M. and John R. Petrocik. 1999. “The Changing Politics of American 
Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap.” American Journal of Political 
Science 43 (July): 864-887. 
 
Kelley, Harold H. 1955. “Salience of Membership and Resistance to Change of Group-
Anchored Attitudes.” Human Relations 8: 275-289. 
 
Kinder, Donald R. and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. “Individualism Reconsidered: Principles 
and Prejudice in Contemporary American Opinion.” In Racialized Politics: The 
Debate about Racism in America, eds. David O. Sears, Jim Sidanius, and Lawrence 
Bobo. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and 
Democratic Ideals. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kinder, Donald R. and David O. Sears. 1985. “Public Opinion and Political Actions.” In 
The Handbook of Social Psychology, eds. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson. New 
York, NY: Random House. 
 
Kluckhohn, Clyde. 1951. “Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action.” In 
Toward a General Theory of Action, eds. T. Parsons and E. A. Shils. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Kluegel, James R. and Eliot R. Smith. 1986. Beliefs about Inequality: Americans’ Views 
of What Is and What Ought to Be. New York, NY: Aldine de Gruyter. 
 
Kohut, Andrew, John C. Green, Scott Keeter, and Robert C. Toth. 2000. The Diminishing 
Divide: Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics. Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings. 
 
Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Wyer, 
Jr. 1991. “The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments.” 
American Journal of Political Science 35 (February): 1-27. 
 
Langer, Gary and Jon Cohen. 2005. “Voters and Values in the 2004 Election.” Public 
Opinion Quarterly 69 (Special Issue): 744-759. 
 
Layman, Geoffrey and Thomas M. Carsey. 1998. “Why Do Party Activists Convert? An 
Analysis of Individual-Level Change on the Abortion Issue.” Political Research 
Quarterly 51 (3): 723-749. 
 
Lazarus, Richard S. 1991. Emotion and Adaptation. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
LeDoux, Joseph. 1996. The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of 
Emotional Life. New York, NY: Touchstone. 
 184 
Leege, David C. 2001. “Religion and Politics (United States).” In International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, eds. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. 
Baltes. New York, NY: Elsevier. 
 
Leege, David C., Kenneth D. Wald, Brian S. Krueger, and Paul D. Mueller. 2002. The 
Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in 
the Post-New Deal Period. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Lerner, Jennifer S., Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small, and Baruch Fischhoff. 
2003. “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field 
Experiment.” Psychological Science 14 (March): 144-150. 
 
Lerner, Jennifer S., Deborah Small, and George Loewenstein. 2004. “Heart Strings and 
Purse Strings: Carryover Effects of Emotions on Economic Decisions.” Psychological 
Science 15 (May): 337-341. 
 
LeVine, Robert A. and Donald T. Campbell. 1972. Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, 
Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Lewis, Michael. 2000. “Self-conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, and 
Guilt.” In Handbook of Emotions (Second ed.), eds. Michael Lewis and Jeannette M. 
Haviland-Jones. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. The First New Nation: The United States in Historical 
and Comparative Perspective. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
MacKinnon, David P., Amanda J. Fairchild, and Matthew S. Fritz. 2007. “Mediation 
Analysis.” Annual Review of Psychology 58: 593-614. 
 
Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. Affective 
Intelligence and Political Judgment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Markus, Greg. 2001. “American Individualism Reconsidered.” In Citizens and Politics: 
Perspectives from Political Psychology, ed. James H. Kuklinski. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mascolo, Michael F. and Kurt W. Fischer. 1995. “Developmental Transformations in 
Appraisals for Pride, Shame, and Guilt.” In Self-Conscious Emotions: The 
Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride, eds. June Price Tangney and 
Kurt W. Fischer. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
Matz, David C. and Wendy Wood. 2005. “Cognitive Dissonance in Groups: The 




McClosky, Herbert and John Zaller. 1984. The American Ethos. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
McConkey, Dale. 2001. “Whither Hunter’s Culture War? Shifts in Evangelical Morality, 
1988-1998.” Sociology of Religion 62 (Summer): 149-174. 
 
McNair, Maurice Lorr and Leo F. Droppleman. 1971. Profile of Mood States. San Diego, 
CA: Educational and Industrial Testing Service. 
 
Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the 
Norm of Equality. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Meyer, Peter. 2007. “Can Catholic Schools Be Saved?” Education Next 7 (Spring). 
 
Milgram, Stanley. 1992. The Individual in a Social World: Essays and Experiments 
(Second ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
 
Mill, J.S. [1859] 1980. On Liberty. New York, NY: Penguin Books. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Miller, William Ian. 1990. Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in 
Saga Iceland. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
———. 1993. Humiliation. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
———. 1997. The Anatomy of Disgust. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Moskalenko, Sophia, Clark McCauley, and Paul Rozin. 2006. “Group Identification 
Under Conditions of Threat: College Students’ Attachment to Country, Family, 
Ethnicity, Religion, and University Before and After September 11, 2001.” Political 
Psychology 27 (February): 77-97. 
 
Mulligan, Kenneth. 2008. “The ‘Myth’ of Moral Values Voting in the 2004 Presidential 
Election.” PS: Political Science & Politics 41 (January): 109-114. 
 
Mutz, Diana C. 1998. Impersonal Influence: How Perceptions of Mass Collectives Affect 
Political Attitudes. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 2006. Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Myrdal, Gunnar. [1944] 1964. An American Dilemma. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
 
 186 
Nagourney, Adam and Megan Thee. 2007. “Young Americans Are Leaning Left, New 
Poll Finds.” New York Times, June 27. 
 
Newcomb, Theodore. 1963. “Persistence and Regression of Changed Attitudes: Long-
Range Studies.”  Journal of Social Issues 19 (4): 3-14. 
 
Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. “Media Framing of a 
Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.” American Political Science 
Review 91 (September): 567-583. 
 
Nickerson, David W. 2008. “Is Voting Contagious? Evidence from Two Field 
Experiments.” American Political Science Review 102 (February): 49-57. 
 
Noelle-Neuman, Elizabeth. 1993. The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion – Our Social 
Skin (Second ed.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2001. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
———. 2004. Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
O’Keefe, Daniel J. 1990. Persuasion: Theory and Research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Parker, Suzanne L., Glenn R. Parker, and James A. McCann. 2008. “Opinion Taking 
within Friendship Networks.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (April): 412-
420. 
 
Peffley, Mark, Pia Knigge, and Jon Hurwitz. 2001. “A Multiple Values Model of 
Political Tolerance.” Political Research Quarterly 54 (June): 379-406. 
 
Pei, Minxin. 2003. “The Paradoxes of American Nationalism.” Foreign Policy 136 
(May/June): 30-37. 
 
Peltola, Pia, Melissa A. Milkie, and Stanley Presser. 2004. “The ‘Feminist’ Mystique: 
Feminist Identity in Three Generations of Women.” Gender and Society 18 
(February): 122-144. 
 
Petty, Richard E. and John T. Cacioppo. 1986. “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion.” Advances in Experimental Psychology 19: 124-205. 
 
Pew Research Center. 2008. “A Portrait of American Catholics on the Eve of Pope 
Benedict’s Visit.” Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center Publications. 
 
 187 
Prendergast, William B. 1999. The Catholic Voter in American Politics: The Passing of 
the Democratic Monolith. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Prothro, James W. and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. “Fundamental Principles of Democracy: 
Bases of Agreement and Disagreement.” The Journal of Politics 22 (May): 276-294. 
 
Putnam, Robert D. 1994. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Rescher, Nicholas. [1969] 1982. Introduction to Value Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
 
Richerson, Peter J. and Robert Boyd. 2005. Not by Genes Alone: How Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
 
Rokeach, Milton. 1973. The Nature of Human Values. New York, NY: The Free Press. 
 
Rosenstone, Steven J. and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and 
Democracy in America. New York, NY: MacMillan. 
 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [1762] 1988. “On Social Contract.” In Rousseau’s Political 
Writings, eds. Alan Ritter and Julia Conaway Bondanella and trans. Julia Conaway 
Bondanella. New York, NY: W.W. Norton. 
 
Sapiro, Virginia. 2003. “Theorizing Gender in Political Psychology Research.” In Oxford 
Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert 
Jervis. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
 
Saxe, Rebecca and Johannes Haushofer. 2008. “For Love or Money: A Common Neural 
Currency for Social and Monetary Reward.” Neuron 58: 164-165. 
 
Saxonhouse, Arlene. 2005. Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens. Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Scheff, Thomas. 1988. “Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System.” 
American Sociological Review 53 (June): 395-406. 
 
Schuman, Howard. 2006. “Letter to the Editor.” Public Opinion Quarterly 70 (Fall): 413-
415. 
 
Schwartz, Shalom H. 1992. “Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: 
Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries.” Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65. 
 
 188 
Sears, David O. 1993. “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory.” In 
Explorations in Political Psychology, eds. Shanto Iyengar and William J. McGuire. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Sears, David O. and Sheri Levy. 2003. “Childhood and Adult Political Development.” In 
Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and 
Robert Jervis. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sears, David and Nicholas A. Valentino. 1997. “Politics Matters: Political Events as 
Catalysts for Preadult Socialization.” American Political Science Review 91 (March): 
45-65. 
 
Shapiro, Robert Y. and Harpreet Mahajan. 1986. “Gender Differences in Policy 
Preferences: A Summary of Trends From the 1960s to the 1980s.” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly 50 (Spring): 42-61. 
 
Sherif, Muzafer. [1936] 1966. The Psychology of Social Norms. New York, NY: Harper 
& Row. 
 
Sigel, Roberta. 1989. Political Learning in Adulthood: A Sourcebook of Theory and 
Research. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Small, Deborah A. and Jennifer S. Lerner. 2005. “Emotional Policy: Personal Sadness 
and Anger Shape Judgments about a Welfare Case.” Political Psychology 29 (April): 
149-168. 
 
Small, Deborah A., Jennifer S. Lerner, and Baruch Fischhoff. 2006. “Emotion Priming 
and Attributions for Terrorism: Americans' Reactions in a National Field 
Experiment.” Political Psychology 27 (April): 289-298. 
 
Small, Deborah A., George Loewenstein, and Paul Slovic. 2007. “Sympathy and 
Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and 
Statistical Victims.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102: 
143-153. 
 
Smith, Adam. [1759] 2002. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. 
Macfie. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
 
Smith, Rogers M. 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 
Smith, Tom W. and Lars Jarkko. 1998. National Pride: A Cross-national Analysis. GSS 
Cross-national Report No. 19. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center / 
University of Chicago. 
 
 189 
Sniderman, Paul M. and Edward G. Carmines. 1997. Reaching Beyond Race. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Sniderman, Paul M. and Thomas Piazza. 1993. The Scar of Race. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Stoker, Laura. 1992. “Interests and Ethics in Politics.” The American Political Science 
Review 86 (June): 369-380. 
 
———. 2001. “Political Value Judgments.” In Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from 
Political Psychology, ed. James H. Kuklinski. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings. 2005. “Political Similarity and Influence between 
Husbands and Wives.” In The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as 
Contexts for Political Behavior, ed. Alan S. Zuckerman. Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press. 
 
Suhay, Elizabeth, Nathan Kalmoe, and Christa McDermott. 2007. “Why Twin Studies 
Are Problematic for the Study of Political Ideology: Rethinking Are Political 
Orientations Genetically Transmitted?” ms. 
 
Sumner, William Graham. [1907] 2002. Folkways: A Study of Mores, Manners, Customs 
and Morals. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications. 
 
Tajfel, Henri and John C. Turner. [1986] 2004. “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup 
Behavior.” In Political Psychology: Key Readings, eds. John T. Jost and Jim 
Sidanius. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis Books. 
 
Tangney, June Price and Kurt W. Fischer, eds. 1995. Self-Conscious Emotions: The 
Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and Pride. New York, NY: The 
Guilford Press. 
 
Tetlock, Philip E. 2000. “Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and 
Political Implications.” In Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of 
Rationality, eds. Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Tetlock, Philip E., Randall S. Peterson, and Jennifer S. Lerner. 1996. “Revising the Value 
Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates.” In The 
Psychology of Values: The Ontario Symposium, Vol. 8, eds. Clive Seligman, James 
M. Olson, and Mark P. Zanna. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
 190 
de Tocqueville, Alexis. [1835/1840] 2004. Democracy in America, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer. New York, NY: The Library of America. 
 
Transue, John E. 2007. “Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy 
Attitudes: American National Identity as a Uniting Force.” American Journal of 
Political Science 51 (January): 78-91. 
 
Turner, John C. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. 
New York, NY: Blackwell. 
 
———. 1991. Social Influence. Bristol, PA: Open University Press. 
 
Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings, Antoine J. Banks, and Anne K. Davis. 
2008. “Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen? Emotions, Political Information Seeking 
and Learning via the Internet.” Political Psychology 29 (April): 247-273. 
 
Valentino, Nicholas, Vincent Hutchings, Krysha Gregorowicz, Eric Groenendyk, and Ted 
Brader. 2006. “Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: Fear, Anger, and Political 
Participation.” Paper presented at the 2006 American Political Science Association 
Annual Conference. 
 
Verba, Sidney and Gary R. Orren. 1985. Equality in America: The View from the Top. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Vitello, Paul. 2008. “After Ground Zero Prayer, Pope Ministers to 60,000 in Stadium.” 
The New York Times. April 21. 
 
Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr. “Churches as Political 
Communities.” 1988. The American Political Science Review 82 (June): 531-548. 
 
Walsh, Katherine Cramer. 2004. Talking about Politics: Informal Groups and Social 
Identity in American Life. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
 
Weber, Max. [1930] 1992. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York, 
NY: Routledge. 
 
White, John Kenneth. 2003. The Values Divide: American Politics and Culture in 
Transition. New York, NY: Chatham House Publishers. 
 
Winkielman, Piotr, Robert B. Zajonc, and Norbert Schwarz. 1997. “Subliminal Affective 
Priming Resists Attributional Interventions.” Cognition and Emotion 11 (July): 433-
465. 
 
Wolfe, Alan. 2006. “Myths and Realities of Religion in Politics. Comment.” In Red and 
Blue Nation? Volume One. Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized 
 191 
Politics, eds. Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady. Washington, D.C.: Brookings / 
Hoover. 
 
Wood, Wendy, Gregory J. Pool, Kira Leck, and Daniel Purvis. 1996. “Self-definition, 
Defensive Processing, and Influence: The Normative Impact of Majority and 
Minority Groups.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 71 (December): 
1181-1193. 
 
Zajonc, Robert B. 1980. “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences.” 
American Psychologist 35 (February): 151-175. 
 
Zuckerman, Alan S. 2005. “Returning to the Social Logic of Political Behavior.” In The 
Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior, ed. 
Alan S. Zuckerman. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
